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

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Communism - Br.

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FORM 40Oia

Date 11/24

To: Col Buxton

For information.

Please return for holding with papers for Gen. Donovan.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Lt. Colonel Doering

DATE: 11/19/43

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT:

The attached is an original copy of an original letter received by me.

This follows General Donovan's order to [redacted] that we give the Signal Corps every assistance for G-2 in the development of equipment similar to our own special sets for their purposes.

It may be of interest to General Donovan.

SECRET

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Date 28 Oct 43

To: Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson

Re: Your memorandum to General Donovan "OW/T Sets for SI London" dated 12 Oct. 1943.

General Donovan made the following comment to the subject memorandum:

"I approve the principle but I am not in a position to say whether there should be 350 available. You can tell Colonel Lowman that provision should be made for producing in a great quantity. The number we can decide only by talking with Colonel Lowman."

E.J.P., Jr.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan DATE: 13 October 1943

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: W/T Sets for SI London

SECRET

1. Major Maddox wrote me under date of 4 October, 1943 in regard to the necessity of securing a considerable number of W/T sets as soon as possible.

2. Major Maddox has already requested Communications through Commander Grayson in London to make available a total of 450 sets, of which 100 will be used for SI, and the balance will be given to affiliated underground services to strengthen our bargaining position with them.

3. Major Maddox points out that we will be greatly assisted in the speedy establishment of our own services on the Continent if we secure help from friendly intelligence services. Making available to our Allies a number of W/T sets will undoubtedly be decisive in establishing favorable conditions for us.

4. If you approve Major Maddox' request, may I suggest that you so indicate in a communication to Lt. Col. Lowman.

5. For this purpose I have prepared a letter addressed to Colonel Lowman indicating your approval.

W.H.S.

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Lt. Col. L. W. Lowman

DATE 12 October 1943

FROM: William J. Donovan, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: W/T Sets for SI London

1. I am advised that SI London has requisitioned 450 W/T Sets from Commander Graveson in London.

2. Since I approve this requisition, I will appreciate your making these sets available to SI London as rapidly as possible.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

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Major Willis 8/20/42

General Donovan

1. Thank you for your memo of August 25th, which I have read with care and with interest.

2. I was especially pleased to have your morning report as it enabled me to get a better view of just what your situation is.

3. I was interested in your tonnage movements and suggest a project of what our tonnage would be, having in mind the purposes to which they put by our partners in the various enterprises.

4. I am meeting Col. Smart tomorrow and will take up the Davidson question with him.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Major Willis

DATE: August 25, 1945

SUBJECT:

Supplementing the report which you asked for, I am including for your information a memorandum which I recently sent to the officers of the Communications Branch which will I think advise you of the current thinking that we are doing about our job and the underlying policies about it.

If you find us off base on this general approach I would appreciate your letting us know. I think you may also be interested in a current morning report on C Camp activities as well as a chart on shipments of total tonnage to the various theaters.

I am sending these to you rather than take up your time to discuss anything which is not of immediate and pressing importance.

Jack

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Officers of the Communications Branch

Major Willis

August 23, 1943

Raising Our Sights on Equipment and Manpower

On several occasions recently I have discussed generally the job the Communications Branch is faced with. I believe most of you agree. Following Mr. Shapiro's discussion with us the other day I am more than ever convinced and believe that all of you are equally certain that a radical change in the overall thinking has to be done by all of us, the peanut whistle won't do when a few hours is needed. The shipping of 6 or 8 agent suits and 4 or 5 men to a theater may and then is simply not good enough. We must get off the single track onto the double track if we are to do a bang up job without which the in the field can't function. The whole picture in the theaters is accelerating too fast to allow us any lag or ah ah at all. It's a matter of doing it whether we think we can or not.

To affect this I want to see the following steps taken immediately:

EQUIPMENT

1. On all the major items in the greatest demand by the theaters I would like to see additional sources of supply immediately set up and the orders where necessary doubled.

2. The manufacturers speeded up on deliveries until they are at least double or triple whatwe are getting from some of them per month.

3. Continued pressure in an effort to boost our priority ratings until we are up where we can assist the manufacturer on much quicker deliveries. I will do all possible to supplement this with the higher echelon of OSS.

4. Vitally needed things brought out of the research and development stage into production as rapidly as possible even if the final vital improvements have to be continued while production is being established on an article that will work and do a job, even though it isn't the perfect job that we will be able to do for them weeks or months later by continued research.

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2. Considerably increased supplies ordered for base station equipment and mobile units. I would like to see us purchase a flush of general utility Army trailers which should be transmissively useful in any field operations. They can carry men, building, radio equipment or whatever seems the most vital to load them up with. (I would like to discuss this with Colonel Shore, Commander Simpson and Major Perry at the first opportunity.)

TRAINING AND RESPONSE

1. While Colonel Hong and the Faculty Board will now be in charge of all training, I believe in thinking of this we must envision the opening up of another camp, additional recruiting drives and getting highest types of men and officers possible, in the shortest space of time.

2. Ninety per cent of our thinking should be on men with specific training such as technical men, instructors, operators, mechanics, code clerks, etc. rather than along general contact liaison or administrative qualities.

3. I don't want to see any man shipped to any theater area who won't be able to assume the full load of necessary work of a constructive and valuable nature when he gets there. Shipping space is too valuable, transportation in the field too sparse and there is no room to feed or house any but real doers.

4. Our training establishments in the theaters must be pushed with real vigor with the thought constantly in mind to ultimately decrease the size of G Camp both in men and equipment until it is almost negligible and put our activities in the field areas with just as good instructors to operate them. I believe the other operations groups will concentrate more and more on the field training of their men which will also relieve the pressure which is now being put upon us.

5. I believe that we should have in mind for training in 1948 and the very early months of '49 about 600 communications operators and technicians for base stations and mobile unit trucks. This is wholly aside from the training of agent operators or [illegible] men.

6. Whenever possible in shipments to the Middle East or Far East I would like to see us obtain air priority with an overage on baggage where possible so that as much equipment [illegible] always be sent with the officers and men as they can [illegible] or the air people will give them the right to take.

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7. As our training facilities in the field improve and equipment and instructors get out there, we will have to use greater and greater courage in taking our own men out of [illegible] Camp and sending them into the field for the final polishing up. I am now speaking chiefly about the Far East area where it takes so long to get men out and because our other bases will be used mostly for training [illegible] operators in the field; but it applies in general to all areas.

SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING

1. Our inventories of stocks on hand must be constantly depleted by shipments abroad. I think it is far better to say we haven't got something in our warehouse because it has been shipped to the field than to have it waiting in the warehouse for an emergency cable before sending it out. Certainly good stockpiles in Algiers and Cairo would enable them to occasionally send a vitally needed piece of equipment back and forth to each other much quicker than we could get it out from here. In other words, I would like to see a general practice of moving stuff out of the warehouse rather than warehousing it. It is true that we may be wrong on the priority of some theater as related to the priority of another theater once in a while but stuff in a warehouse here cannot win a war over there.

2. An effort made to get blanket priorities for certain tonnage and certain cubic footage obtained from the theaters on a more or less regular schedule. I believe this can be done if we are ingenuous enough to devise descriptive titles which will permit a certain flexibility in what we send in the cargoes such as "Agent sets and related parts" or "batteries and power supplies" not having to specify just what type of batteries or just what type of power units; or "mobile transmission and receiving units."

3. All orders on vital equipment held at a maximum within our financial abilities at all times until we have acquired adequate stockpiles within the theaters. This would enable the manufacturers to plan their material requirements ahead, not get jittery about the use of or idleness of some machine that looks as if it is running out of work; and they can also plan their employment operations more smoothly.

I don't think I have included anything in this memorandum that all of you have not thought of from time to time and you probably feel just as strongly about them as I do, in short I make no claim to original thinking or any greater desire for progress than all of us have as a Branch. But I just tried to break down some of the

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feelings I had about this in a memorandum so that we can establish it as a policy of thinking. I am sure if we do we will be way out ahead and I am equally sure that if we don't OSS as a whole will suffer, and we won't have done a creditable job.

I believe we are going to have to be our own self-starters making our own forward looking policy and anticipate demands and requirements even with a considerable hazard because the chances of having adequate advice on things well in advance seem pretty slim.

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Communications School, Det. "C"

OSS Form 1153

COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL

DETACHMENT "C"

DAILY MORNING REPORT

DATE Aug 24, 1943

Herewith daily morning report of personnel for the twenty-four hour period ending 11:59 p.m., Monday, August 23, 1943.

CLASS	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	CIVILIANS	STUDENTS	TEMPORARY	TOTAL
1. Station Complement	3	67	0	0	14	84
2. Trainees	14	160	6	30	0	210
3. Instructors	7	13	7	0	0	27
4. Graduates Awaiting Orders	6	17	1	0	0	24
5. Available Housing Facilities	3	0	0	0	0	3

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Expedition X-55

Tonnage - Communications Equipment

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SECRET

From Files of the Secretariat
Please Return

28 September 1943

Mr. James Lawrence Fly
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Fly:

I wish to acknowledge with thanks your letter of 8 September 1943 to General Donovan and to express my appreciation for the cooperation which your letter displays. It will be brought to the attention of General Donovan for his information as soon as he returns to the city.

There is enclosed for your information and transmittal to Mr. Sterling a letter to him designating the representatives of this Agency who will consult with him on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Attachment

R.Thrun:Copeland

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(25)

24 September 1943

Mr. Lawrence Fly
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Fly:

I wish to acknowledge with thanks your letter of 3 September 1943 to General Donovan and to express my appreciation for the cooperation which your letter displays. It will be brought to the attention of General Donovan as soon as he returns to the city.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

THRUN:BLACK

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Date 11 Sept 1945

To: COLONEL BUXTON

For your information. A copy of this letter has been sent to Mr. R. Boulton of SI for his information and to draft a reply for your signature.

R. Thrun

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Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

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COMMISSIONERS:

JAMES LAWRENCE FLY, CHAIRMAN
PAUL A. WALKER
NORMAN S. CASE
GEORGE HENRY PAYNE
T. A. M. CRAVEN
RAY C. WAKEFIELD
C. J. DURR

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

SEP 2 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan

This will acknowledge receipt of your communication of 27 August 1943, wherein you advise that your service operates a number of direction finding installations in the North African and Middle East Theatres for the purpose of locating clandestine enemy radio stations, cite the authority for this activity and requesting the approval of arrangements whereby information relating to clandestine radio operations in the areas mentioned, as a result of our monitoring activities, be referred to your office.

The Federal Communications Commission is very happy to render this service, and arrangements have been completed whereby the Chief of our Radio Intelligence Division, Engineering Department, Mr. G. E. Sterling, has forwarded information showing the approximate locations of certain transmitters in Africa, classified as clandestine, a list of the daily change of call letters employed by these stations, frequencies and procedures employed in transmissions. Such other information as develops from time to time will be forwarded directly from the Radio Intelligence Division to your representatives.

Sincerely yours

James Lawrence Fly
Chairman

FOR DEFENSE
BUY UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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17 August 1943

SECRET

Honorable James L. Fly, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C.

My dear Chairman Fly:

The Office of Strategic Services operates a number of direction finding installations in the North African and Middle East Theatres for the purpose of locating clandestine enemy radio stations. Authority for this activity has been granted by Generals Eisenhower and Brereton for their respective theatres.

If, in the course of your activities of policing the ether, the Radio Intelligence Division of your agency comes into the possession of information that concerns the territory above referred to, it will be much appreciated if such information could be made available to us. Details of such a proposed arrangement between our agencies can be worked out between the Chief of your Radio Intelligence Division and our people here concerned with this activity.

It seems to me that such cooperation will greatly increase the effectiveness of our efforts in these theatres, and I will greatly appreciate it if this matter will meet with your approval.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Arrangements Control
London Office
Equipment
Foreign Governments

SECRET

Major Willis

Ensign Putzell

21 August 1943

The following is a quotation from a recent personal letter from Colonel Bruce to General Donovan, dated August 9, 1943:

> "Larry Lowman told us this morning that many of these Governments were obtaining, or attempting to obtain, communications supplies directly from Washington, either on their own request or through a request made by the British, who in turn give those supplies to the foreign services without cost probably obtaining credit for them. I think in this connection (and Larry) agrees) that two things would be advisable: (1) That London be kept informed of all such requests from the British or foreign agencies, and (2) that as far as practicable (since it is one of our best exchange points) that the London office make the physical delivery of such equipment to the various foreign services."

I have been instructed to ask you to investigate the practicability in all respects of this matter and to let me have your conclusions and recommendations.

W.J.F., Jr.

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Communications Bal [illegible]
& Allotment

Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment
Attention: Lt. Hahn.
Lt. Colonel Edward L. Bigelow, Personnel Officer.

26 July 1942.

Allotment for Communications.

1. Due to the need of additional Communications personnel in the various theaters and the fact that transfers have been requested in sufficient volume to fill all vacancies which Communications has in the theater allotments, the following vacancies in the Other Overseas Areas Allotment are assigned to Communications:

T/Sgt	T/3rd	Sgt.	T/4th	Cpl.	T/5th	Pfc.	Pvt.	TOTAL
1	2	1	1	3	5	3	[illegible]	25

Approved:

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Communication No. 12,025

CONFIDENTIAL

x Navy Dept

(93) x Naval Research Laboratory

x Direction Finder

20 July 1943

TO: Chief of the Bureau of Ships

REFERENCES: (a) Code 985;
(b) J.C.S. 155/7/D

1. It is requested that the Naval Research Laboratory be directed to develop, under a high priority, a small portable direction finder for this office.

2. The direction finding unit should operate in conjunction with the Marine Corps type MAB set, or, if this is not possible, the RBZ receiver, the unit to cover a frequency range of from 2300 kc to 4500 kc, and be able to take bearings for homing purposes, such as to lead a man or a small boat from a point of approximately 3 miles away to within 25 or 50 yards of a ship or fixed point.

3. The details of this unit have been discussed with the personnel in Section 925 of the Bureau of Ships in a preliminary way. The problem seems feasible and would probably require only a short time to develop.

4. Since the lack of such a homing device has proved exceedingly embarrassing in a number of cases, it will be most helpful if the development work could be undertaken as expeditiously as possible.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

BANE:BLACK

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Subject: Interviewing Enlisted Men and Officers at Fort Monmouth.

SPSMT 352 Ft. Mon. 1st Ind. [illegible]
(8 July 1943)

WD, ASF, OCSigO, Washington, 25, D. C., 8 July 1943.

To: Director, Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. The request to interview enlisted men and officers at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, who have had signal communication training is approved.

2. Pending completion of the War Department study on assignment of personnel with foreign language qualifications, it is requested no personnel with such qualifications be interviewed.

For the Chief Signal Officer:

Louis Candler,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Deputy Director, Signal Troops Division.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 July 1943

Subject: Interviewing Enlisted Men and Officers at Fort Monmouth

To: Chief Signal Officer
3E - 340 Pentagon Building
Arlington, Virginia

Attention: Lt. Colonel Duncan Hodges

1. It is requested that Major Philip C. Lovell, and Captain Richard R. Quay be permitted to visit Fort Monmouth for the purpose of interviewing enlisted men and officers who have had training in communications. These men are urgently needed for overseas assignment. No foreign language qualifications are necessary.

2. If permission is granted, these officers, upon arrival at Fort Monmouth, will confer with the Classification Section as to the names of the enlisted men and officers to be interviewed.

For the Director

G. Edward Buxton

Acting Director

29168

EWG/pch

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For the Director

EWG/pch

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3E - 340 Pentagon Building
Arlington, Virginia

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For the Director

EWG/pch

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For Ben Donovan's File

Communications 12,666
Material
War Production Board
British Supply Council

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton

DATE: July [illegible], 194[illegible]

FROM: C. W. Horn

SUBJECT: British Supply Council

In line with our conversation on the telephone concerning arrangements we had with the War Production Board whereby OSS checks the requests for priority for communication material and provides a letter which the Washington representative of the British Supply Council forwards to War Production Board. This has been done in order to make it unnecessary for the British Supply Council to divulge the secret nature of their activities.

I have been signing this letter of concurrence to date by special arrangement we made with WPB. Hereafter Lt. Colonel Lawrence Lowman or in his absence Major Frederick A. Willis will sign such letters. I have notified the British Supply Council of this change and have taken this matter up with Colonel Lowman who has agreed to this arrangement. I believe this is satisfactory and solves this problem.

For your information.

C. W. Horn
Commander, USNR

Lowman — Copy sent 7/7/43

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Communications [illegible]
x Personnel
x Procurement
x War Dept (Signal Corps)

19 June 1943

Subject: Request for Priority to procure Communications Personnel from the Signal Corps

To: Assistant Chief of Staff G-1
Attention: Colonel R. E. Jenkins

1. Colonel Jenkins of G-1 and Mr. Cheston of OSS recently discussed the difficulties of recruiting satisfactory communications personnel. It was suggested at that conference that OSS report in some detail on the situation and make a request for the right to interview candidates.

2. The operations of OSS are of such character that the quality of its manpower largely determines its success in attaining its objectives. OSS communications men in the field require a higher degree of self reliance than those assigned to a normal military operation, due to the autonomous nature of each mission.

3. We have been told by the Signal Corps that they require our asking for officers and men by description and specification number. We have tried this system and found in it such difficulties as make such procedure highly unproductive. In the past, the Army has taken the position that officers and men must be asked for by specification number and broad description. Requirements for new manpower by the OSS during the last six months of 1943 are for men of such special caliber as to promise even less in the way of results under this system.

4. To pick men for highly specialized operations from the scattered information usually found on a Form 20 card is unsatisfactory. The alternative -- shipping a large group to some central point in order that each may be interviewed in person -- is highly destructive of security; it

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is impossible to find out a man's attitude for a prospective job without telling him the nature of the job. Moreover, the security checking facilities are in this way seriously and unnecessarily burdened by the submission of large lists of men of whom in the past only a very small percentage have been found suitable for the task at hand. Finally, this dislocation represents a considerable waste of transport facilities as well as valuable training time.

5. On the basis of current estimates for work in progress, the OSS will require the recruitment in this country of a group of highly specialized men totalling some 660 officers and men for the remainder of the calendar year.

6. This group will consist of approximately 10 officers and 100 enlisted men per month, of whom 223 enlisted must be qualified in some 22 different foreign language dialects, as follows:

Arab	2	Danish	3
French	95	Dutch	10
Italian	20	German	10
Spanish	11	Norwegian	8
Albanian	2	Polish	8
Bulgarian	3	Swedish	8
Greek	9	Swiss	6
Hungarian	2		
Rumanian	2		
Croatians)			
Serbians)			
Slovenians)	9		
Dalmatians)			
Belgians	10		
Czechs	5		

All of this group will be used in communications and should have had training in radio engineering or operation.

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7. It is requested that a Directive be issued authorizing the granting of a priority to OSS to procure this personnel from the Signal Corps. If this authority is granted, it is further requested that the OSS be given permission to interview the personnel suggested by the Signal Corps at the Signal Corps centers, such as Fort Monmouth, Camp Crowder, etc.

William J. Donovan
Director

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1 Croat 2
2 French 95
3 Italian 20
4 Spanish 11
5 Albanian 2
6 Bulgarian 3
7 Greek 9
8 Hungarian 2
9 Rumanian 2
10 Croatian } 9
11 Serbian
12 Slovenian
13 Dalmatian
14 Belgian 10
15 Czech 5
16 Danish 3
17 Dutch 10
18 German 10
19 Norwegian 8
20 Polish 8
21 Swedish 8
22 Swiss 6

223

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Communications 11,371
x Far East
x China
x Lt McGranahan

SECRET

Mr. Charles P. Healy

9 June 1943

Edmond L. Taylor

Attached Report

I am attaching a copy of a report prepared for me by Lt. McGranahan on the proposal for establishing a clandestine radio station for the Far East. He does not come to any definite conclusions and there is no doubt that the subject requires further study. In the meantime, however, the following steps seem to me practical and advisable:

1. To start at once recruiting and training two or three reliable Japs and small American personnel to work with them on a black station wherever it is decided to set it up.

2. To purchase now the 10 KW transmitter referred to on page four, paragraph C of McGranahan's memorandum.

3. To instruct OSS representatives in the China Theater and eventually in the Pacific and Southwest Pacific Theater to report as rapidly as possible their suggestions as to the location and characteristics of a freedom station for use against Japan.

cc: General Donovan
Mr. Tryon

RECEIVED

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June 1, 1943

Mr. James L. Fly, Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Fly:

Lt. Colonel Lowman has kept me advised of the help the Federal Communications Commission has given us in connection with our DF operations abroad. He tells me that Mr. G. E. Sterling and his assistants have not only trained our engineers at your school but have built for us the necessary equipment to carry out our plans.

These are now completed. Without the assistance the Federal Communications Commission has given, it would not have been possible to carry them forward.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director

General Donovan's copy

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Communications Branch 11797
x Federal Communications Commission
x DF Operations

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General Donovan

DATE: June 1, 1943

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT:

Because of the great help the Federal Communications Commission has given us in setting up our DF plans, I have written up a letter to Chairman James Fly which I think he would very much appreciate.

If it is satisfactory to you, would you mind signing and sending it off, with a copy to Mr. G. E. Sterling, who is his Chief Engineer.

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Communications Section, O.S.S.
X War Dept. (Army Service Forces)
X Signals Equipment
X Procurement

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MAY 28 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:
(THRU: Brig. General John R. Deane)

Subject: Radio Procurement by the Office of Strategic Services.

1. The Director of Material, Army Service Forces, has reviewed with the Signal Corps your letter of May 25, 1943, requesting authority to purchase sending and receiving sets direct.

2. It is believed that the plan of procurement furnished by the Signal Corps in the attached memorandum will result in a satisfactory procurement of sets needed by the Office of Strategic Services and will, at the same time, serve to make possible a better balanced load on the radio industry.

3. It is suggested that the Director of the Office of Strategic Services communicate needs for these sets direct to the Chief Signal Officer not later than June 5, 1943, in order that the necessary obligation of funds may be carried out prior to June 30, 1943.

BREHON SOMERVELL,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
For the COMMANDING GENERAL, A.S.F.

W. H. BYERS
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces

1 Incl:
Memo f/ Signal Corps,
5/28/43

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CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 2[illegible] 1943

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(TBRS: Brig. General John R. Deane)

Subject: Radio Procurement by the Office of Strategic Services.

1. The Director of Materiel, Army Service Forces, has reviewed with the Signal Corps your letter of May 25, 1943, requesting authority to purchase sending and receiving sets direct.

2. It is believed that the plan of procurement furnished by the Signal Corps in the attached memorandum will result in a satisfactory procurement of sets needed by the Office of Strategic Services and will, at the same time, serve to make possible a better balanced load on the radio industry.

3. It is suggested that the Director of the Office of Strategic Services communicate needs for these sets direct to the Chief Signal Officer not later than June 5, 1943, in order that the necessary obligation of funds may be carried out prior to June 30, 1943.

BRENON SOMERVELL,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

1 Incl:
Memo f/ Signal Corps,
5/28/43

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, ~~SERVICES OF SUPPLY~~ Army Service Forces
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SPSRP 400.13 Purchases

SPSRP
May 28, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Purchases Division,
Army Service Forces,
Room 5-D-677, Pentagon Building.

SUBJECT: Procurement by Office of Strategic Services

1. This office believes that because of its superior knowledge of the facilities picture, the load on industry, and the capacity and ability of individual manufacturers, the Signal Corps can procure and get delivered the specially designed radio transmitters and receivers referred to in the attached letter from the Director, Office of Strategic Services, to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, in less time than this could be accomplished by direct procurement by Office of Strategic Services. This office further feels that direct procurement by Office of Strategic Services might be detrimental to the entire Signal Corps radio procurement operation, inasmuch as this procurement would almost necessarily cut across Signal Corps procurement plans. Furthermore, this office believes that it can place contracts for the equipment within a very few days after receipt from Office of Strategic Services of necessary information.

2. If the Office of Strategic Services will, by June 5, 1943, furnish this office adequate procurement information and funds (including specifications, if possible), the Signal Corps will undertake to place a firm contract or to obligate the funds by June 30. In making this undertaking, the Signal Corps, notwithstanding its extremely heavy load of end of the year business, is willing to give special consideration to Office of Strategic Services and its requirements. The same service will be given to other procurements desired by Office of Strategic Services upon the same basis, i.e., on receipt of necessary information by June 5, 1943.

3. It will be extremely difficult for the Signal Corps, or for any other agency, to place contracts if procurement data are received after June 5, due particularly to the heavy strain upon the industry and particularly upon their costing departments, which are overburdened with year end closings of procurements. Most manufacturers are insisting upon having three weeks within which to furnish quotations.

4. The policy of issuing letters of intent for 100% of the

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estimated cost is not regarded as sound, although it can be employed in special circumstances.

For the Chief Signal Officer:

Eugene V. Elder
Colonel, Signal Corps
Director, Materiel Division

1 Incl - Ltr fm OSS
to CS, ASF,
dtd May 25, 1943.

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23 May 1943

Commanding General
Army Service Forces
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Through: Brigadier General John R. Deane,
Secretary, Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

1. Reference is made to directive dated 26 March, 1943, numbered AG 400 (16-3-43) OB-S-D-M, Subject: "Supplies and Equipment for the Office of Strategic Services," setting forth the procedure to be followed in the procurement of material required by the Office of Strategic Services.

2. This agency finds itself in a difficult position in view of the short length of time between the present date and the close of the present fiscal year, at which time the funds unobligated as of 30 June, 1943, will revert and will no longer be available.

3. In accordance with Paragraph 3 (e) of the directive referred to, direct procurement by OSS is limited to $5,000 in cases of emergency and all other procurement must be handled by the Army Service Forces. The most pressing need of this agency is for signals equipment requested by Theater Commanders for immediate use overseas of types which are not procurable directly from the Signal Corps. We are in receipt of requests for the delivery of not less than 600 sending and receiving sets in the North African, Middle Eastern, European and Far Eastern Theaters of Operations. The sets requested are of special design for secret use by our agents and operatives in the field and behind enemy lines. The signals equipment requested of OSS from each Theater mentioned is highly specialized and has been designed after considerable research and experimentation for the particular uses to which it will be put.

4. OSS requirements for signals equipment are comparatively very small and will not exceed a total of $300,000 before 30 June, 1943. However, under the terms of the directive mentioned above, it is necessary for the Signal

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Corps to enter into contracts for our requirements. Since the types of equipment required immediately in the several theaters mentioned are not directly procurable from the Signal Corps, the necessity for our going to that branch will only add to their already overburdened production schedules.

5. In view of these circumstances, I request that authority be given to this agency to handle, in amounts not in excess of $100,000 for any one contract, and up to a total of $300,000, its own procurement for signals equipment from now until 30 June, 1943, in the manner prescribed by your office. As a suggestion, this can be accomplished in the following ways:

(1). Authorize the OSS to amend existing contracts which were awarded prior to the issuance of the directive referred to above in order not to interrupt the critically needed flow of present production lines.

(2). In addition to (1), authorize the OSS to enter into its own contracts for the procurement of its signals equipment as outlined above, or

(3). Authorized the OSS to issue letter contracts obligating 100 percent of the estimated cost of the contract and thereafter forwarding all pertinent papers to the ASF for the preparation and execution of the final contract.

William J. Donovan
Director

whVanderbilt: elw
Putzell: Nelson

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1st Ind.

Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C., 26 May, 1943 -- To Commanding General, Army Service Forces.

It is recommended that an early report be action be taken to expedite the procurement of the Signal equipment required by the Office of Strategic Services.

[redacted]
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.

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- 2 -

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Communication Equipment (N.S.E.)

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

x Wireless Sets
x OSS Agents
x Shapiro, I. D.

May 8, 1943

STRICTLY PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM TO: General William J. Donovan

FROM : I. D. Shapiro

SUBJECT : Agents' Wireless Sets

Within the last day or two we have had two cables from Algiers regarding agents' WT sets (cable #108 and #111). The first cable concerns an urgent request to supply twenty five sets to the Chief of French Secret Intelligence and Guerilla Services, the second concerns an emergency shipment of fifty sets and a need for up to two hundred sets during the next three months.

I have just been discussing with Lt. Simpson the replies to these messages, Col. Lowman being out of the city for about a week. I pointed out to Lt. Simpson that unless our people in the field, engaged as they are in urgent and difficult operations, can know definitely how many sets will be made available, and when they will be delivered to the Theatre, they cannot make specific plans for G-2 and our Allies. Furthermore, unless actual deliveries meet committments, some of their most important plans may fail through lack of WT sets.

Lt. Simpson seemed very disinclined to make any promises to our Algiers detachment with respect to supplying them two hundred sets within ninety days. On the other hand he talked of a new type set, ten of which are just coming off

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the production line. If, after examination and testing, the sets proved satisfactory then ten or twenty at a time may be available for shipment. However, Lt. Simpson gave me the impression of being quite hesitant in counting on the existing production facilities for such quantity as is required in North Africa. In his own words he said "We have stuck our necks out so often in the past that we do not wish to do so again by forecasting the number of sets we are going to be able to supply".

Because practically every operation that we have to undertake in enemy territory depends entirely on WT sets I feel that the whole success of our program is in danger if we are unable to count firmly on our production facilities for an adequate number of sets in adequate time. I feel furthermore that our people in the field are entitled to know just what they may expect in this connection.

I dislike troubling you in this matter but would suggest that you call in Lt. Simpson or anyone else and satisfy yourself as to the dependa ility of our existing arrangements for the production of agents' WT sets. I would like to cover my harmonious relations with the Communications Branch by not having it appear that your interest results from any statement of mine. You might say to Lt. Simpson that you have read cables 108 and 111 and want to know whether or not we are definitely going to make good the request from the Theatre.

I. D. S.

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OSS Form 60

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE May 6, 1943

FROM

EDDY, ALGIERS

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

COMMUNICATIONS

(FOR INFORMATION)

DONOVAN, SECRETARIAT, SO, S.A., SRS, GEN. MAGRUDER, COL. HUNTINGTON, NATO.

INCOMING HEADING

RECEIVED

SECRET

111. This message is for 192 and Comun from Weaver, 238 and Pfliegor.

Concerning your messages number 33 and 46, please make inquiries on your end about shipments 20535 and 20575 which were never received and which we are trying to trace. We are requesting special Theater approval for an emergency shipment of 50 sets. However, in the meantime try to send a few with each outgoing party. Within the next 3 months up to 200 sets will be needed; please do your best to fulfill this requirement. It is imperative that we have a pool of at least 400 between 3 and 8 megacycles. The sets which arrived recently did not have crystals. In every case send SSTR RAW--H one model to the greatest extent obtainable.

TOR: 5/6/43 5:01 pm.

FILE COPY

SECRET

OPERATOR'S RECORD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—31401-1

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Communications 11, 1944
*JCS #187
* Foreign Territory
* OWI
COPY NO. 15
* War Dept.

SECRET

January 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARIES

J.C.S. 187 will be placed on the J.C.S. Agenda upon receipt of report from the Joint Staff Planners, to whom it has been referred.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110002-0

Communications 11, 1942
< JCS #187
COPY NO: 16
< For. Territory
< OCCI
< War Dept

SECRET

142-1
(J.C.S. 187)

January 6, 1943

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS IN NEWLY LIBERATED TERRITORY

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed Memorandum from the Secretary of War is presented for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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Communications II, 1943
x JCS #187
COPY NO. 16
x For. Territory
x OWI
x War Dept.

SECRET

142-1
(J.C.S. 187)

January 6, 1943

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS IN NEWLY LIBERATED TERRITORY

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ENCLOSURE

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

1. Attached hereto is a letter received by me from Mr. Elmer Davis under date of December 26, 1942, with reference to the control of communications in newly liberated territory.

2. Although the question put by Mr. Davis is general in form and apparently applies to all newly liberated countries, I know from my conference with him that his inquiry related solely to the present occupation of North Africa and the form which that occupation has taken.

3. The method of control of communications in North Africa is so closely tied up to Operations that I should be glad of the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the extent to which that control should be exercised for the purpose of military security, and I therefore refer this letter to you for that purpose.

4. It must be remembered that the extent of this control is also dependent upon the form and extent to which the civil authorities in North Africa are recognized and dealt with by this government, which is in itself a matter on which I am in constant communication with the Secretary of State. For this reason I should be glad to have your reply bear this feature in mind and be returned to me for consultation with the Secretary of State.

5. I am informing Mr. Davis of this action.

/s/ Henry L. Stimson
SECRETARY OF WAR

Incl.
1 -

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SECRET

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You will remember that I discussed with you and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy the question of the control of the media of communication in newly liberated territories, and that there was general approval of the proposal that such control should be assured in the future.

Since the general subject has various aspects from the information and propaganda point of view, we have attempted to draft a general statement which I am enclosing herewith. I should appreciate it if you would let me have your comments at your convenience. It would be extremely helpful to this office if some such policy as the enclosed were adopted by the departments of government primarily concerned.

Cordially

/s/ Elmer Davis

Director

Enclosure

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December 22, 1942

CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS in NEWLY LIBERATED TERRITORY

In occupying territory (enemy, enemy-occupied, or other), radio stations, and all other media for the dissemination of information, must be considered as immediate military objectives, since they are the prime instruments of psychological and political warfare.

In working out any military plan, the following requirements are among those which should be reckoned with:

1. The capture, simultaneous if possible, of transmitters, of control rooms and studios.

2. The prevention of sabotage at all of these points, and a watch on lines at vulnerable points.

3. The insurance of a continuing service (by radio, press and other media) to be established immediately and maintained with as little interruption as possible. Security control of output from a military point of view is not enough, since political sabotage is likewise a source of loss of life and equipment.

   The provision by political warfare and propaganda agencies of skeleton staffs, trained in psychological and political warfare for the areas concerned, should therefore be considered indispensable.

   Such a staff should include enough people to ensure a politically controlled service of news, to take charge of existing personnel, if any, and to recruit suitable local talent. The leader of such a section would, of course, work under the jurisdiction of and in the closest possible contact with, the commanding officer

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Radio stations and newspaper and other plants will not be required for purely military operational needs throughout the whole of the day. When not so required, it would seem reasonable that the psychological or political warfare director should organize and put out programs and publications subject to the security requirements of the military, but under his control as to psychological or political policy.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan DATE: March 31, 1943

FROM: C. W. Horn

SUBJECT: Communication Systems of Latin America

ARGENTINA

Communication lines usually follow population groupings. This is true in Argentina and we therefore find most of the telegraph and telephone facilities in the northeastern portion of the country and radiating from Buenos Aires. Argentina has efficient telephone and telegraph services and is probably the most advanced in this respect in all of South America.

The existing facilities of both the land wire and radio communication systems in Argentina are presented and analyzed as to ownership and control. This includes the cable connections with foreign countries.

DOMESTIC TELEGRAPH

The domestic land-line telegraph system of Argentina is owned and operated by the Government. It reaches all parts of the country and gives good service. It consists of 165,000 miles of telegraph wire.

DOMESTIC TELEPHONES

Practically all of Argentina telephone facilities are controlled by foreign interests, the most important of which is the United River Plate Telephone Company, Ltd., a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph

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Communications 12, 1944
Platin, Amerika
x Sanoy
x Hoher, C.W.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan

DATE: March 31, 1943

FROM: C. W. Horn

SUBJECT: Communication Systems of Latin America

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Corporation of the United States. This company, with its headquarters in Buenos Aires and serving in the most populated area including the Federal District, the states of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba and La Pampa, (all within a radius of 400 miles of Buenos Aires) operates 410,000 telephones or about 90 per cent of the total of 461,000 telephones in Argentina. There are two other smaller International Telephone and Telegraph subsidiaries known as Compania Telefonica Argentina and the Compania Telegrafica-Telefonica Commercial and their services are included in the above figures.

The next largest telephone company is controlled by Swedish interests, the Compania Commercial de Administracion (L. M. Ericsson Telephone Co.) who operate approximately 20,000 telephones in the western part of the country as well as in the state of Entre Rios (adjoining the state of Buenos Aires on the north). The territory served by this company lies in the states of Entre Rios, Mendoza, San Juan, Salta, Tucuman and Santiago del Estero.

The smallest interest in domestic telephone service is that of the Compania Internacional de Telefonos controlled by the big German electrical firm of Siemens & Halske. This company operates approximately 8,200 telephones, mainly in the states of El Chaco, Formosa, Missiones and Corrientes, all adjoining Paraguay where this same company controls all of the telephones.

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INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE & RADIO TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS

Argentina is connected by land-wire telephone to Chile over the trans-Andean cable owned by the All America Cables & Radio, Inc., (a subsidiary of International Telephone & Telegraph (U.S.). Argentina is also connected by land wire circuits to Paraguay.

Connection to Uraguay is by means of a submarine cable owned by the Compania Telegrafica y Telefonica del Plata controlled by Siemens & Halske (German) and in which International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (U.S.) has a 15.5% per cent minority interest.

Radio telephone service is maintained by the Compania Internacional de Radio (Argentina), a subsidiary of the United River Plate Telephone Company Ltd. (I.T.T.(U.S.)) as follows: -

Buenos Aires - New York
Buenos Aires - Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
Buenos Aires - La Paz (Bolivia)
Buenos Aires - Lima (Peru)
Buenos Aires - Bogota (Colombia)
Buenos Aires - Caracas (Venezuela)
Buenos Aires - Madrid (Spain)
Buenos Aires - Berlin (Germany)
Buenos Aires - Berne (Switzerland)

NOTE: Both New York and Buenos Aires act as relay stations to points not directly served. Example - Calls from New York to Bolivia, Uraguay or Paraguay are relayed via Buenos Aires.

Radio telephone service is also furnished by Transradio Argentino (Transradio Consortium) from Buenos Aires to Santiago (Chile), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Berlin

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(Germany). Inasmuch as Transradio does not operate a land wire telephone system it has no connection with land wire telephone subscribers and must provide special booths in Buenos Aires for this purpose. (Note - Transradio Consortium is internationally owned by U.S.-45%; British 25%; French 25%; German 25%. See discussion on Transradio Consortium attached).

INTERNATIONAL RADIO TELEGRAPH & CABLE CONNECTIONS

Land Line Telegraph - International land line telegraph connections are in existence between the Argentina government system and the systems of the adjacent countries of Paraguay, Uraguay, Bolivia, Chile and Brazil.

Radio Telegraph Circuits - There are three organizations in Argentina that provide radio telegraph service to and from foreign countries. They are:

a) Transradio Internacional Argentino (Consortium-See attached report)

b) Sociedad Anonima Radio Argentina (U.S.)

c) Compania Internacional de Radio Argentina (U.S.)

These three companies maintain circuits as follows:-

a) Transradio Internacional Argentina (Consortium)

Buenos Aires - Paris, France (Radio France) (Operations suspended)
Buenos Aires - Berlin, Germany (Government)
Buenos Aires - Rome, Italy (Italoradio)
Buenos Aires - New York, U.S.A. (R.C.A.C.)
Buenos Aires - London, England (C&W)
Buenos Aires - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (C.R.B.)
Buenos Aires - Santiago, Chile (T.C.)
Buenos Aires - Manila, P.I. (R.C.A.C.) (Circuit closed)
Buenos Aires - Madrid, Spain (Transradio Espanola)

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Buenos Aires - Asuncion, Paraguay (Government)
Buenos Aires - Amsterdam, Holland (Government) (Circuits closed)
Buenos Aires - Brussels, Belgium (Government) (Circuits closed)
Buenos Aires - La Paz, Bolivia (CTIMOL)
Buenos Aires - Berne, Switzerland (Radio Suiza)
Buenos Aires - Tokio, Japan (Government)
Buenos Aires - Warsaw, Poland (Government) (Circuit closed)
Buenos Aires - Lima, Peru (West Coast Telegraph Co.)
Buenos Aires - Barcelona, Spain (Transradio Internacional)
Buenos Aires - Oslo, Norway (Government) (Circuit closed)
Buenos Aires - Stockholm, Sweden (Government) opened Jan. 2, 1943
Buenos Aires - Moscow, U.S.S.R. (Government) opened Jan. 2, 1942

b) Compania Internacional de Radio Argentina (C.I.R.A.)

Buenos Aires - New York, U.S.A. (Mackay Radio)

c) Sociedad Anonima Radio Argentina (S.A.R.A.)

Buenos Aires - Madrid, Spain (S.A.R.A.)
Buenos Aires - New York, U.S.A. (Mackay Radio)
Buenos Aires - Asuncion, Paraguay (S.A.R.A.)
Buenos Aires - Rio de Janeiro (S.A.R.A.)
Buenos Aires - La Paz, Bolivia (CTIMOL)
Buenos Aires - Prague, Czechoslovakia (Government) (Circuit closed)

NOTE - Transradio Internacional Argentina is one of the companies controlled by the "Consortium" which is owned as follows - USA-25%; British-25%; French-25%; and German-25% - See attached report on this organization.

Sociedad Anonima Radio Argentina is controlled by All America Cables and Radio Inc. which is a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, a U.S.A. company.

Compania Internacional de Radio Argentina is a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, a U.S.A. concern.

Cable Connections - The three companies that have cable landings in Argentina are:

a) All America Cables & Radio, Inc. (U.S.A.)

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b) Western Telegraph Company, Ltd. (British)

c) Cia Italiana dei Cavi Telegrafici Sottomarini (Italian)

All America Cables & Radio Inc., a subsidiary of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., a U. S. company, has direct cables between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, Uruguay; Santos, Brazil; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. By way of the Trans-Andean Telegraph Company, a subsidiary, Cable company gives Argentina connection with Chile and South American west coast points and with Panama and New York via its cables up the west coast of South America to Panama and the United States.

The Western Telegraph Company is controlled by Cables and Wireless, Ltd., a British company. It gives Argentina connection with London and Europe via Brazil. This company also has lines from Buenos Aires to Chile which connect with its Pacific coast cable system between Chile and Peru.

The Italian cable runs to Europe via Brazil and has been interrupted by belligerent action.

The United States of America has a deep concern in who controls and operates communications systems in the various countries of this hemisphere, both from an economic and defense viewpoint. From the defense angle the United States is a party to a mutual agreement among all of the nations south of our border, and as the most powerful of all of these nations, it is called upon to defend them from foreign agression. It is therefore, proper that the United States view the situation from a military and naval

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prepared to cope with any situation which may arise by making the necessary plans for utilizing its strength and facilities in any portion of this hemisphere. One of the most important, as well as of immediate need, upon the outbreak of hostilities is an efficient system of communications. By communications is included all forms of wire, cable, radio, telephonic and telegraphic services. It is therefore essential that the control of those communications should be in friendly hands, either that of the nationals of the countries concerned or by nationals of other countries of this hemisphere, and definitely not in the control of any non-American hemisphere interests.

An additional reason, and a very important one from an operating standpoint, is the need of a universal American Standard, both in technical apparatus and in operational procedure in order that services may be inter-connected and additional equipment installed. Furthermore, personnel trained to the same standards will be available for immediate mobilization of facilities. It is evident therefore that we must not permit European and other foreign interests to install their types of equipment, with their differing technical standards, if we are to preserve a purely American system. In plain language it should be possible to connect any telephone or telegraph instrument in any country to the wire and radio services of any other country and it should be possible to ship equipment from one country to another in the event of an emergency, knowing that the sets will fit into the general plans and perform satisfactorily. It is not too much to expect that the standards which should be adopted in Latin America should be those in existence in the United States.

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because we are the most advanced nation in the world in the communications field. Furthermore, we have the manufacturing facilities to insure sufficient production to meet all needs.

Assuming that this line of reasoning is sound and that we agree in general as to the desirability of hemisphere control and hemisphere standards, we then face the following problems in the country of Argentina.

A - Elimination of non-hemispheric control or connectivity in the following companies:

Land Wire Telephone

1. Acquire by Purchase Compania Comercial de Administracion which is controlled by the L. M. Ericsson Telephone Company of Sweden.
2. Acquire control of the Compania International de Telefonos which is controlled by the German firm of Siemens & Halske.

International Radio Telephone and Telegraph Services

1. Eliminate non-hemispheric interests in the Transradio Argentina, which is controlled by the Consortium.

Cable Connections

1. Eliminate the German control of the submarine cable connecting Buenos Aires with Uruguay.
2. Inasmuch as cable connections with foreign countries can easily be controlled by the country which it touches, and because such cable systems are usually of an extensive

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international character it is not deemed necessary or advisable at this time to try and obtain control. Cables are therefore in a somewhat special class.

E - Arrange for the conversion of the land wire telegraph and telephone systems throughout Argentina to the American Standard to permit interchangeability of equipment and parts. In the case of radio telephone and telegraph equipment similar action would be taken to insure interchangeability of equipment and service, all of which should be in accordance with the American Standard.

From an economic viewpoint it would be very desirable if all communications equipment were of American pattern and design. It is probable that in some of the more advanced countries, notably Argentina and Brazil, it will be necessary for American concerns to establish manufacturing plants or to license native manufacturing concerns to produce this type of equipment. Most of the telephone equipment in use in Argentina, and which was installed by the American company known as International Telephone & Telegraph, was manufactured in Europe by a subsidiary company. The trend in recent years has been the establishment of assembly plants, if not entire manufacturing units, by American industries in some of the Latin American countries. This trend is quite likely to grow.

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Just how far United States interests may object to go in persuading Latin American nations to permit United States money to acquire control of their utilities is something of a question. In the United States all radio companies must be American controlled, and no more than twenty per cent of the voting stock can be held by foreigners. All officers, directors, and most of the personnel are required to be American citizens. It is probable that some of the South American countries, particularly those with nationalistic tendencies, may decide to copy the United States in this respect with the result that American interests would lose nothing control of many of the companies now in existence. This would be an economic loss to us but does not necessarily affect the hemisphere defense plan provided we all adopted American Standards.

The mention made above in reference to the adoption of American Standards for communication services could also very well apply to other public utility services such as railroads and electric power systems, both of which play important parts in time of war. If the people of this hemisphere effectively unite in policy and principles it seems reasonable to expect that they will unite in adopting standards which will greatly benefit all concerned in putting these principles to practical uses. To accomplish this the other nations of this continent must recognize the United States as the leader in technical and manufacturing development and accept our standards which are the result of intensive study and progress. The acceptance of such principles may have far reaching effects and cannot help but influence such basic economic factors as tariffs,

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trade agreements, etc. The key word of our future relationship with our Latin American neighbors could very well be "American Standards", both economic and technical.

C. H. Thorn
Technical Adviser

Enclosure

Transradio Consortium Agreement

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TRANSRADIO CONSORTIUM AGREEMENT

(A.E.F.G. Trust)

Soon after the close of World War I the four leading radio companies of the world entered the South American field by obtaining concessions from different countries. The four big radio interests were:

a) Radio Corporation of America (U.S.A.)

b) Gesellschaft fur Drahtlose Telegraphie m.b.H. (Telefunken Company) (Germany)

c) Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie Sans Fil (France)

d) Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company (Ltd) (Great Britain)

There was a competitive scramble for concessions and it became obvious that there would be duplication of expensive high powered radio telegraph stations in the more important South American countries. Furthermore, whatever traffic would be available would be in competition with the well established cable companies. Because of this situation the four companies entered into negotiations to combine their interests and resources, finally resulting in an agreement signed on October 14, 1921. This agreement, with supplemental agreements, became known as the Transradio Consortium. This Consortium provided for a Trust, known as the A.E.F.G. Trust and to which all four companies turned over their external rights and properties. The

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consisted of eight trustees and a Chairman who were to hold all the rights and properties of the four parties in four equal shares. Each of the four companies appointed two trustees but the Radio Corporation of America named the Chairman, in addition to its two trustees, which Chairman was required to be an American citizen but not connected with the Radio Corporation. This Chairman's powers were outlined and besides being able to break a tie vote could veto any action of the majority of the trustees which in his opinion is unfair to the minority of the trustees. American interests therefore enjoy an advantage.

Under this agreement, three national companies were formed, one each in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Each of these national companies is organized under the laws of the country in which it operates. These national companies, with their voting control, are as follows: (as of January 1942)

Transradio Internacional Argentina, S.A.

A.I.T.T. Trust (under British Laws)	60%
R.C.A. Communications (U.S.)	6%
Cables & Wireless Ltd. (British)	6%
Telefunken Company (German)	5%
Italoradio (Italian)	5%
Compagnie Generale (French)	4%
Public holdings, Argentina	16%

In addition this company has outstanding an issue of Debenture Bonds, held as follows:

Public - Argentina	65%
Radio Corp. of Amer.	18%
Marconi's Wireless Tel. Co. (C&W)	12%
Italoradio - Italian	5%

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BRAZIL

Companhia Radiotelegrafica Brasileira
(Voting Control)

A.E.F.G. Trust	71%
R.C.A. Communications (US)	10%
Italoradio - (Italian)	8%
Societe Anonyme I.T. (Belgian)	4%
Cables & Wireless (British)	5%
Compagnie Generale (French)	2%
Public holdings, Brazil	2%

This company also has outstanding an issue of Debenture Bonds held by the four parties of the Trust, as follows:

Radio Corp. of America	32%
Marconi's Wireless Tel. Co.	30%
Compagnie Generale	21%
Telefunken Company	11%
Italoradio	6%

CHILE

Transradio Chilena
(Voting Control)

A.E.F.G. Trust	60%
Telefunken (German)	11%
Compagnie Generale (French)	10%
Cables & Wireless (British)	9%
RCA Communications (USA)	9%
Public holdings, Chile	1%

This company has no funded indebtedness.

In the Republic of Colombia the A.E.F.G. Trust radio stations were acquired jointly by the Radio Corporation of America and Marconi's Wireless Telephone Company Ltd. by buying out the interests of other parties, namely French and German. The company now operating the stations in Colombia, known as Marconi's Wireless Telephone Company, is under the management of R.C.A. Communications, Inc. (Radio Corporation of America sub-

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sidiary) and which owns 60% of this Colombian company while the other 40% is owned by Cables & Wireless Ltd. (British).

The radio stations of the A.E.F.C. Trust opened circuits as follows:

Argentina Company
1924

Buenos Aires - New York
Buenos Aires - London
Buenos Aires - Rome
Buenos Aires - Berlin

1929

Buenos Aires - Manila
Buenos Aires - Madrid

1931

Buenos Aires - Amsterdam
Buenos Aires - Brussels
Buenos Aires - Bolivia

1932

Buenos Aires - Berne, Switzerland
Buenos Aires - Tokio

1935

Buenos Aires - Warsaw

1937

Buenos Aires - Lima, Peru

1939

Buenos Aires - Oslo, Norway
Buenos Aires - Barcelona, Spain

1940

Buenos Aires - Beyrouth, Syria

1942

Buenos Aires - Stockholm
Buenos Aires - Moscow

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Chilean Company
1928

Santiago - Buenos Aires

1929

Santiago - Berlin

1930

Santiago - New York

1931

Santiago - London

1937

Santiago - Lima, Peru
Santiago - Tokio

1939

Santiago - Rio de Janeiro

Brazilian Company
1926

Rio de Janeiro - New York
Rio de Janeiro - London
Rio de Janeiro - Tokio
Rio de Janeiro - Paris
Rio de Janeiro - Berlin
Rio de Janeiro - Buenos Aires

1927

Rio de Janeiro - Lisbon

1929

Rio de Janeiro - Madrid

1932

Rio de Janeiro - Berne, Switzerland
Rio de Janeiro - Montevideo

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1933

Rio de Janeiro - Bogota, Col.

1934

Rio de Janeiro - Brussels

1935

Rio de Janeiro - Warsaw
Rio de Janeiro - Tokio
Rio de Janeiro - Amsterdam

1939

Rio de Janeiro - Santiago, Chile

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan

FROM: C. W. Horn

DATE: March 17, 1942

SUBJECT: Communications - Latin America

Following your instructions I am studying the status of the communications systems in Latin America, the extent of foreign ownership, and other associated factors in this field. In view of your desiring a quick report I am going to incorporate this into two parts, first a general summary of the situation and, secondly a more comprehensive report with information more in detail.

As the subject covers a wide field and a great deal of territory I am availing myself of sources of information at hand. If a complete study is to be made it will require a considerable staff with agents in the various countries to obtain the latest and minute details such as stock ownership and other matters of some of the companies which cannot be very easily obtained otherwise.

The field of communications promises to be benefited greatly by advances which have been made in recent times and which have been greatly stimulated by the war. It is natural to believe that these improvements, and perhaps new forms of telegraph and telephone traffic, will find uses in Latin America and will be incorporated in any new

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extensions of the existing facilities which are bound to take place after the war.

Latin America has generally been dependent upon foreign development and manufacture of its technical apparatus and will continue to be until such time when they develop their own industries in this field. Therefore, after this war is over we in the United States have an excellent opportunity of helping our Latin neighbors to build up their communication systems with the introduction of American designed and manufactured equipment, particularly the new developments which are now taking place. Obviously European countries will make a determined effort to compete in this field, particularly as they already have interests in the territory, and it would seem logical that the United States interests should make a thorough study and prepare themselves in order that they may be in the most advantageous position. From a hemisphere defense angle it seems good commonsense that communications should be entirely controlled by hemisphere interests. Therefore, the problem is not only commercial but also political and communications should be an important item in any Pan-American agreements now in existence or hereafter undertaken.

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I am herewith submitting the general survey, the first part mentioned previously, and will immediately begin work on the second part which will be more in detail.

C. A. Horn
Technical Adviser

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan DATE: March 19, 1943

FROM: C. W. Horn

SUBJECT: General Survey of the Communications Situation in Latin America

Telegraph and telephone communications involve land wire lines, submarine cable and radio. This survey is divided into two parts - (A) Wire Lines (telephone and telegraph); and (B) Radio and Cable (telephone and telegraph).

A. WIRE LINES (telephone and telegraph)

In all of Latin America the land wire telegraph services are owned and operated by the respective governments. In some of the countries the service is inadequate while in some others it meets the demands. All of Central America and the West Indies have a total of 144,000 miles of wire while all of South America has a total of 373,000 miles of wire which makes a total of 517,000 miles of telegraph wire south of the Rio Grande. As a measure of comparison the United States has 2,300,000 miles.

In the case of wire line telephones we find that the greatest concentration is naturally in the vicinity of the greatest population centers. As these are relatively few and far apart we find that there has been little incentive toward interconnection between these areas until the advent of radiotelephony. Now, with a few exceptions,

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notably the wire circuits between Buenos Aires and Santiago, Chile; and the cable between Buenos Aires and Montevideo; the traffic between the larger cities of Latin America is handled by radio telephone circuits.

There are 1,345,000 telephones in all of Latin America including the West Indies. As a comparison we find that Canada alone has 1,333,000 telephones while the United States has 21,919,000. The total investment in Latin American telephone plants is estimated at about [illegible],000,000 of which 53.3 per cent is held by [illegible] of the United States and only 5.4 per cent by local interests or governments. Canada comes second with about [illegible],000,000 invested, then Sweden with [illegible], Great Britain with 30,000,000 and France and the Netherlands with 3,000,000 each. * See Note below.

Until about the beginning of the present century Latin America was more closely related by commercial and cultural ties with Europe than with the United States and for that reason European interests obtained a foothold in the communications field in a number of these countries. American interests, particularly in the telephone field actually bought their way in by buying

* NOTE: Statistics have been obtained from the report "Inter-American Communications" prepared by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs for the Inter-Departmental Committee.

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up some of the existing foreign controlled firms, and then expanding their facilities. We thus find that such companies as L. M. Ericsson Telephone Company of Swedon and Siemens & Halske of Germany have substantial interests in the telephone business in the Argentine. We find that the Canadian interests through control of the Brazilian Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd. are the owners of the Companhia Telefonica Brasileira which is by far the largest telephone company in Brazil. The British control a company known as the Para Telephone Company, Ltd. while American interests, both International Telephone & Telegraph and American & Foreign Power Company own the telephone systems in a number of localities.

In Chile the largest interest in the telephone field is controlled by the International Telephone & Telegraph of the United States.

The telephones of Ecuador are controlled by the L. M. Ericsson Telephone Company of Sweden while the German firm of Siemens & Halske controls the telephones of Paraguay.

The Mexican Telephone & Telegraph Company, one of the two largest telephone companies in Mexico, is 51 per cent owned by International Telephone & Telegraph while 49 per cent is L. M. Ericsson of Sweden. The other

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telephone company known as Empresa de Telefonos Ericsson, S.A. is controlled outright by the L. M. Ericsson Company of Sweden. There are several smaller companies locally owned and government owned. In recent years the Mexican government has endeavored to eliminate the use of the duplicate telephone system particularly in Mexico City, and has been putting pressure on the two above named companies to consolidate their facilities.

American interests control the telephone systems in Cuba, Costa Rica, Columbia, and Panama. The British control the largest telephone company in Venzuela. In Peru the International Telephone and Telegraph Company Inc. controls the larger interest while the British Marconi Company controls one of the smaller companies.

The attached tabulation indicates the extent of foreign ownership of telephone facilities in the Latin American countries.

B. RADIO and CABLE (telephone and telegraph)

The first communications contacts that the South American countries had with countries outside of their continent were by cable. During the period when the British were expanding the cable industry to its fullest they provided a circuit via West Africa to Brazil and Argentina and also up the west coast of South America. This first cable between England to Brazil was opened in 1875 and all traffic between the United States and

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South America had to be routed via England. In later years the French cable company laid a cable via Cape Dakar to Brazil. This was followed by a German cable which was laid in 1911. After the World War the Italian also entered this field.

An American cable company made connections between the United States and Colombia and Peru in the early 1890's. This company, now known as the All America Cables and Radio Incorporated, now has cables connecting the United States with all of the 20 Latin American republics and some of the West Indies Islands. The Western Union Telegraph Company has a cable which connects with a British cable in the West Indies. Incidentally the French, German and Italian cables across the South Atlantic are not in operation at the present time.

Several years prior to 1920 the major radio communications companies of the world, notably the American, British, German and French engaged in highly competitive activities to establish radio stations in Latin America for the purpose of developing radio telegraph communications in this area. This competitive situation was finally eliminated by the pooling of the resources of this group through the so-called "Transradio Consortium". Under this agreement the interests of four companies, each the largest radio interest in its country, pooled their

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resources and rights in the South American republics and established a board of eight trustees and a chairman. These rights to be held for the four parties in equal shares. The Radio Corporation of America, in addition to its own two trustees, also names the chairman who is required to be an American citizen not connected with the Radio Corporation of America. Under this Trust (commonly known as A.E.F.G. Trust) national companies were formed in the republics of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to conduct international communication services in each of these countries. These national companies are organized under the laws of the country in which they exist. The voting controls of these national companies varies in different percentages with the majority held by the A.E.F.G. Trust in each of the three countries mentioned.

In most of the countries of Latin America the international radio telephone and telegraph stations are controlled by foreign countries. A tabulation is attached hereto showing the situation in each of the Latin American countries in respect to international communications by submarine cable and radio.

Many of the countries in Latin America have laws which require that a certain percentage, in many cases approximately 80 per cent, of the technical and administrative employees of the communication companies must be

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citizens. The laws of the United States require that communication companies be owned by American citizens and that the top executives of such company all be American citizens. It is logical to believe that other American republics will follow similar lines and for defense purposes enact legislation with a tendency toward stricter native control and ownership. The reason that this has not been done before is because they had to depend upon foreigners for equipment, trained personnel and financing.

It is reasonable to assume that our Latin American neighbors will be in favor of national control of their communications systems and perhaps restrictions favoring hemispheric control. A new deal may be necessary to accomplish such a move and I feel that we have perhaps reached the psychological moment for advancing such a proposition. At present the feeling in all of these countries is somewhat united against the Axis and possibly also European idealisms. If we wait until peace has been concluded it is possible that we will receive much greater competition to such a plan, which competition may be more effective because the hatreds of war will have greatly subsided.

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C. W. Horn
Technical Adviser

Enclosure

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NATIONALITY OF INTERESTS CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

	TELEPHONES (Land Wire) (Comparison indicated by number of telephones)							SUBMARINE CABLE CONNECTIONS	RADIO (Int. Circuits)	
	Total no. of telephones	Locally owned Govt. & Private	United States	Great Britain	Germany	Sweden	Canada		Telephone	Telegraph
[illegible]										
[illegible] Rica	5,485	152	5,333					A.A.C. (U.S.)	T.R.T. (US)	T.R.T. (US)
[illegible]mala	3,661	3,661						A.A.C. (U.S.)	T.R.T. (US)	T.R.T. (US)
[illegible]ras	4,852	4,852						None	T.R.T. (US)	T.R.T. (US)
[illegible]co	178,726	8,500	72,744			97,482		A.A.C. (US) Mexican Telegraph Co. (Western Union 60% and A.A.C. 40%) (US)	None	Mexican Government
[illegible]ragua	1,800	1,800						A.A.C. (U.S.	T.R.T. (US)	T.R.T. (US)
[illegible]ma	14,722	8,557	6,165					A.A.C. (US)	T.R.T. (US)	T.R.T. (US)
[illegible]lvador	4,000	4,000						A.A.C. (US)	Government	Government

See Note for Abbreviations.

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NATIONALITY OF INTERESTS CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Country	TELEPHONES (land wire) (Comparison indicated by number of telephones)							SUBMARINE CABLE CONNECTIONS	RADIO (International Circuits)	
	Total no. of telephones	Locally owned Govt. & Private	United States	Great Britain	Germany	Sweden	Canada		Telephone	[illegible]
[illegible] America										
[illegible]gentina	460,857	1,579	419,052		8,240	28,966		A.A.C. (U.S.) Italian (Italian) C&W (British) Plata River Cable to Uraguay (German)	I.T.&T. (US) A.E.F.G. (European)	A.A.C. (US) A.E.F.G. (European)
[illegible]livia	2,621	500					2,121	A.A.C. (U.S.) C&W (British)	I.T.&T. (US)	Marconi Wireless (British)
[illegible]razil	290,000	25,599	37,233	3,099			224,069	A.A.C. (U.S.) Amazon Tel. Co. (British) Italian Cable (Italian) C & W (British)	I.T.&T. (US) A.E.F.G. (European)	I.T.&T.(US) A.E.F.G. (European)
[illegible]hile	90,943	4,788	86,155					A.A.C. (U.S.) C & W (British)	I.T.&T. (US)	A.E.F.G. (European)
[illegible]olombia	42,600	32,128	10,472					A.A.C. (U.S.)	Marconi W.T. (US & British) Assoc. T & T Co. (US) A.A.C. (U.S)	Government A.A.C.(US) Marconi W. T. Co. (US-60%) (British 40%)
[illegible]uador	7,600	4,400				3,200		A.A.C. (U.S.)	None	Govt.Station under construction

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NATIONALITY OF INTERESTS CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Country	TELEPHONES (land wire) (Connection indicated by number of telephones) Total No. of telephones	Locally owned Govt. & Private	United States	Great Britain	Netherlands	France	Germany	SUBMARINE CABLE CONNECTIONS	RADIO (International Circuits) Telephone	Telegraph
Latin America										
[illegible]	3,800						3,800	None	None	None
[illegible]	35,151	5,750	25,974	3,427				A.A.C. (U.S.) C & W (British)	A.A.C. (U.S.)	A.A.C. (US) C & W (British)
[illegible]	55,000	45,154					3,502	A.A.C. (U.S.) C & W (British) Italian Cable (Italian)	Via Buenos Aires thru German controlled cable.	Via Buenos Aires. Govt. station to Brazil
[illegible]uela	31,856	2,060		29,796				A.A.C. (U.S.)	Caracas (British)	Govt. Station
[illegible]tish Guiana	2,528			2,528				C & W (British)	None	None
[illegible]nch Guiana	168	168				168		French Cable	None	Government
[illegible]ch Guiana	662	662			662			None	Government	Government

NOTE: Abbreviations - Plata River Cable - Compania Telegrafica-Telefonica del Plata (owned I.T.&T. 45.58% and Siemens & Halske 54.52%). Connects Argentina and Uraguay with both telephone and telegraph service. (Germany)

A.E.F.G. - Transradio Consortium, also called the A.E.F.G. Trust. (Owned 25% by Radio Corporation of America, Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. Lt (now called Cables & Wireless Ltd) Compagnie Generale de Telegraphic Sans Fil, and Telefunken, respectively American, British, French and German.

I.T.&T. - International Telephone & Telegraph Company, U.S.

R.C.A. - Radio Corporation of America, U.S.

C & W - Cables and Wireless Ltd. (British)

T.R.T. - Tropical Radio Telegraph Co. (United Fruit Co.) U.S.

A.A.C. - All America Cables & Radio Inc. - International Telephone & Telegraph Company (U.S.)

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Communications Div. 10,921
x Eddy
x Legal
x Personnel

March 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: The Secretariat

With reference to the attached memorandum from Lt. Colonel Lowman, I think the request should be made, if it has not already been done, to Eddy to get the theater commander to request the transfer to him of the men listed, and if possible to allow the 100 pounds over and above their standard personal equipment allowance. If we get that we can then make the request for transportation.

W.J.D.

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Communications Bk. 10, 8.41
X Eddy, Wm.
X Requests
X Personnel

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: The Secretariat

With reference to the attached memorandum from Lt. Colonel Lowman, I think the request should be made, if it has not already been done, to Eddy to get the theater commander to request the transfer to him of the men listed, and if possible to allow the 100 pounds over and above their standard personal equipment allowance. If we get that we can then make the request for transportation.

W.J.D. D

3/23/43

Col. Lowman says that the men have been requested by the Theater Commander. They are in the first group of 28 requisitioned of OPD by AFHQ. As for the 100 lb., Col. L. has arranged to transport the equipment by SO & SI men going into that area (as per memo to Col. Donovan, 3/18/43). He feels there is no longer a problem in that connection.

EJP

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO Colonel Donovan

DATE: March 10, 1943

FROM Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT

You inquired as to the present status in regard to the efforts of the Communications Branch in taking care of the immediate needs as requested by Colonel Eddy for North Africa.

Since this operation now has the approval of the Theater Commander and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff something should be done to expedite the shipment of the following 8 men who are so urgently asked for in that theater.

Tech. Fifth Grade	Buck M. Milliford
Tech. Fifth Grade	Oscar Garcia
Tech. Fifth Grade	Clayton C. Masterson
Tech. Fifth Grade	Austin H. Thompson
Tech. Fifth Grade	Fred L. Holm
Tech. Fifth Grade	Will S. Talbot
Pvt.	William J. Dillon
Pvt.	Clarence R. Cox

These men are radio operators for fixed stations and for our secret communications. In addition to their obtaining transportation, if it were possible to allow them each 100 pounds over and above their standard personal equipment allowance, they would be able

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SECRET

to take over agent nets and a number of crystals to relieve the present situation.

We have received cables on this subject from Colonel Eddy: No. 6 to you dated December 2; No. 19 dated December 15; No. 39 dated January 13; No. 91 to SI dated February 21; and a most urgent message, No. 103 dated February 26.

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Communications 10,791

FEB 17 RECD

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

x Africa, N.
x Direction Finders
x Enemy
x Radio Stations

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO Colonel Donovan

DATE February 15, 1943

FROM: Lt. Col. Lowman

SUBJECT. DF (Direction Finding)

In answer to your inquiry to me asking for an explanation of Colonel Eddy's cable #68 to you, I am attaching explanatory report from our Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Simpson.

I have also attached an additional copy, with the thought that you might want to send this along to General Magruder, since he was also interested in the subject.

SECRET

Attachments

To General Magruder
Will you look
at this - and
return it
D.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Lt. Col. Lowman

DATE: February 12, 1943

FROM: Lieutenant Simpson

SUBJECT:

1. In reference to #68 from Eddy to Donovan—portable loop direction finders are rather insensitive to weak signals, and in most cases can not receive high frequency signals from thirty to several hundred miles away from them because of a phenomenon known as "skip"; that is, short-wave signals go straight up into the sky and are reflected down to a distant point with no signal apparent in between the transmitting point and the distant arrival point.

2. To compensate for this, permanent or semi-permanent Adcock long-range direction finding systems are placed at convenient points from one hundred to one thousand miles apart, to take bearings which locate a station within an area of from thirty to fifty miles in diameter.

3. After the long-range Adcocks definitely place a station in a certain area, the mobile loop units take up the trail in automobiles, if roads are available, or pack sets if not, and criss-cross through the area until the signal is picked up. Then, of course, it's a matter of following the DF indication to the exact spot of the transmitter.

4. One direction finder of either long-range or portable loop is rather limited in its usefulness since it can only give direction and not distance. For this reason, two, and preferably three, long-range units should work together. Furthermore, if British and French DFing groups are working in an area, it is strongly suggested that all units be combined in order to have several effective operating groups.

5. I am quite sure that what DF equipment the U. S. Army has in Africa is being used in the direction of aircraft over the vast theater of operations, and none of it is available for clandestine station location. I am also inclined to believe, from the tone of messages signed by either Eisenhower or CINC, that they desire OSS to head up this group, or at least supply equipment and try to coordinate the situation.

JHS

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February 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Colonel Lowman

Please tell me the meaning of #68 from Eddy for me, copy of which you have received.

W.J.D.

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February 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Colonel Lowman

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W.J.D.

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM

To: General Magruder

From: William H. Vanderbilt

January 30, 1943

I attach memo from Lt. Colonel Lowman which is self-explanatory. Inasmuch as this is an intelligence matter, could you advise whether or not you recommend our making such an arrangement providing it is first approved by Colonel Donovan.

WHV.
William H. Vanderbilt

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Commander Vanderbilt

DATE: January 29, 1943

FROM: Lt. Col. Lowman

SUBJECT:

Colonel Eddy has cabled asking us to furnish direction-finding equipment for the purpose of locating enemy radio bases along the coast of North Africa. One of the main connections here is the information sent to submarines on provisioning and fueling and general intelligence for their activities.

At the present time we have a group of men working out of Liberia on this type of operation for Jf. This means that between the several points that will eventually be established a fairly complete direction finding job can be done in the whole Northern section of Africa.

The only people who make the kind of apparatus that will do this type of work effectively is the Federal Communications Commission. As you know, they are engaging in this work throughout the United States and limited thereto. The F.C.C. have been extremely cooperative and have agreed to build us the equipment we require. They have also agreed to help train our men.

They have informed us that they have weekly meetings with the F.B.I., the British and, I believe, G-2, to exchange information on direction finding pretty well throughout the world. Since we are getting in on this work ourselves, several questions come up that should be decided as to our participation. Do we, in the spirit of cooperation, wish to attend these meetings which are of interest generally and which can aid greatly in the effectiveness of the job we contemplate?

It is our understanding that these meetings are really under the auspices of the F.B.I., as coordinator of all intelligence information within the United States. They do not want our participation in these meetings unless we are willing to contribute what information we obtain. That is a question which should be investigated as to policy here before we go any further.

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SECRET

It would also seem that the information gained from this source, aside from our work in North Africa, would be of general intelligence value to the OSS.

I have just talked to Mr. Jett of the F.C.C., and Capt. Moro has had discussions with Mr. Sterling, Chief of their Intelligence. It is now at the point that we are asked to contribute if we wish to participate, and a decision on this question would be appreciated. If it is decided that we should, then a letter should be prepared for Col. Donovan's signature addressed to Chairman Fly of the Federal Communications Commission, requesting that we be admitted to the group for the exchange of pertinent information. Mr. Jett said they would then ask us to appoint a Liaison Officer from the Branch to attend the meetings.

SECRET

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File

Communications 10/671
× Radio Photo [illegible]
× China
× Lasey, Alghan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

DATE: February 29, 1944

SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible] This [illegible] Such [illegible] therefore [illegible] obtain at [illegible] with Colonel [illegible] his in services.

[illegible] Lieve that [illegible] radio companies [illegible] that we should [illegible] their facilities wherever available. If our traffic should become heavy [illegible] we should either lease their facilities or perhaps even take them over, the same as we now do with telegraph and telephone circuits. This is the quickest way of obtaining such services.

Enclosure

C. W. Horn
Technical Adviser

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Colonel Donovan

February 22, 1943

C. W. Horn

Radio Photo Circuits

In reference to the attached memorandum dated February 15 from Lt. Col. Lowman to Mr. Lusey. This memo concerns the suggestion of Mr. Lusey for the establishment of a radio photo circuit between the United States and China.

I agree with Colonel Lowman that we should make use of existing commercial radio circuits for the transmission of photos and facsimile material by radio. Such a circuit requires monitoring circuits and therefore considerable equipment which may be difficult to obtain at present. I note that Mr. Lusey concurs with Colonel Lowman's recommendation of using existing services.

I believe that American cable and radio companies are a part of the American war effort and that we should use their facilities wherever available. If our traffic should become heavy enough we should either lease their facilities or perhaps even take them over, the same as we now do with telegraph and telephone circuits. This is the quickest way of obtaining such services.

Enclosure

C. W. Horn
Technical Adviser

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Col. W.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Lusey

DATE: 2/15/43

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT:

CONFIDENTIAL

Concerning our conversation in this office February 12, regarding radio photo work, it is our recommendation that this be set up with Press Wireless:

(1) On the basis of it being an additional activity on our part which we are not presently set up to handle. As discussed, it would require taking at least one man off other work and also setting up a dark room.

(2) Press Wireless have the trained personnel and are far better equipped to take care of such traffic.

(3) If at some point it be deemed advisable to make such an installation, we can always do so, but as to its being an excuse for further use of the Hollywood plant on our part, I am sure the way things are shaping up, that we will find a better excuse than that to use it.

NAL

I concur.
OVL

To Charlie Horne
What do you think of this?

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Communications Branch

RESTRICTED

ELP
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

London

Dated February 16, 1943

Rec'd 10:21 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY

1211, February 16, 11 p.m.

Following for Leigh and Grandin, Federal Communications Commission, from Anderson.

31430. Reference my 61145 via state:

One. Colonel Hazeltine states that Office of War Information and Office of Strategic Services have each placed at his disposal a $10,000 credit with the American Consulate General, Algiers. In addition the Army Finance Officer of HQ has been instructed by both organizations through the Army Finance Office in Washington to pay any vouchers submitted by Colonel Hazeltine. This allows him considerable freedom of decision and movement within limits restricting any government expenditure.

Two. Federal Communications Commission expenditures began with Peters' but authorization therefore did not arrive until January 31, State Department cable number 161. Since Federal Communications Commission operations had to proceed, Colonel Hazeltine paid for them but of the general funds at his disposal. Now, however, he wants Federal Communications Commission to establish a $10,000 fund with the American Consulate General, Algiers to cover these past expenditures. He also desires a future credit of $5,000 monthly, the total amount of which might or might not be used. This future credit could best be arranged through the Army Finance Officer in Washington.

Three. Colonel Hazeltine anticipates the need for two monitoring units in Algiers: one to remain in the neighborhood of the broadcasting station to serve the requirements of the broadcasters; the

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other to move forward with AFHQ and supply its needs. It is particular reference to these changes, the exact expenditures for which cannot be anticipated, that he desires the above credit to be established. If this cannot be done, he will make his headquarters the proposal outlined in my previous cable.

Four. Colonel Hazeltine emphasizes that he is very satisfied that the work of the Federal Communications Commission staff - so much so that he will make every effort to have them transferred to any organization which might eventually take over monitoring operations in Algiers.

Five. Colonel Hazeltine would appreciate an early reply, which should be sent to him in Algiers since he will be in London for only a few days.

MATTHEWS

KLP
C O P Y

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Communications 10,589
Hallicrafter
Receiver

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 20, 1943

TO: Mr. James R. Murphy

FROM: Captain J.E. Horton

SUBJECT

I am attaching hereto copies of our Shipping Order #1130 - 1 Hallicrafter communications receiver. The cargo shipment #1925 means that it was sent to you in your name c/o OSS, American Embassy, London, England. We are advised that this will probably move within the next two days.

2/26 [illegible] from Horton [illegible] [illegible] Shipped -

Attach/2

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

February 1[illegible], 19[illegible]
No. 1126

SHIPPING ORDER

Exp. No. .....

S. R. S. No. .....

Shipping Instructions (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

Cargo Shipment #1[illegible]

[illegible] Capt. A.U.S.
Authorizing Officer.

Item	Quantity	Description	Box No.	Weight	Dimensions
	1	SX-28 receiver with tubes and speaker		101 lbs.	[illegible] x 1[illegible] x 4[illegible]

DUPLICATE

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

February [illegible] 1944

SHIPPING ORDER

NY 1320

Exp. No. .....

S. R. S. No. .....

Shipping Instructions (Be specified by [illegible])

[illegible]

Authorizing Officer.

Item	Quantity	Description	Box No.	Weight	Dimensions
	1	SX-28 receiver with tubes and speaker		[illegible] lbs.	[illegible]

DUPLICATE

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Communications
x Miller, W.
x Faulkner
x M.O.
x Radio

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Frederick Oechsner

DATE: February 18, 1943

SUBJECT:

I feel that we are making steady progress in the radio matter. Yesterday I had a meeting of the technical experts, and we thrashed out pretty well what we would require in the way of equipment and power to set up operations in North Africa.

The attitudes of WPB and of Brophy seem to promise the possibility of expediting procurement of equipment, and I am working on the requisite lists which I will take up with Jim Murphy for handling either through Commander Vanderbilt and the WPB or through Brophy.

On the personnel side, Mr. Faulknor, the Chief Engineer of CBS in Chicago, is ready to come with us (the best arrangement for him would be a Major's commission), and we have located the names of several outstanding men who could work with him as a team, actually setting up the stuff over there. On the editorial side, I have been lining up possibilities, some of whom I will see in New York this weekend; the program end also is moving ahead.

My crying need is, of course, for some man to take this radio thing over and run it as soon as I get it over the hump. Stewart Brown would be a possibility for this. I saw Mr. Davis

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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yesterday morning in this connection, and I am sure that he would let Mr. Brown go only with the greatest reluctance. He is to talk with Stewart and make various other inquiries and will get in touch with us.

Another major need is for a man to take over the Publications and Campaigns Division (pamphlets, leaflets, whispering campaigns, round-robin letters, etc.). I have interviewed one prospect, Mr. William Philips, presently in charge of domestic publications work for OWI; he is much interested in coming with us and might be our man for the job. In New York, I hope to see several people who might work with us on publications in a subsidiary capacity.

I hope you will be able to fit a visit to the combat cadre at Camp Ritchie into your program not too distantly. Pending our decision from the JCS regarding activation, it would do the boys' morale a lot of good.

F.C.O.

F.C.O.

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File

Communications Branch 10,516
x Personnel Military
x Allotment
x Signal Corps.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Lowman

To: Colonel Donovan

Subject: Allotment and Procurement Objectives

Through our own experience with Communications personnel we find that it will be continually difficult to obtain officer material through an allotment plan. The Signal Corps have a fast and very successful program of training operators, but great difficulty in obtaining sufficient officer material to handle these men.

We have found that in requesting officers by name from the Signal Corps that they have in the past refused to release them, even though on two of these requests the men were in office jobs. When the Signal Corps found out we were interested, I presume they looked into the qualifications of the men requested and soon afterwards assigned them to jobs in the field where their past records of achievement could result in the best results for Signal Corps work.

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With this experience it is only natural that if under an allotment request to the Signal Corps we ask for assignment of officers, they would be reluctant to give up their good men. There can be no real objection to this, I suppose, and since that is the case we find that we are unable even now to obtain men from civilian life who can fit our needs and make good officers. To sum up, we believe the Signal Corps can supply us with radio operators without hurting their program and probably with some officers, but for the most part we will be left on our own, and are perfectly willing to take this responsibility through a procurement objective in each case and through our own efforts in obtaining officer material.

Our present allotment for the all too scanty procurement objective under the 90-day arrangements we are now working under, is essential to us in the acquiring of personnel to use as a working basis for projects that will later be officially approved and perhaps expanded. We must set up small groups of well-trained executive officers and men whose knowledge and experience of our needs can be immediately put to the task of

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licking the timing problem between the waiting for final approval and the go-ahead signal.

In other words, when a project is approved it calls for immediate action and we must have officers and men who are trained in the highly specialized work we are called upon to do and ready to leave by boat or plane to set up our preliminary objective.

The men asked for under the project itself are later processed in the same way and sent out in the field to supplement and build on to the neculeus already established.

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Communications 10.4.43
Equipment
Sadowski, Col
Polish

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: 2/12/43

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT:

SECRET

I arranged with Lt. Colonel Sadowski to meet with his own engineers and with ours to exchange ideas on the agent sets. He was eager that our own engineers see the Polish ones. An experiment was set up for today, contact arrangements were made between Temporary Building Q and the Communications Camp.

I knew from Colonel Sadowski that he had been trying to persuade G-2 and the Signal Corps to help him get priorities for parts. It wasn't until this morning, however, just before our experimental meeting, that I learned that Lt. Colonel Sadowski was bringing Captain Zamoyski, who, I understand, is the Military Attache of the Embassy. They had also invited Colonel Yeaton of G-2 who had asked Major McCann and Lt. Kingman of the Signal Corps.

When Colonel Yeaton arrived, I asked him if he knew the Signal Corps men that were coming and he said "yes", that they were attached to G-2 as technical advisers, and that he brought them along to see the Polish set in operation. I explained to him that it was somewhat embarrassing since we had no idea the Poles were using our offices as a place to carry on a demonstration

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which we had arranged with them for the purposes of selling G-2 on the idea of clearing priorities. Colonel Yeaton said it did not matter to him where the experiment was held, and that he had wondered why it was being conducted over here-- tossing it off very lightly. He personally vouched for both Major McCann and Lt. Kingman.

Colonel Yeaton was very frank in his statements and said that he had brought the Signal Corps technicians along not only to get their opinion as to the value of the Poles' work so that they could consider the priority problem, but also so that they would be better able to advise him in evaluating the intelligence matter that they received. In other words, by knowing what the sets could do, he could better tell if the statement was made that a Polish agent in Germany had relayed the information to England, whether it was technically possible, or not.

He went on to say that he thought it was very unfortunate that the Army had not been granted the right to gather intelligence in the manner that you have been authorized to; that you had gotten the money and therefore they were not able to establish this kind of undertaking themselves. He hastened to add, however, that he was delighted that the money had gone to you, since the work was important and should be done for the good of the country.

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In defense of G-2 he stated that before the War, the Government did not recognize the importance of intelligence, and that any criticism of G-2 was entirely uncalled for when you looked at their record of only having 27 men on military intelligence throughout the world!

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Communications Br. 10,454
X Approval
X Projects

Messrs. Whitney Shepardson and
Davis Halliwell
Colonel Donovan

February 8, 1943

Preparation of Projects

Please notify the appropriate members of your respective Branches that all projects which will require the use of communications equipment or facilities are to be approved in respect of such requirements by the Communications Branch prior to submission to the Secretariat for further handling.

W. J. D.

EXPLT [illegible] :IRN

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Communication Equipment 10,416
x Radio
x Transmitters
x War Dept (Signal Corps)
x OWI

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. James Murphy

DATE: February 18, 1943

FROM: Frederick Oechsner

SUBJECT: Radio Equipment

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

order #5 RCA
J.P.S. 47817
Purchase order 5306
2-50KW

Before leaving for New York, I want to provide you with this general estimate of our radio needs so that you may discuss it with Brophy in broad outline. If OWI has some of this equipment and if Brophy's O.K. is enough authorization for them to turn it over to us, then fine. If, however, we have to go through the WPB, I would like to know what procedure to follow so that we can get this going simultaneously with our search for personnel.

On that material which OWI would not be able to furnish us, but which WPB is willing to help us get, I suppose we should proceed through Commander Vanderbilt's office.

In case OWI has not got any 50 KW broadcast-band transmitters available (though I understand that they have two on order, work on which was suspended), we should revert to C.W.Horn's memorandum of February 10th regarding "Procurement of Radio Broadcasting Equipment". We should lose no

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time then in trying to get, let us say, at least three of these transmitters from the Signal Corps.

Here is the total equipment needed as of present reckoning:

3 to 5 Radio Broadcast Transmitters of 50 KW or more strength;

3 to 5 broadcast transmitters of 5 KW strength, for possible use in the combat detachments or for emergency use in the field pending procurement of 50 KW equipment; (I understand that OWI has some of these 5 KW transmitters which they might be willing to let us have.)

For the combat companies, 32 Hammarlund receivers, Model "Super-Pro" or, if those are not available, 32 Hallicrafter receivers, Model SX-28.

(A memorandum from Major Weaver informs me that a source for these Hallicrafter receivers has been located and that we could procure them immediately upon receipt of the proper directive. In the event Hammarlund "Super-Pros" are available in insufficient quantities, we should get as many as are available and make up the deficiency with Hallicrafters.)

I will look forward to hearing the outcome when I return from New York, at which time I can take up whatever is necessary to be done in the way of approaching WPB directly or through Commander Vanderbilt's office.

Z.C.O.
F.C.O.

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Communications 10,416
x Radio
x Transmitters
x War Dept.
x OWI

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. James Murphy

DATE: February 12, 194[illegible]

FROM: Frederick Oechsner

SUBJECT:

Something to remember when we dicker for radio equipment (whether from the Signal Corps or stuff that OWI may have earmarked) is that we are not interested in short-wave transmitters, but broadcasting transmitters.

I mention this in connection with the Colonel's letter to General Deane.

Thanks D.

F.C.O.
F.C.O.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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COPY
COLONEL DONOVAN

SECRET

Mr. P. C. Ochsner
C. W. Horn

February 8, 1943

Radio Broadcasting

We have agreed that there is an immediate need for one or more broadcast transmitting stations complete to be erected in the locality discussed in our recent meeting. What we need immediately is at least one 50 kilowatt broadcast transmitter operating on the regular broadcast frequencies (not short wave) and inasmuch as it usually takes from eight months to a year to build this apparatus we will have to find some way of achieving our objective in order not to jeopardize the project by delay.

I have found that the Signal Corps of the U. S. Army placed two orders for the construction of a total of five 50 kilowatt broadcast transmitters with the Radio Corporation of America. I also find that this apparatus is just about ready for shipment. Obviously the thing for us to do is to try and obtain one or more from the Signal Corps. I have no idea as to the reason why the Signal Corps ordered this particular type of apparatus unless it was possibly for purposes similar to those for which we desire to use it. In this case, inasmuch as OSS has taken over this activity, it would be perfectly logical for the Signal Corps to turn over this apparatus to OSS.

I suggest that the most efficient way of handling this matter is to have Colonel Donovan contact the proper officer in the War Department and make a direct request for this equipment. For purposes of identification Colonel Donovan should ask for one, if possible two, of the five units ordered by the Signal Corps under their contract numbers as follows:

4 - RCA Type 50E Standard Broadcast Transmitters
Contract DA-W2124-SC-681 File No. 8580 -
Phila - 43

1 - RCA Type 50E Standard Broadcast Transmitter
Contract DA-W2124-SC-490 File 16576 -
Phila - 42

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I have also found out that OWI placed an order for 2 similar transmitters with RCA and that they have only been partially completed because of delay orders from OWI. I do not know the reason why OWI issued the delay orders unless they are not certain as to whether they should engage in broadcasting itself or only engage in short wave broadcasting.

I will be glad to obtain additional information if those should be required. The source of this information should not be divulged as it might be embarrassing to some people.

C. W. Horn
Technical Adviser

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COLONEL:

You wondered if you had sent a letter to the JCS on these transmitters. You did write a letter to JCS on transmitters, but they were short wave type. Those referred to by Mr. Horn and Mr. Oechsner are for regular broadcast frequencies (Not short wave).

~~The letter to JCS is attached.~~

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COLONEL:

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Communications 2,416
* Radio
* Transmitters
* War Dept (Signal Corps)
* OWI

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan DATE: February 10, 1943

FROM: Frederick Oechsner

SUBJECT: Procurement of Radio Broadcasting Equipment

Referring to the matter I discussed with you briefly this morning, I attach a copy of a memorandum from C. W. Horn.

You will see that five transmitters are available in all. Mr. Horn cannot offhand think why the Signal Corps should require these transmitters, and he thinks that we ought to go after at least two or three of them. (He considers it possible that the transmitters were ordered on behalf of the Psychological Warfare Section, which has now come over to OSS. If that is the case, we should have a good claim to the equipment.)

Mr. Horn's suggestion, as he states, is that you should make a request for two or three of these transmitters (or all, if you think it advisable), going to as high an authority as you consider necessary to get decisive action on our request.

Mr. Horn asks that we be careful that no mention of his name is made in any correspondence. I would appreciate being kept advised of the progress

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made in this matter.

I am also eager to know what the letter to General Deane, regarding the transmitters routed to OWI, may produce.

F.C.O.

F. C. O.

Att.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. F. C. Oechsner

FROM: C. W. Horn

DATE: February 8, 1943

SUBJECT: Radio Broadcasting

We have agreed that there is an immediate need for one or more broadcast transmitting stations complete to be erected in the locality discussed in our recent meeting. What we need immediately is at least one 50 kilowatt broadcast transmitter operating on the regular broadcast frequencies (not short wave) and inasmuch as it usually takes from eight months to a year to build this apparatus we will have to find some way of achieving our objective in order not to jeopardize the project by delay.

I have found that the Signal Corps of the U.S. Army placed two orders for the construction of a total of five 50 kilowatt broadcast transmitters with the Radio Corporation of America. I also find that this apparatus is just about ready for shipment. Obviously the thing for us to do is to try and obtain one or more from the Signal Corps. I have no idea as to the reason why the Signal Corps ordered this particular type of apparatus unless it was possibly for purposes similar to those for which we desire to use it. In this case, inasmuch as OSS has taken over this activity, it would

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be perfectly logical for the Signal Corps to turn over this apparatus to OSS.

I suggest that the most efficient way of handling this matter is to have Colonel Donovan contact the proper officer in the War Department and make a direct request for this equipment. For purposes of identification Colonel Donovan should ask for one, if possible two, of the five units ordered by the Signal Corps under their contract numbers as follows:

4 - RCA Type 50E Standard Broadcast Transmitters Contract DA -W2124-SC-681 File No. 3580 - Phila - 43

1 - RCA Type 50E Standard Broadcast Transmitter Contract DA-W2124-SC-490 File 16570 - Phila - 42

I have also found out that OWI placed an order for 2 similar transmitters with RCA and that they have only been partially completed because of delay orders from OWI. I do not know the reason why OWI issued these delay orders unless they are not certain as to whether they should engage in broadcasting itself or only engage in short wave broadcasting.

I will be glad to obtain additional information if these should be required. The source of this information should not be divulged as it might be embarrassing to some people.

/s/ C. W. Horn
Technical Adviser

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Communications Branch

DATE 2/5/43

TO: Mr. Murphy

RE: Attached memo

Have now just had a call from Col. Goodfellow who advises that Col. Woolnough of the War Department (I believe he is General Waldemyor's right-hand man) called him to say he had gotten a note from Mr. Wyatt asking that certain of our people be given transportation. These are probably Treveson and Floyd.

Col. Woolnough said he will not approve OSS people going abroad without the definite assurance from an officer here that the project for which they are going over has been approved by the Joint Chiefs. Col. Goodfellow suggested that I call Col. Woolnough and explain the reasons for our sending our men in advance of this; but, before doing so, I thought you had better have the story and had better give me your advice.

(9175) MAJOR LOWMAN

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Communications Ex. 10,410
x Transportation
x Commissions
x Lowman, L.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. James R. Murphy

DATE: February 8, 1943

FROM: Lt. Col. Lowman

SUBJECT:

This is in regard to our conversation at lunch today on the subject of expediting travel orders for men going abroad and on the subject of pending Navy commissions.

I spoke to Mr. Kirk and told him that he would hear from you, but his understanding, I gather, is still that some authority of the Theater Command or Commander has to be given before men can go overseas.

We would like to get Lt. Graveson and Ensign Floyd off immediately. They are available on 24-hour notice.

Lt. Bates and Pvt. Wood are needed at once in the London Message Center and will be available as soon as they finish their shots, which will be by the 27th of February.

The fixed station operators listed will also get the necessary shots and will be ready by the first week in March. There are ten names, eight of them are surely going and two are alternates. At least four will go to London and four will go to Algiers.

On the matter of Navy commissions, we still feel that under the new Navy ruling Mr. Lang could obtain a commission as Ensign. He is making the attempt himself since there is nothing organically wrong with him and he knows a friend of his received a commission under the same situation.

The other three men have their papers in, have been approved and are just awaiting the log jam which we never seem able to break. Shutty, Shilzony and Faass we are very apt to lose unless we get quick action. Lang will be drafted within a week, but we can still press for his commission as Ensign since, under Navy regulations, he can be commissioned from the Army.

Please advise, and thanks for your help.

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TRANSFERS OVERSEAS PENDING

Lieutenant (SC)	George L. Graveson USNR
Ensign	Ollie R. Floyd

Code Men

2nd Lieutenant	Arthur S. Bates 0-489931
Private	Richard Wood 31265529

Fixed Station Operators

Private	Fred L. Helm	39314598
Private	Carleton W. Campbell	39531221
Private	Will S. Talbot	38198467
Private	William A. Davis	37333408
Private	William J. Dillon	35393592 - ALTERNATE
Private	Oscar M. Garcia	38124268
Private	Buck M. Willeford	38124431
Private	Clayton O. Masterson	18166020
Private	Austin H. Thompson	36368313
Private	Clarence R. Cox	37376040 - ALTERNATE

Navy Commissions or Appointments (pending)

Robert E. Lang	Ensign
Louis J. Schutty	Warrant Officer
Frederick Schilzony	Warrant Officer
Raymond S. Fauss	Warrant Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: February [illegible], 1944

FROM: C. [illegible] Horn

SUBJECT: Communications - Philippines - Australia

I have read the plan proposed by [illegible] Casey and also the comments on this plan by Lt. Colonel Lowman.

I believe that Mr. Casey's plan is good and Col. Lowman informs us he can provide the needed equipment. However I believe this [illegible] should consider the [illegible] suggestion of Mr. Casey as merely one portion of a more general and [illegible] plan for the whole area including the Netherlands East Indies and many of the other islands in this territory. Some of these places are held by rather widely scattered enemy forces and it might not be too difficult for experienced people, preferably natives, to operate without too much danger of capture. An example of this is the small Australian guerrilla force which has been on Timor Island for a considerable period of time.

Australia is the natural base for such operations and it will be necessary for us to operate a well equipped station in that country. The required arrangements will have to be made through the Theatre Commander of that

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area of operations and that brings up two possible angles of approach:

a. That we operate as a unit of U. S. forces under either the Army or Navy, or both.

b. That we operate independently, in which case there may be some difficulty of obtaining permission from the Australian government.

It is probable that the Australians have some such system already in operation and it may be their desire to handle the Australian line of communication themselves, or possibly in a cooperative manner. It seems quite probable that our own military forces already have an organized system of communications in operation [illegible] resist efforts to establish our own system, especially for [illegible] purposes, and maybe for [illegible] already engaged in such work. We must have more and complete information on what both the Australians and our military forces, or perhaps they are acting together under General MacArthur's supreme command, are doing in order to plan the proper approach and gain their cooperation in carrying out our assigned duties. We must be ready to do a bigger and better job than has been done heretofore in this area, if anything has been done, and present a complete and comprehensive plan to the Theatre Commander.

Inasmuch as any plan we prepare will probably be submitted to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for approval, and as such approval will provide the authority to carry out the project,

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it is essential that our proposal be complete and recognize the existing situation in this area. It is means that we will have to obtain information from Australia if it is not available here in the War and Navy Departments.

After a study has been made and plan has been approved the method of operation will probably require that headquarters for this activity be established in Australia. The OSS representative in charge will require full authority and will of course have to be held fully responsible for all activities. This means that he will have to recruit the necessary staffs for psychological warfare activities including natives and others who know the territory intimately. He will have to obtain material and have liaison with the Commander of the theatre operations. It is means that it will be a sizeable project. Mr. Lucy's proposal only considered the Philippine Islands. Inasmuch as the same equipment and organization, somewhat expanded, can handle all of the territory in the Southwest Pacific it is felt that we should undertake the general plan rather than the limited one suggested. It should be no more difficult to obtain approval of the general plan than a plan which only provides for a portion of the activities.

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C. W. Korn
Technical Adviser

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Colonel Donovan

February 14, 1942

C. W. Horn

Communications - Philippines - Australia

I have read the plan proposed by A. R. Lusey and also the comments on this plan by Lt. Colonel Lowman.

I believe that Mr. Lusey's plan is good and Col. Lowman informs us he can provide the needed equipment. However I believe that we should consider the Philippine suggestion of Mr. Lusey as merely one portion of a more general and comprehensive plan for the whole area including the Netherlands East Indies and many of the other islands in this territory. Some of these places are held by rather widely scattered enemy forces and it might not be too difficult for experienced people, preferably natives, to operate without too much danger of capture. An example of this is the small Australian guerrila force which has been on Timor Island for a considerable period of time.

Australia is the natural base for such operations and it will be necessary for us to operate a well equipped station in that country. The required arrangements will have to be made through the Theatre Commander of that

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a. That we operate as a unit of U. S. forces under either the Army or Navy, or both.

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It is probable that the Australians have some such system already in operation and it may be their desire to handle the Australian line of communication themselves, or possibly in a cooperative manner. It seems quite probable that our own military forces already have an organized system of communications in operation for handling intelligence and might resist efforts to establish our own system, especially for SI purposes, and may be for Psychological Warfare also if they have already engaged in such work. We must have more and complete information on what both the Australians and our military forces, or perhaps they are acting together under General MacArthur's supreme command, are doing in order to plan the proper approach and gain their cooperation in carrying out our assigned duties. We must be ready to do a bigger and better job than has been done heretofore in this area, if anything has been done, and present a complete and comprehensive plan to the Theatre Commander.

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SECRET

C. W. Horn
Technical Advisor

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Communications 10,373
× Philippines
× Luzon
× Australia

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan DATE: 2/13/43

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SECRET

SUBJECT: The attached memo and your request for our recommendations.
(Communications - Philippines - Australia)

As I explained to Mr. Lusey, we fortunately have the equipment available and we agree with him as to the feasibility of the plan.

There are several difficulties which will have to be met. First of all, permission to establish the base station in Australia. As far as I know, we are not in the same position as we were in Cairo where we had already established contacts and set up an office, so that we could get out some of our men and equipment to be available when clearances were made. To establish a base at Darwin at the present most likely point, will take months unless we can find some way of getting out men and equipment very soon.

The project itself if approved by the Joint Chiefs here, should also include a supplementary memorandum giving us an allotment and procurement objective for manpower.

I am taking Mr. Lusey on Monday to meet Mr. Zimmerman, head of the Dutch Procurement Mission in this country, and I am sure that I can make arrangements to borrow Mr. Van Dissell, their most competent engineer, to use as consultant in that field. Mr. Van Dissell is responsible for many of the Dutch installations in Java and can be of great assistance.

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This whole planning will have to be very closely coordinated so that the intricate arrangements for landing men and equipment in the Phillipines can be made very shortly after we can establish a working base in Darwin. This working base can be on more or less of a makeshift basis with semi-portable material and a handful of men, and could be built up on a more permanent scale as operations in that whole territory increase.

How long do you think it will take to get permission to operate in Australia as a base. How far ahead has planning gone on having agents in the Dutch Indies or the Phillipines?

As to Mr. Lusey's suggestion on Page 2 that we consider a portable broadcasting station--I feel much more strongly when he indicates that such a plan would completely jeopardize our under cover work. Anyway, this portable broadcasting equipment which Mr. Coschner is just getting under way on, is a long way off from any possible operations in the Phillipines.

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To: COLONEL LOWMAN

Will you look at the attached and give me your recommendations.

DONOVAN

Director's Office

(3308)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 4, 1943 **SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

FROM: A. R. Lusey

As instructed I submit herewith a brief plan for an SI communications system from the Philippines to Australia and within the Philippines.

Fortunately high frequency radio communication between the Philippines and Australia has always been very easy. I personally have maintained a consistently efficient amateur radio circuit from Manilla to Australia using as low as 30 watts of power - this circuit operating during daylight as well as night. We can, therefore, reduce the weight and bulk of our communication equipment to be landed on the Mindanao coast to reasonable limits.

The personnel and equipment would have to be landed on the coast by submarine. Two separate main base stations should be established at least one hundred miles apart. These base stations should operate on alternate days, on exactly the same frequency and using exactly the same call letters. This should greatly increase the security.

Each agent to be sent in the field should carry a small battery - Vibropack powered transceiver. Scheduled hours of operation would be established between the field agent and the main base station. The main base station would relay the field agent's material to Australia.

The main base stations should be equipped with a gas engine power unit, a 100 watt transmitter and a good receiver. The agent's portable sets should be a maximum of 10 or 15 watts. Each base station should be supplied with at least six months' spare parts for all equipment, several spare agent's sets and a six months' supply of gaso-

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SECRET

line for the engines.

I have discussed this matter with Mr. Allman and he is prepared to draw up an SI plan whenever instructed.

In order to save valuable time it might be desirable to include in the personnel one or two men capable of writing propaganda material based on broadcasts supplied to them from either America or Australia. We could give them a small mimeograph or some kind of duplicating equipment with a sufficient supply of paper and leaflets could be distributed wherever desired. We can also, if desired, include a portable broadcasting station (either high or low frequency) to operate within the Philippines if the opportunity presents itself. However, this would enormously increase the chances of our people being uncovered and the coverage to be had by such broadcasts is a very much disputed quantity. I believe that the best possible coverage for propaganda would be, at least at first, by printed material and word of mouth.

Our agents would, of course, furnish us with much valuable equipment on which to base future SO operations in that area.

The type of equipment suggested herein is available in our own communications department. I have not attempted to list the actual equipment or the type thereof as our communications department is much better qualified to do this.

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Communications 10,373
x Philippines
x Australia
Lusey, A.L.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: LtCommander R. Davis Halliwell

With reference to the copy of Mr. A. R. Lusey's memorandum to you of February 4th on the SI communication system from the Philippines to Australia and within the Philippines, Major Devlin, Lt. Fleischer, and the writer have spent some time on this subject; and we believe the plan is entirely feasible and could be very well worked out.

You will recall that our FE-5 plan calls for an initial trip to the Philippines for the purpose of forming an organization for subversive activities.

This is the plan for which we have three men picked out, who have been standing by for some months— they are the three men with whom you were so helpful during the depth of their morale problem several weeks ago.

Fleischer and Brady particularly would be helpful in assisting in planning, and Kaufman is now in the midwest on a radio test.

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SECRET

The SO Branch will be delighted to "pick up the ball" on our part of this matter just as fast as you believe it advisable. (We have not discussed Mr. Lusey's memorandum with SI or Colonel Lowman.)

R. [illegible]
Lt. Commander, USNR
Deputy Chief, SO

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SECRET

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R. D[illegible] Halliwell
Lt. Commander, USNR
Deputy Chief, SO

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To: COMMANDER HALLIWELL

Will you look at the attached and give me your recommendations.

15937B

DONOVAN

Director's Office

(3308)

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153878

SECRET

February 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

FROM: A. R. Lusey

As instructed I submitted herewith a brief plan for an SI communications system from the Philippines to Australia and within the Philippines.

Fortunately high frequency radio communication between the Philippines and Australia has always been very easy. I personally have maintained a consistently efficient amateur radio circuit from Manilla to Australia using as low as 30 watts of power - this circuit operating during daylight as well as night. We can, therefore, reduce the weight and bulk of our communication equipment to be landed on the Mindanao coast to reasonable limits.

The personnel and equipment would have to be landed on the coast by submarine. Two separate main base stations s hould be established at least one hundred miles apart. These base stations should operate on alternate days, on exactly the same frequency and using exactly the same call letters. This should greatly increase the security.

Each agent to be sent in the field should carry a small battery - Vibropack powered transceiver. Scheduled hours of operation would be established between the field agent and the main base station. The main base station would relay the field agent's material to Australia.

The main base stations should be equipped with a gas engine power unit, a 100 watt transmitter and a good receiver. The agent's portable sets should be a maximum of 10 or 15 watts. Each base station should be supplied with at least six months spare parts for all equipment, several spare agent's sets and a six months supply of gaso-

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SECRET

line for the engines.

I have discussed this matter with Mr. Allman and he is prepared to draw up an SI plan whenever instructed.

In order to save valuable time it might be desirable to include in the personnel one or two men capable of writing propaganda material based on broadcasts supplied to them from either America or Australia. We could give them a small mimeograph or some kind of duplicating equipment with a sufficient supply of paper and leaflets could be distributed wherever desired. We can also, if desired, include a portable broadcasting station (either high or low frequency) to operate within the Philippines if the opportunity presents itself. However, this would enormously increase the chances of our people being uncovered and the coverage to be had by such broadcasts is a very much disputed quantity. I believe that the best possible coverage for propaganda would be, at least at first, by printed material and word of mouth.

Our agents would, of course, furnish us with much valuable equipment on which to base future SO operations in that area.

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URGENT

(852)

EGIC SERVICES

Communications

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

FROM: A. R. Lusey

With reference to my memorandum on Philippines communications, I have discussed this matter very thoroughly with Colonel Lowman and his communications experts.

We are in complete agreement as to technical requirements and Colonel Lowman says there is no problem involved as regards equipment. He would like all the time possible in order to develop proper operating personnel.

I would suggest he be given authority to start work on this project immediately so that when we are ready to go ahead no time will be lost.

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Communication from [illegible]
[illegible]
Hunt, Capt. Charles
England

February 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Colonel Lowman

I have your memorandum on communications with England dated January 29. Of course I would be very glad to sit with you any time you wish. Please let me know.

W.J.D.

7

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 29, 1945

FROM: Lt. Col. Lowman

SUBJECT: Communications - England

In reply to your January 27th memorandum asking if cable No. 25150 from London had been answered. This has not been done because Captain Huot has gone to North Africa and because, before we answer it and before Lt. Graveson returns to London, we would like to have a conference with you. He is leaving by earliest transportation available.

In advance of this conference, which we would like to have at your earliest convenience, I thought you might like to glance at the General plans and Table of Organization as submitted by Captain Huot. This has just arrived and has direct bearing on the cable in question. I am attaching it herewith with a few comments which are pertinent to the subject and which may be of assistance to you.

The scope and scale of these stations is many times in excess of that contemplated by anyone, including Capt. Huot and Lt. Graveson who were both there during the negotiations. Like any other organization which is built to operate soundly and successfully, the steps will have to be taken gradually

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and "timed" to be increased with use and need. If this is done, it will not be difficult for it to grow as large as outlined, providing we can obtain manpower.

After clearing this point with you, Capt. Doering included in the presentation of the Dipper Plan a paragraph which stated that if the J.C.S. approved, Signal Corps men would be needed. If it works, this should be of great value.

I would again like to stress the point I made in our conference which Lt. Col. Bruce attended, that it took two years for the British to complete their present SOE station, and that their second station is still on paper. Nevertheless, I believe we can get ours ready and operating in a little over two months providing we can get the help we need to build it in England, and we are on the way now to accomplishing that through the aid of a Navy crew. We will not be able at the end of two months, however, to staff the station on any such scale as outlined. Instead of copying the British pattern and suggested requirements, which total approximately 200 persons not including cooks, clerks, stenographic help and other general administrative personnel, we have set up a tentative goal for the staffing of Charles which I have attached.

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In the meantime, we will be ready with semi-portable equipment in England to operate to Scandinavian countries on a scale that will undoubtedly take care of OSS needs and which will also relieve the British to some extent by the time OSS is ready to go forward in that territory. If by any chance a few operators should go out in that field before we are able to get established, it is our understanding with the British that they will assist us until we are ready to operate ourselves.

As to the outline of duties and the setting up of ranks by Capt. Huot, I feel very strongly that these should be limited by normal and well-thought-out growth. In other words, if we find that we can get a good Warrant Officer who has the technical ability and executive ability to swing a particular job, we are not going to be concerned whether the rank fits the job but rather that the job fits the man.

As to Capt. Huot's suggestion that, as Chief Signal Officer, he should be a liaison man in the London office with trips at intervals to other theaters ofoperation, I would like to point out that his time and duties as Chief Signal Officer will be required in active administration of the stations. We have neither the time nor the manpower to afford such a luxury, and we couldn't find any one anywhere to match Lt. Col. Bruce who

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will be in London, for clear executive decision and necessary liaison work. I have given Col. Bruce a memorandum outlining our plans and asking him to keep an eye on our operations, which of course he readily agreed to do.

Lt. Greveson and I would be glad to sit down with you and discuss these matters more fully and to take whatever steps you feel are necessary to bring about the best results.

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TENTATIVE STAFF FOR CHARLES

1	Chief Signals Officer	Lt. Commander or Major
1	Personnel Adjutant	Junior Officer
1	Officer in Charge of Charles	Captain or Lieutenant
3	Watch Officers	Junior Officers
6		
4	Supervisors of Watch (Signal Masters)	Warrant, Master or Tech. Sgt.
1	Maintenance Supervisor	Warrant, Master or Tech. Sgt.
5	Maintenance Men (Operators)	Tech 5 or 4
52	Operators as follows:	Tech 2 to PFC
	6 Chief Operators	
	6 Senior Operators	
	40 Operators	
1	Chief Clerk	Corporal or Sergeant
7	Clerks	PFC or Corporal
1	Mess Sergeant	
3	Chief Cooks	
4	Assistant Cooks	
78		

CHARLES TRANSMITTING STATION

1	Officer in Charge	Warrant, Master or Tech. Sgt.
4	Chiefs of Watch	Tech 3 or 2
4	Shift Men	Tech 4 or 3
4	Maintenance	Tech 5 or 4
13		

January 28, 1943

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Communication 10,277 A
× Africa N.
× Radio Station
× Requirements
× Storm, C.W.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Murphy

DATE: February 20, 1943

FROM: Mrs. Clements

SUBJECT:

Col. Lowman asked that the attached file be returned to you.

C.C.

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE OF

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Oeschner

DATE: 2/15/45

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT: North African Radio

SECRET

After our pretty thorough discussion in Colonel Donovan's office yesterday, I see no reason for writing a lengthy memorandum giving my comments on this subject.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Horn's memorandum of February 4 covers much of the problem.

Be sure to give this original letter to General Deane and reply to Mr. Murphy, along with this memorandum to you from me.

SECRET

have attached another copy the House memo in case Col D wants to see it

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM DATE: February 4, 1945

TO: Major L. K. Bowman

FROM: E. W. Horn EWH

SUBJECT: Copy Memorandum - Mr. Whitaker

The attached is a copy of the memorandum to Mr. Whitaker on information we would like to have him obtain for us to help us plan the project

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Mr. John T. Whitaker

February 6, 1943

C. W. Horn

North African Radio

To erect a high power radio station it is necessary that we have two basic factors in order to obtain maximum efficiency. These factors are:

A - Station site.

B - Available power supply.

A high power radio station cannot be erected in a city or town, it must be located outside where there is sufficient space to erect the proper antennae especially directional antenna should be used. This tends to complicate the matter because such sites are usually removed from power supply sources.

We may briefly analyze the requirements of the two factors mentioned above:

A - It is highly desirable that the transmitter be located on ground which has high conductivity in order that the antenna system may operate at maximum efficiency. It is to be remembered that any loss in the antenna system reduces the amount of radiation at the source in the same manner that an improper lighting fixture reduces the amount of illumination of even a high power lamp.

The most desirable location for a radio station therefore is in marshy territory, preferably salt marshes which means somewhere near the coast. It should be determined that whatever "wet ground" exists is not of a temporary nature due to the rainy season. However it should be possible to find locations at the edge of towns which are harbors such as Algiers, Bone, and possibly Bizerte or Tunis in the future. The latter two locations appear to be desirable from a general standpoint as well as being on salt water and in territory which the maps indicate would be good ground conditions.

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It is also of course necessary to keep in mind the security problem which might limit the number of areas to areas which are well protected by our forces.

Large scale local maps would be advantageous and an effort should be made to obtain these especially if they show elevations.

B - The matter of power is of course very important. In the cities and localities in which we might be interested it is desirable to have the following information:

1. The nature of the local power supply which should include:

a. - Capacity of the local plant including information whether an additional 250 kilowatts is available.

b. - The type of current, whether alternating or direct, and the frequency if alternating such as 50 cycles or 60 cycles, voltage of the distribution lines, including information whether the supply line to the area concerned has sufficient capacity for an additional 250 kilowatts.

c. - A map showing the primary and secondary distribution lines with notations as to voltages and capacity. This may be obtained from the local power company.

d. - A general report on the condition of the power generating plant and the distribution system in general as to its condition and reliability in order to assure ourselves of constant and uninterrupted supply. This should include protection of the distribution lines in order to prevent sabotage from interfering with our activity.

e. - From my knowledge of the area there are some high power transmission lines and it is desirable that we know where these lines are and their capacity, including the voltages, etc. A map should be obtained showing the transformer stations, generating stations and other details. It is possible that some location may be found where the power supply may be switched in from more than one source in order to assure reliability of service.

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Another factor which is of importance to us is the ability to obtain telephone circuits into the station. The office of the P.T.T. in Algiers should be able to furnish a wire sheet showing their system. Such communication lines are desirable in view of the fact that we may want to originate programs in other cities in this territory, and also perhaps transmit programs in other cities in transmission by the short wave station in that locality. It may also be necessary for us to tie several stations together on occasion and telephones lines will be required for this purpose. These maps should show whether the circuits are "loaded circuits", have repeater stations, and whether they are in cable or overhead lines.

C. J. Horn
Technical Adviser

cc - Maj. Lowman
Maj. Weaver
Mr. Cochsner

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Mr. John T. Whitaker

February 4, 1943

C. W. Horn

North African Radio

There are some matters we should obtain information on because they are based on incomplete reports and I am listing these below:

A - I received a report from a former radio manufacturer in France that a broadcast transmitter of approximately 150 kilowatts had been ordered by the P.T.T. of Algiers and that most of the equipment had been constructed. I was informed that some of the equipment had been diverted and installed in southern France, the remainder had been shipped to Algiers and possibly even the diverted portion had been replaced. Radiodiffusion of the P.T.T. in Algiers should know about this and bring us up to date on the status of this apparatus. It is desirable to know what apparatus has been delivered, the voltages, both primary and secondary supply including the rectifier plate voltage. We would like to know the location and what plans they have in connection with this apparatus.

B - We would like to have accurate and up to the minute information concerning the existing broadcast stations, including the short wave, now in North Africa. We want to know the power radiated by the antenna, as differentiated from some European ratings, their location, what frequencies they are operating, under whose management and control, and schedule of operations. It will be desirable to have information as to their available power supply at these stations and whether an additional supply of 150 to 250 kilowatts is available at each station. If possible some description as to the type of apparatus that is used should be obtained, especially whether it is factory built or "assembled" job.

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It would be of interest to know what the figures are as to the number of receiving sets in use in North Africa and other general information concerning broadcast reception by the public. Such figures might be obtained from the broadcasting department of the P.W.B.

C. W. Rosa
Technical Advisor

cc - Maj. Lowman
Maj. Weaver
Mr. Oschsner

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To: Colonel Lowman

Colonel Donovan would now like to have your comments on this. Mr. Horne said something about broadcast waves being better than short wave.

M. Lucas

Director's Office

(3308)

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Communication No. 10417

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1943.

Col. William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Col. Donovan:

Your letter of January 30, 1943, pertaining to the disposition of shortwave transmitters has been received and forwarded to the Munitions Assignments Board for consideration.

At the present time only six 50 kw transmitters are subjects of controversy, the other three having been recommended for assignment by the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) to which assignment no dissent has as yet been filed. However, in the final settlement of this case it is likely that these three additional transmitters will have to be brought into the picture.

The situation with reference to the disposition of six of the nine available transmitters is confused. In addition to a request from your office there are on file in the Munitions Assignments Board bids from the Office of War Information, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Board of War Communications as well as a request from the Psychological Warfare Agencies of the United Kingdom. The U.K. bid is being backed up by no less a personage than Mr. Anthony Eden. The State Department is also interested in the disposition of the transmitters.

In an endeavor to secure a settlement of the controversy a paper has been prepared and forwarded to Mr. Harry Hopkins, who is Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board. In this paper an attempt has been made to summarize the facts and to formulate a basis for a solution. This document includes a copy of your letter of January 30th.

If I can be of any further service, please feel free to call upon me.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary

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SECRET

January 30, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Deane,
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

It has just been brought to my attention that the Signal Corps, Naval Communications and the FCC have agreed to turn over to OWI something like nine 50-100 kw short-wave transmitters. These transmitters had been built by RCA for the British and I believe are now actually completed or at least near completion.

I think this arrangement was made without knowledge as to the necessity of OSS obtaining just such transmitters for its secret or black propaganda. Even one of these transmitters now if available for us could be used for clandestine purposes in various places.

It is especially important to have this now as we are setting up our branch and this equipment is needed. OWI have covered every place for open propaganda. We need it for our closed propaganda. I wish you could help us.

Sincerely,

SECRET

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan DATE: January 29, 1945

FROM: Commander W.H. Vanderbilt

SUBJECT: Inventory - Communications

For your information, I am attaching hereto copy of Mr. Horton's memorandum of January 27, 1945, relative to communications equipment on hand and on order. You will see that we have made substantial progress in securing supplies of critical items.

WHV.
W.H.V.

Attachment - 1

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Copy

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Charles M. Soars

FROM: J.E. Horton

DATE: January 27, 1943

SUBJECT: Communications Equipment In Stock and On Order:

The following is a brief summary of the radio communications equipment and material now in stock and on order with indicated delivery dates on the latter. Within about a week's time we shall be able to furnish you with a complete inventory and a breakdown on the small items, such as installation material and tools. For the present we will list the smaller items by value only.

IN STOCK

Quantity	Description
2	AVT-22B 5-Kilowatt transmitters.
6	RCA Type 4332/4336 400-watt transmitters.
100	RCA Type AR-77 Communications Receivers.
25	Hallicrafters' SX-28 receivers.
40	X-35 35-watt transmitters.
13	Witte Diesel Electric 3 K.V.A. Generators.
22	Burke Hand Generators.
38	Portable Typewriters.
40 tons	BX Armored Cable.
250,000'	Assorted magnet wire, antenna wire, guy wire and rubber covered cable.

Value (approx.)

$60,000	Assorted tools, parts and installation material.
16,000	Assorted power and receiving tubes.

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EQUIPMENT ON ORDER

Quantity	Description	Approx. Delivery Date
80	RME portable 20-watt field transmitter/receiver with hand generator.	3-1-43
6	RCA Type ET-4331 1 kilowatt transmitters.	3-1-43
40	Press Wireless 500-watt transmitters.	3-15-43
30	RCA Type ET-4332 400-watt transmitter.	1-31-43
10	RCA Type TE-134 400-watt tropic treated transmitters, dual channel.	2-20-43
250	AAK 15-X 15-watt transmitter/receivers.	Starting 1-28-43
100	PDR portable 100-watt transmitter/receiver with light weight gasoline motor generator.	1-31-43
250	RCA Type AR-88 Communications Receivers.	6-1-43
50	Hallicrafters Type S-29 portable AC and battery operated Communications Receivers.	1-29-43
300	Philco 6-volt storage batteries.	2-25-43
25	SCR-284 Signal Corps field transmitter/receiver with hand generator.	2-7-43
250,000 ft.	Assorted wire, guy wire, rubber covered cable.	2-5-43

Value (Approx.)		
$25,000	Installation material, tools and parts.	Starting 2-1-43
20,000	Power and Receiving Tube	2-25-43

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File

To W.J.D. from General Magruder

Communications [illegible]

The subject is of interest especially to commanding services of Army & Navy.

Justice
Wishes for
Scrambling speech

Consideration should be given to assistance in filing of patents — the $15,000 is considered too much — on such vague prospects. The [illegible] is that the Federal Government has examined the patents affecting high-frequency work.

I think the Swiss National might be [illegible] by "Informant", approached by our people in Switzerland and his financial benefits made dependent upon the results obtained — i.e. if of value and used by our Government he may be guaranteed benefits.

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To: General Magruder

Have you seen this? After you have read it, please talk with me.

W.J.D.

Director's Office

(3308)

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Communications 10/45
* Justice Dept
* Wohlforth, Robt
* Scrambler speech
* Switzerland

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
8th Floor - 225 Broadway
New York, New York

60-0-28

January 26, 1943

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Service
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I am enclosing copy of the article entitled, "Methods for the Automatic Scrambling of Speech". As you know, this article was written by the contact in Switzerland that we described to you during the meeting Thurman, Ed Levi and I had in your office the week before last.

Pursuant to your suggestions, I have taken up the matter of eliciting information from this contact with Murray Gurfein of your office in New York, and enclose a copy of my memo to Murray explaining the situation.

I have also discussed the insurance project with Major Jones, and offered him our experience and services in any capacity that will be helpful.

Many thanks for your interest and offers of assistance. I am,

Sincerely yours,

Robert Wohlforth

ROBERT WOHLFORTH,
Expert.

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8th Floor - [illegible] Broadway
New York, New York

[illegible]/ph

[illegible]

January [illegible], [illegible]

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Service
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

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cc - Messrs. Issoke & Levi

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Communications [illegible]
[illegible]
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[illegible]

[illegible] Broadway
New York, New York

60-[illegible]-78

January [illegible], [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MURRAY GURFEIN, ESQUIRE, O.S.S.

Re: Contact in Europe

For a number of months information has been secured on Axis industry from an American citizen resident in New York who is an official of a parts company in the radio field. This informant is well connected by reason of much work he has done for the Navy Department and is well qualified in the electrical, radio and high-frequency field. He is a person of middle age and his product is known throughout the world. For a period of years he has had patent license agreements with European firms principally in Germany. He has traveled abroad considerably and is widely acquainted on the Continent.

In the course of our interviews the problem of communicating with enemy and neutral countries in Europe and securing current information from them was discussed at some length. Our informant stated to us that he had retained as patent engineer some time ago a Swiss National of Zurich, Switzerland at the rate of $100 per month to assist in certain radio developments and to handle other foreign patent interests. This Swiss National is assistant professor at Zurich University and has been known by our informant for the last seven years. In addition to the retainer, our informant owes the patent engineer for royalties a sum of money, approximately $15,000. The effect of the retainer has been to enable the Swiss National to extend his Laboratory work and to take out Swiss patents in which our informant shares the American interest. Today the Swiss National is head of the high-frequency laboratory of the firm of Brown-Boveri in Baden, Switzerland. This Swiss firm is manufacturing for the Nazis today. His specialty in the high-frequency field is speech scrambling, and automatic coding devices. Attached is a copy of an article by the Swiss National on his specialty. Until recently the Swiss National used to travel in Germany to the

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Brown-Boveri plant at Mannheim, but he has not been in [illegible] for the past year. However, he is posted on all the developments in the German high-frequency field and remains with the engineers of the German Brown-Boveri from time to time. The Swiss National is a young man in the early thirties married to a German girl from Munich. They are Anti-Nazi and can be relied upon according to our informant. Some of the patents filed in this country by the Swiss National have been taken over by the Federal Government and sealed because of their importance in high-frequency work and in direction finding.

According to the informant the Swiss National desires to collaborate and feels that his interests are with the United Nations. The informant states that it would be very easy for a representative of this Government to make friends with the Swiss National and to represent himself as being close to the informant. The informant and Swiss National have many interests in common and many friends in common. Further, if it was possible to pay over to the Swiss National the money due him from the American informant as an earnest of good faith and to advance the filing of his patents, a perfect understanding and means of communication should be able to be developed.

The information that can be elicited from the informant would concern the latest refinements, developments and inventions of the Germans in the high-frequency field with especial emphasis on speech scrambling and secret communication problems. Informant believes that it would be easy for a representative to ingratiate himself and obtain the confidence of this Swiss National and to have him indicate exactly what has been happening in the Brown-Boveri factory and laboratories, not only in Switzerland, but in Germany as well. The value of this information is of special importance to high-frequency developments and refinements in this country.

ROBERT WOOLFORTH
Expert

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METHODS FOR THE AUTOMATIC SCRAMBLING OF SPEECH

The guarding of the secrecy of a conversation is of great importance not only for military but also for commercial communication. This is especially true for multiple channel wireless transmission which holds many possibilities of expansion.

We have been studying for a considerable time now the problems relative to the scrambling of speech and the improvement of automatic coding devices for telephonic or telegraphic transmission.

The fundamental scrambling methods, as well as the processes we have developed ourselves, to ensure a better transmission secrecy, are described and compared in this article.

I. INTRODUCTION.

WIRELESS transmissions can, as is known, be picked up in many cases by unauthorized listeners. Even in cable or line transmission, there are ways of listening in. For these reasons, telegrams are often sent coded. But devices for coding speech transmission exist as well. From the coded signal transmitted, the receiver making use of a decoding device, adjusted to the coding programme being used, reproduces the original message in clear form.

A known method to complicate undesired listening in on wireless messages, is to change the carrier wave continually or suddenly at intervals according to a programme agreed on in advance. It is however possible for a listener in having at his disposal a wide-band amplifier or an automatic quick-tuning equipment to receive and understand such messages without knowing in advance the tuning programme being used. Further, systems of this kind are undesirable on account of the large frequency band width required. Other suggestion to increase the secrecy by high-frequency carrier modulation are not suitable for multiple use, because scrambled messages are often transmitted by ordinary telephone lines which have limited frequency band possibilities. In many cases, for example the installation of coding devices in telephone central stations or even at the private adress of telephone subscribers is desirable quite independently of whether the message is wireless-transmitted on part of the distance or not. This means that low-frequency scrambling is necessary without widening the frequency band.

In known telegram codifying methods the ordinary sequence of the signs or series of signs are replaced by other signs or series of signs in an order which can be altered in accordance with a programme settled on in advance (substitution process). Often, the order in which the signs are given out is, itself, periodically changed (transposition process). Both transmission processes can be utilized automatically with the help of suitable apparatus.

It is more difficult to scramble spoken messages and then to reproduce the original words, as words and sentences spoken are not composed of simple and separate signs which, like letters and numbers, are easy to codify. Speech vibration is a continuous phenomenon comprising many wave shapes of different amplitudes, frequencies and duration, corresponding to its various tones and possibilities of expression.

II. THE COMPOSITION OF SPEECH AND SCRAMBLING POSSIBILITIES.

Vowels and consonants have very different characters due to the different ways of pronouncing them. The vowels "v" are composed of a fundamental wave and many harmonics. They are distinguished one from another by their fundamental frequency f_0 ($\omega_0 = 2\pi f_0$) and the amplitudes "a" of their components.

$$v = V(t) \sum_{k=1}^{n} a_k(t) \cdot \cos\left[k \int \omega_0(t)\, dt - \varphi_k\right]$$

The function V(t) expresses the interruptions due to speech pauses and consonants. The vowels occurring in speech are, thus, represented by a blend of oscillations, modulated in frequency and amplitude occurring intermittently and having a tone.

On the other hand, the consonants "w" have a continuous amplitude spectrum, without marked fundamental oscillations, that is to say they have a noise character.

$$w = W(t) \int_0^{\infty} b(\omega) \cdot \cos(\omega t) - c(\omega) \cdot \sin(\omega t)\, d\omega$$

In automatic coding of speech, these complex oscillations are modified according to a system agreed upon. It is, however, to be kept in mind that the slightest language particularities are heard by a trained ear. They may suffice to make certain words comprehensible or to allow a guess at them. A listener in for whom the message is not intended can also try to find out all or part of the coding process by systematically changing the coded signals. After deciphering a part of the text the remainder is easier to analyse as, little by little, new suppositions on the remaining contents are possible. If the key remains the same, that is, if the creation be-

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tween the uncoded speech and the coded speech is always the same, it would be easy to discover the key after having deciphered part of the message. For this reason it is necessary to change the scrambling constantly in accordance with a programme. Finally, the requirement remains that the decoded message, received by the rightful receiver, should be sufficiently clear.

Considering all these difficulties and requirements, it is easy to conceive that most of the suggested automatic speech-coding systems are either a technical impossibility or do not offer sufficient guarantee as to secrecy.



Fig. 1. — Noise-tone method.
The coded signal s results from the combination of the clear signal x and the noise-tone y. This coding is insufficient, as many of x can still be found in s.

The "addition" process, in which an interfering frequency is superimposed on the signal frequency, is quite insufficient. In Fig. 1 we give under "x" as speech wave a length cut out of the oscillogram of the word "Gesellschaft" and under "y" the interfering wave, in this case the vowel "a". In the resultant signal oscillogram "z" we find again many particularities of "x". For an exercised ear, a distinguishing of the original signal is still easier. Even if the interference amplitude is a multiple of the voice amplitude, certain words can, nevertheless, be heard. The inevitable phase and amplitude distorsion produced by the transmission so modifies the interfering signal wave y superimposed that correct reconstruction of the speech x at the reception end with the help of an opposed interference signal wave is impossible.

Processes in which the message is transmitted by a device with non-linear characteristic, in order to make it unintelligible are also insufficient. The original message is reconstructed at reception by using a non-linear characteristic device on the receiver side, as well. With this system, too, the keyed message is never completely incomprehensible and a satisfactory reconstitution at reception is impossible because of the inevitable phase and amplitude distorsion due to the transmission. The same objections apply to many processes maintaining message secrecy by phase or amplitude distorsion, by interruption or mixing with other oscillations.

III. SUBSTITUTION METHOD

A well known scrambling process consists in giving a definite frequency shift, agreed on, to the initial clear-speech frequency. This frequency substitution is obtained by modulating the original frequency with constant or changing auxiliary frequencies which, in general, are selected outside the voice range frequency band.

A simple modulation of the voice vibrations x by means of an auxiliary frequency g_1 gives two mixed resultant frequencies at the output of the modulator M, one being the sum of the voice frequencies and auxiliary frequency, the other their difference. In Fig. 2 the "sum" frequencies are eliminated by a low-pass filter TP, so that only the "difference" frequency z_n is passed. Its composing frequencies fall in the original voice frequency range if the auxiliary frequency corresponds to the maximum voice frequency. On the receiver side, with a similar device, a modulation-product is obtained from the oscillations transmitted and an auxiliary frequency "g_1" from which the clear language is reconstructed. This frequency inversion often used is not sufficient to meet practical exigencies because the auxiliary frequency necessary to decipher the message can be easily determined by trying.

Fig. 2. — Inversion method.
By modulation of the clear signal x with an auxiliary frequency g_1 we get the inverted signal z_n. This coding is insufficient as the auxiliary frequency g_1 made use of, can easily be determined by tests.

The voice frequencies, shifted by a first modulation, are, often, modulated a second time by a frequency "g_2". In the arrangement shown in Fig. 3, the "difference" frequencies of the first modulation are sup-

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pressed by a high-pass filter HP, and the "sum" frequencies of the second modulation, by a low-pass filter TP, so that a signal z_n results, the components of which are those of the message transmitter shifted



Fig. 3. — Frequency-shifting method.
By double modulation with the help of the auxiliary frequencies g_1 and g_2 we get, from the clear signal x, the coded signal z_n the components of which are frequency-shifted. The degree of secrecy is insufficient, as the frequency shift can be detected easily by experimentation.

by the difference of the two auxiliary frequencies. Even this frequency shift does not answer the practical demand as the necessary shift to reconstitute clear language can be found out too easily by experimenting.

To increase the secrecy, the spectrum of the voice frequencies is divided up into n bands, x_1 up to x_n, which, for transmission purposes, are shifted by unequal quantities. In this way, the mth voice band x_m is shifted into the k_{th} voice band x_k. The key of this frequency shift is given by the relation between m and k, m giving the position of the original frequency band and k that of the displaced band. For example:

m	k
1	3
2	4
3	1
4	5
5	2

It can be characterized by the number S which is obtained by the permutation of the normal succession 1, 2, 3, . . . n. In our example S = 34152.

This substitution-keying is effected by the arrangement shown in Fig. 4. The first frequency band x_1 is transmitted through the band-pass filter F_1 to the modulator M_1 which modulates it with the auxiliary frequency g_1 given by the generator G_1. The sum frequency band y_1 belongs to the band that can pass through the band-pass filter BP and is transmitted to modulator N_3, for example. The difference-frequencies produced in this modulator constitute the third frequency-band z_3 of the codified signal, because only the differences can pass the low-pass filter TP. The other message frequency-bands are shifted in the same way. The frequency bands passing through the filters F_1, F_2 . . . F_n, BP and the auxiliary frequencies $g_1 \ldots g_5$ of the generators G_1 and G_2 have, for example, the following values:

F_1	200 : 750 cycles	g_1	6510 cycles
F_2	750 — 1300 "	g_2	4100 "
F_3	1300 — 1850 "	g_3	1050 "
F_4	1850 — 2400 "	g_4	7400 "
F_5	2400 — 2950 "	g_5	6050 "
BP	1100 — 3650 "		

The input filters $F_1 \ldots F_5$ can be suppressed in certain cases, if the frequencies they should reject fall after the first modulation beyond the range of filter BP. The same device is used to reform the original message by a new frequency shift.

In Fig. 3 the first oscillogram represents the word "Gesellschaft", uncoded. Below it are represented separately, before the keying, the spectrums of the



Fig. 4. — Substitution coding.
From double modulation with the auxiliary frequencies $g_1 \ldots g_5$ and a signal-channel commutation in R, we get, from the original signal x_1 the coded signal z_n, the frequency bands of which are shifted by various amounts. Undesired deciphering is difficult as the proper shift-values must be repeatedly searched for, for each one of its new values.

five frequency bands $x_1 \ldots x_5$ and, after the keying with key S = 34152, the bands $z_1 \ldots z_5 = x_{31} \ldots x_{52}$, the first index indicating the rank occupied before and the second the rank occupied after the keying.

As the key S can easily enough be determined by tests, it is modified in the latest apparatus, at determined time intervals t_w. For this operation, the permutator R is used, which interchanges the five frequency bands according to a determined programme. This programme is given, for example, by the succession of the keys S_1 = 34152, S_2 = 51342, S_3 = 53421 etc. as in the following table:

m	k_1	k_2	k_3	k_4	k_5	k_6
1	3	5	5	1	3	4
2	4	1	3	4	2	5
3	1	3	4	5	4	2
4	5	4	2	2	1	3
5	2	2	1	3	5	1

The first band x_1 of the speech spectrum appears alternatively in the form of third, fifth, first, etc. frequency band x_{31}, x_{53}, x_{12}, x_{24} of the coded signal.

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

Fig. 5. — Substitution coding.

x_1 Clear signal oscillogram of the word "Gesellschaft". $x_{11} \ldots x_{15}$ Oscillograms of the five frequency-bands of the word "Gesellschaft". $z_1 \ldots z_5$ Oscillograms of the permutated frequency-bands, out of which the keyed signal is found. By tests, the frequency-shift can be precisely determined. For example, one can see that the frequency-band z_1 is formed of the second clear message band x_{12}. For this reason, secrecy is limited.

The message to be transmitted x is subdivised into the successive elements $a, b, c, \ldots$ of a duration t_0. Analogously, the spectrum in the first band x_1 is also divided into elements $a_1, b_1, c_1, \ldots$, that of the second band into elements a_2, b_2, c_2, etc.

The message x can be represented as follows:

$$x = \begin{Bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \end{Bmatrix} = \begin{Bmatrix} a_1 & b_1 & c_1 & d_1 & e_1 & f_1 & g_1 & h_1 & i_1 & k_1 & \ldots \\ a_2 & b_2 & c_2 & d_2 & e_2 & f_2 & g_2 & h_2 & i_2 & k_2 & \ldots \\ a_3 & b_3 & c_3 & d_3 & e_3 & f_3 & g_3 & h_3 & i_3 & k_3 & \ldots \\ a_4 & b_4 & c_4 & d_4 & e_4 & f_4 & g_4 & h_4 & i_4 & k_4 & \ldots \\ a_5 & b_5 & c_5 & d_5 & e_5 & f_5 & g_5 & h_5 & i_5 & k_5 & \ldots \end{Bmatrix}$$

In each line we find all the successive elements of one of the frequency bands, c_2, for example, is the third element of the second frequency band.

With the given keying programme, the transmitted signal z is represented as follows:

$$z = \begin{Bmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \\ z_3 \\ z_4 \\ z_5 \end{Bmatrix} = \begin{Bmatrix} a_{11} & b_{11} & c_{11} & d_{11} & e_{11} & f_{11} & g_{11} & h_{11} & i_{11} & k_{11} & \ldots \\ a_{12} & b_{12} & c_{12} & d_{12} & e_{12} & f_{12} & g_{12} & h_{12} & i_{12} & k_{12} & \ldots \\ a_{13} & b_{13} & c_{13} & d_{13} & e_{13} & f_{13} & g_{13} & h_{13} & i_{13} & k_{13} & \ldots \\ a_{14} & b_{14} & c_{14} & d_{14} & e_{14} & f_{14} & g_{14} & h_{14} & i_{14} & k_{14} & \ldots \\ a_{15} & b_{15} & c_{15} & d_{15} & e_{15} & f_{15} & g_{15} & h_{15} & i_{15} & k_{15} & \ldots \end{Bmatrix}$$

In each line we find all the elements of a frequency band of the keyed message. The first index indicates from which frequency band of the original message the element is taken and the second into which frequency band the element has been shifted.

The interval between two key changes, that is the duration t_0 of an element, is, in general, of a second or more. The deciphering of the received and recorded message is easily possible for an unauthorized listener. The often repeated spectrum of an element is taken from a frequency band and its frequency is shifted by a variable amount, until the unnatural impression produced

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by incorrect shifting disappears. It is possible to find out in the same way the shift of the other frequency bands of that element and of all the other following elements, which allows of reforming the clear language. This procedure gives remarkably quick results with a little training. The requisite time increases, however, when the element duration is reduced, it is, further, more difficult to find out the correct shift for short elements.

By a special synchronization system, we have been able to reduce the element duration to 0.05 s, which improves the secrecy of the substitution keying system considerably. Oscillograms obtained with elements having a duration of 0.05 s are reproduced in Fig. 6. The deciphering difficulties are also naturally increased if the number of frequency bands is increased and their width reduced at the same time; but this needs a greater number of filters and modulators. The use



Fig. 6. — Substitution coding.
x. Oscillogram of the word "Gesellschaft".
z_1 ... z_5 Oscillograms of the variably shifted frequency bands of x.
Owing to the variable frequency shift, the correct back shifting needed to decipher is difficult to find out and secrecy is thus considerably increased.



Fig. 7. — Frequency-band shifting.
x. Oscillogram of the word "Gesellschaft". x_{21} ... x_{25} Second frequency band of x after having been shifted into the 5 frequency channels.
It is clearly seen that the amplitude character is not altered by this frequency shift. Frequency-substituted scrambled signals can thus be deciphered by the analysis of the energy-rhythm.

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of varying auxiliary modulation-frequencies g with continuously varying character also permits of replacing sudden frequency shifts by continuous ones.

The amplitude curve in function of time, $X_0 = \sqrt{x_0^2}$ of each frequency band is not altered by the frequency shift. This is visible in Fig. 7, for example, where the spectrum of the second frequency band x_2 of the word "Gesellschaft" for several frequency shifts is reproduced. The sending sequence remains the same whatever the element duration and the amplitude diagram $Z_0(t) = \sqrt{z_1^2 + z_2^2 + \ldots}$ of the complete ciphered message z corresponds to the amplitude diagram $X_0(t) = \sqrt{x_1^2 + x_2^2 + \ldots}$ of the clear message. The characteristic fundamental frequency ω_0 of keyed vowels can also be easily determined as it is the difference of the frequency shifted components of a band. For this reason, one can easily draw the melodic diagram $\omega_0(t)$ which gives the tone curve of the fundamental frequencies in function of time. The deciphering of the keyed message by unauthorized persons can be tried by comparison of the amplitude diagram $Z_0(t)$ and the melodic diagram $\omega_0(t)$ to known words and sentence diagrams. Although these diagrams depend greatly upon accent, pronounciation, etc., a systematic use of this method and a little exercise render possible the deciphering of substitution-keyed messages.

By a fairly simple method we can complicate this deciphering, through weakening by unequal amounts the different frequency bands of the coded message before sending it. This modifies the amplitude diagram which can thus no longer be used for deciphering. These variations can easily be neutralized at the authorized receiver end by corresponding reduction of the damping of the different frequency bands, according to the programme agreed on in advance.

IV. TRANSPOSITION METHOD.

The initial successive message elements a, b, c ... of a duration t_0 can be time-shifted by unequal amounts. According to a key T = 41532, the first element, for example, takes the forth place, the second the first place etc. so that to the original serie x corresponds the serie z:

$$x = a\ b\ c\ d\ e$$
$$z = b\ e\ d\ a\ c$$

The realization of this transposition method is obtained by delaying the different elements by unequal time fractions, differing one from another by a whole multiple of t_0, before their transmission. As the delays cannot be negative, the overlined numbers will be increased by five units in the key T = [illegible] from which the key T* = 16587 results and the keyed message z^* will be:

$$z^* = [illegible]$$

In the device shown in Fig. 8 the elements are magnetically recorded on a steel band L, moving in the sense of the arrow, by the recorder magnets $K_1 \ldots K_5$. The pick-up magnet K_6 takes up the elements in their recording order and the eraser magnet K_7 neutralizes the message recording. For coding with the key T, the message oscillations, periodically returning, are successively sent to the horizontal conductors of the keying table Q, through the commutator U, turning in the direction indicated by the arrow, the diagonal conductors being connected to the recorders.



Fig. 8. — Transposition coding.

Through the commutator U and the keyboard Q the uncoded signal c is sent alternatively to one or the other of the recorder-magnets $K_1 \ldots K_5$ so that the elements are recorded in another order on the steel band L. The signal pick-up is carried out by K_6 and the erasing by K_7. For the decoding process, the signal is passed through the apparatus in the opposite direction (dotted arrow).

Connections between these conductors are indicated by small circles, corresponding to the key T, the first horizontal conductor being in contact with a diagonal conductor at it's forth crossing, the second at it's first crossing, etc. The first message element is recorded in forth place on the steel band for the original position indicated of the commutator switch. When the commutator has passed to the second contact, and the steel band has advanced an element length between two magnets, the second element is recorded in sixth position. After a complete revolution of the commutator, the five first elements are recorded on the

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steel band in the order of the keyed message and are picked up by the magnet K_1. If the commutator and the band continue to advance, the same keying process is periodically repeated.

The keying must be chosen so that two elements are never recorded one on the other and that there is never a non-recorded gap on the steel band. The keyed message is then non-superimposed and without gaps. The study of a recording phase shows that this condition is fulfilled when, on each horizontal conductor 1 ... 5 and on each vertical conductor 11 ... 15, there is but one connecting point. This leads to the requirement that the key, as in the substitution method, be obtained by a permutation of a continuous serie of numbers 1, 2, 3, ... n.

With a similar apparatus, the original message is given at the receiver end by a new permutation. The key T_e employed for this is a permutation of the series of numbers 1, 2, 3, ... n, according to the key T used for the transmission. To the sending key T = 41532 or $T^* = 46587$ corresponds the reception key T_e = 25413 or $T_e^* = 25468$. By keying with the sending key T^* the element succession x ... a b c d e becomes, for example, the transmitted signal y. After decoding with the key T_e^* at reception the signal x_e is obtained, which is retarded by five elements in respect to x:—

x	...	a	b	c	d	e					
y	...			a	c		b	e	d		
x_e	...					a	b	c	d	e	

In the decoding process, the coded signal is recorded by the recorder K_1. The elements, taken up by the pick-up magnets K_1 ... K_n and passed through the commutator U, reproduce the original message of the keys of both sender and receiver correspond.

With most keys, certain recorder or pick-up magnets are used several times, others not at all. The key given in Fig. 8 leaves, for example, magnets K_2 and K_5 unemployed. Certain magnets can thus be suppressed with a corresponding reduction of the number of possible key combinations.

The unauthorized listener can, by trying several key-settings, attempt to reconstitute a clear message. With the transposition method described, this process gives fairly quick results because of the frequent repetition of the same keying programme cycle.

A sufficient increase in the coding programme cycle is impossible with a single commutator owing to the insufficient number of contact positions. On the transmitter side several pick-up magnets can be used but in different number to that of the recorders. They are connected to the keying-table and to a commutator switch. For example, 10 recorders and 11 pick-up magnets give a cascade keying of a 110 element-period in the sent signal.

In Fig. 9 an oscillogram section is reproduced of the word "Gesellschaft" and below, the intermediate message y coded with the key T_e = 46587. The cascade coded message z results from a second keying given by the pick-up magnets connection order according to key T_e = 437658.

Among the numerous possibilities to increase the period we shall also mention the use of perforated bands. Fig. 10 shows a device in which this principle is applied. A hole O_{nm} punched at the intersection of the nth transversal line with the mth longitudinal line of the band E corresponds to the mth recording head and to the nth element to be transmitted. As until the recording moment of this element the steel band has progressed by $(n - 1)$ elements, the recording will take place at the $(n - m - 1)^{th}$ place on the steel band. The recording succession can be determined by the diagram on the right of Fig. 10. By drawing a horizontal line from the nth element of the uncoded signal x to the hole O_{nm} and from this



Fig. 9. Transposition coding.
x: Clear signal oscillogram of the word "Gesellschaft". y: Intermediate signal after the first element shift.
z: Coded signal after the second element shift.
The shifting of all elements gives an incomprehensible signal. A possibility of undesired deciphering by back-shifting has however to be taken into consideration.

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point by an oblique line. The $(n+m-1)^{th}$ element of the coded message z is reached. Gaps and double recordings are avoided if there is but one hole on each horizontal and on each oblique line.



Fig. 10. Transposition coding.
x. Uncoded signal. ➤ Transmitting direction.
z. Coded signal. ➤ Receiving direction.
The shift of the message element is obtained by the alternate connecting (through the device of the perforated band E) of the recorder or pick-up magnets $K_1 \ldots K_6$. This system renders possible a big coding programme period and thus complicates undesired deciphering.

To control a large number of recording heads, combined hole-signs, comprising two or more holes on the same transversal line can be punched in the band, in which case an electric combiner is required. Here, the same measures to prevent unauthorized recording must be used.

The duration of a syllable of the German language, normally spoken, varies between 0·05 and 0·5 s. The duration of an element t_0 should be shorter than the duration of a syllable and the average element shift longer.

Practically the following values are used:

Element duration: 0·05 s.
Maximum delay: 0·8 s.

Based of these values, we have constructed coding apparatus which meet the given conditions perfectly well as to synchronization exactitude and the comprehensibility of the decoded message, even under unfavorable transmission conditions. The amplitude curve, which is unchanged by the normal substitution method is here completely transformed by the element permutation of the transposition method. An unauthorized decipherer, working on the energy rhythm analysis system, gets no results in this case. If the element shift is insufficient, one can however get an idea of the contents of the message by looking for the vowels of an element-group and in arranging them in a correct order which permits of finding out the words. An arbitrarily chosen decoding key sometimes allows of bringing back several elements to about their original order. With a little exercise, it is possible to guess the message words after a few deciphering tests with different keys.

The deciphering possibilities rapidly diminish with the increase of the element shift, but the increase of the shift increases, too, the duration of the transmission between the input of the coding apparatus and the output of the deciphering apparatus. This renders conversation difficult and consequently reduces the field of useful commercial application.

V. COMBINATION OF BOTH CODING METHODS

The frequency band-substitution, as well as the transposition methods do not always satisfy the required conditions concerning secrecy. With the ordinary substitution method deciphering is possible by use of the amplitude and melodic diagrams, and the shifted elements of the transposition method can also be restituted to their initial order if their shifting time is too short. In both cases, the deciphering by someone not owning the key, requires great routine, an appropriate installation and much time.

For all cases in which the secret must absolutely be kept, even from well equipped deciphering specialists, we have elaborated a process which eliminates the inconveniences of both the above given methods.

From the initial signal x which, for example, has been divided into 5 different frequency bands $x_1 \ldots x_5$ and furthermore time-shifted, a signal z will result in which the original message will be both time-scrambled and frequency-shifted by varying amounts:

$$z = \begin{Bmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \\ z_3 \\ z_4 \\ z_5 \end{Bmatrix} = \begin{Bmatrix} \ldots a_{11}\, b_{31}\, c_{21}\, g_{21}\, f_{31}\, f_{14}\, h_{11}\, g_{11}\, g_{31} \ldots i_{11} \\ b_{21} \ldots a_{22}\, a_{12}\, c_{22}\, g_{12}\, h_{32}\, e_{12}\, k_{22}\, h_{12} \ldots \\ a_{33} \ldots b_{33}\, c_{13}\, b_{13}\, f_{33}\, d_{33}\, d_{33}\, f_{13}\, f_{33} \ldots k_{13} \\ \ldots d_{44}\, d_{54}\, e_{14}\, g_{14}\, g_{24}\, i_{14}\, i_{24}\, h_{14}\, k_{24} \ldots \\ a_{55}\, c_{55}\, d_{15}\, e_{15}\, b_{15}\, c_{15}\, e_{55}\, f_{15}\, h_{55}\, k_{55}\, k_{15} \ldots \end{Bmatrix}$$

The original successive news elements are again designated, here, as a, b, c .... The first index indicates the frequency band in which the element was before the keying and the second, the frequency band after the element has been shifted. As there is a frequency change (substitution) and a time-shift (transposition) we call this proceeding the combined method.

The new coding is realized by the use of various intermediate signals. A first intermediate signal is obtained, for example, by frequency-shifting the five

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frequency-bands $x_1 \ldots x_5$ into a same frequency band, indicated by index 6:

$$\begin{matrix} y_{61} \\ y_{62} \\ y_{63} \\ y_{64} \\ y_{65} \end{matrix} \left[\begin{matrix} a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ b_{26} & b_{26} & c_{26} & d_{26} & e_{26} & f_{26} & g_{26} & h_{26} & l_{26} & k_{26} \\ a_{36} & b_{36} & c_{36} & d_{36} & e_{36} & f_{36} & g_{36} & h_{36} & l_{36} & k_{36} \\ a_{46} & b_{46} & c_{46} & d_{46} & e_{46} & f_{46} & g_{46} & h_{46} & l_{46} & k_{46} \\ a_{56} & b_{56} & c_{56} & d_{56} & e_{56} & f_{56} & g_{56} & h_{56} & l_{56} & k_{56} \end{matrix} \right] \cdot \begin{matrix} y_{51} \\ y_{52} \\ y_{53} \\ y_{54} \\ y_{55} \end{matrix}$$

Another intermediate signal is obtained by alternatively exchanging the five signal channels:

$$\begin{matrix} y_{71} \\ y_{72} \\ y_{73} \\ y_{74} \\ y_{75} \end{matrix} \left[\begin{matrix} a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ a_{26} & b_{26} & c_{26} & d_{26} & e_{26} & f_{26} & g_{26} & h_{26} & l_{26} & k_{26} \\ g_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ h_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \end{matrix} \right] \cdot \begin{matrix} y_{51} \\ y_{52} \\ y_{53} \\ y_{54} \\ y_{55} \end{matrix}$$

By delaying unequally the different individual bands a third intermediate signal is produced:

$$\begin{matrix} y_{81} \\ y_{82} \\ y_{83} \\ y_{84} \\ y_{85} \end{matrix} \left[\begin{matrix} a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ a_{26} & b_{26} & c_{26} & d_{26} & e_{26} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{26} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \\ a_{16} & b_{16} & c_{16} & d_{16} & e_{16} & f_{16} & g_{16} & h_{16} & l_{16} & k_{16} \end{matrix} \right] \cdot \begin{matrix} y_{71} \\ y_{72} \\ y_{73} \\ y_{74} \\ y_{75} \end{matrix}$$

Finally, the signal y_{91} is obtained from y_{81} by a new permutation of the channel order:

$$\begin{matrix} y_{91} \\ y_{92} \\ y_{93} \\ y_{94} \\ y_{95} \end{matrix} \left[\begin{matrix} \ldots & a_{16} & b_{26} & c_{36} & e_{46} & f_{56} & l_{16} & h_{16} & g_{16} & g_{26} & \ldots & l_{16} \\ \ldots & b_{26} & a_{26} & a_{16} & c_{26} & g_{16} & h_{26} & e_{26} & k_{26} & h_{16} & l_{16} & \ldots \\ a_{16} & \ldots & b_{26} & c_{16} & b_{16} & f_{16} & d_{26} & d_{16} & f_{16} & f_{26} & \ldots & k_{16} \\ \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & d_{16} & d_{26} & e_{16} & g_{26} & g_{16} & l_{26} & l_{16} & b_{26} & k_{26} \\ \ldots & a_{26} & c_{26} & d_{26} & e_{26} & b_{26} & c_{16} & d_{16} & l_{16} & h_{16} & k_{26} & k_{16} \end{matrix} \right] \cdot \begin{matrix} y_{81} \\ y_{82} \\ y_{83} \\ y_{84} \\ y_{85} \end{matrix}$$

The individual bands of y_{91} are now back-shifted into the voice frequency-band by an unequal frequency-shift and thus the keyed signal z is produced, which can be transmitted by a standard speech-frequency band.

The deciphering of the message by displacing the elements is now impossible because of the frequency-change. The dephasing of the elements deforms the energy diagram used for the deciphering of ordinarily substitution-method messages. The two dangerous deciphering possibilities are thus eliminated by this proceeding.

Fig. 11 shows a device for combined keying. $M_1 \ldots M_5$ are the modulators to form the difference-frequencies from the original messages and from the auxiliary frequencies produced by the generator G. The intermediate signal $y_{61} \ldots y_{65}$ passes by filtering through the filters BP (the 3100 ... 3650 cycles frequency band of the modulation product).

The frequency-shifted bands are now permutated by the permutator switch Q, the output result of which are the five frequency bands $y_{51} \ldots y_{55}$ composing the signal y_5. These five frequency bands are next sent through a 5 channel retarding steel band device $H_1 \ldots H_5$ ensuring by a single motor drive an individual element delay time t on each channel. At the pick-up magnets $K_1 \ldots K_5$ the five parts $y_{51} \ldots y_{55}$ of the intermediate signal y_5 are obtained. One can, if it is desired, send each part through a band-pass filter ZP which suppresses all disturbing frequencies situated outside of the band. A new element-permutation by the permutator switch P gives the intermediate signal y_{81} and, by a second modulation with auxiliary frequencies $g_1 \ldots g_5$ the message z, covering all the 300 ... 2950 cycles frequency band, is obtained. The sum-frequencies engendered in modulators $N_1 \ldots N_5$ are superior to 6950 cycles and are withheld by the collective low-pass filter TP.

For deciphering the signal passes the same way through the apparatus, it is only necessary to invert the drive of the permutator switches P and Q. The drive of the receiving permutator P must however be delayed in respect to that of the sending permutator Q, by a time corresponding to the time required for each element to pass through both apparatus. This passage-time, contrarily to that which is needed in



Fig. 11. — Combined keying device.
The message frequency-bands $x_1 \ldots x_5$ are frequency-shifted by various amounts by modulation with the auxiliary frequencies $g_1 \ldots g_5$ and furthermore variously time-delayed by the Heinlotz magnetone cores $H_1 \ldots H_5$. This double coding offers maximum secrecy guarantee.

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

Fig. 12. — Combined coding.

x. Uncoded signal oscillogram of the word "Gesellschaft". $z_1 \ldots z_5$ Coded signal frequency bands, time and frequency shifted by variable amounts. The characteristics of the fundamental signal x are no longer recognizable on the delayed and frequency-shifted bands $z_1 \ldots z_5$. Any deciphering without knowing the key is practically impossible.

the substitution method, may be short and conversation is thus not impeded.

In Fig. 12 the frequency bands $z_1 \ldots z_5$ of the signal z are represented below the voice oscillogram x which has been obtained by 0·03 s element combined-keying.

VI. TRANSMISSION OF CHARACTERISTIC VALUES.

Efficient coding is also attained if, instead of transmitting modified or shifted voice frequencies, this is performed with characteristic values of the amplitude spectrum. For high fidelity transmission it would be necessary to transmit an incommensurable number of characteristic values, corresponding to the great number of variable partial amplitudes and their dephasing.

It is preferable to determine the variable fundamental frequency of the vowels and the amplitudes of a great number of voice frequency-bands by means of automatic voice-analysis. For the transmission of the corresponding characteristic values, a finite number of transmission channels is sufficient, the total band width of which is even slightly smaller than that of the normal voice range.

To reproduce the voice at the receiver, a blend of oscillations is made, the vowel fundamental-frequency of which is synchronized with the fundamental frequency of the transmitter. For consonants, the oscillation has, as on the transmitter-side, a noise-character.

By means of the particular amplitude characteristics, the frequency-bands of this oscillation blend are controlled in such a manner that the amplitude depending on the frequency approximates at least to that of the initial message.

In this way, vowels and consonants having no coincidence with the clear voice signal x, are produced. They are, nevertheless, comprehensible because their oscillation character and the energy distribution of the spectrum approach those of the clear signal.

The realization of the characteristic-values method is simplified if, already on the transmitter side, the vowel oscillation g and an oscillation blend h of a frequency band of small width got out of the consonants is transmitted to the receiver through a special channel. The oscillation blends v_0 and w_0 respectively are produced from the signals g and h, at the reception end, by non-linear transmission. These blends v_0 and w_0 are formed, one of the high harmonics of g having a tone character and the other of an unlimited number of partial vibrations having a noise character. From these oscillation blends, comprehensible spoken words or sentences can be reconstituted by amplitude-controlling the separate frequency bands in function of the characteristic values.

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Each tele-communication is generally in direct correlation to a key, but two or more bands can also be read simultaneously, each combination of lines corresponding to a certain key. If the bands do not have the same number of lines, the period of the total collection of programmes is very long. Element shift and channel selection are realized in hand-combination by the usual methods. The key changing in both transmitter and receiver must, of course, be simultaneous. A perfect synchronization on both sides is of highest importance. Serious tests have shown that with 0.05 – 0.1 s elements synchronization errors of 5 % of the element length have already a perturbating effect and that for errors of 10 % comprehensibility is considerably reduced. For this reason we have realized a synchronization system assuring an exactitude of 1 to 2 % of the element length, that is of 1 ms. The synchronization subsists even when transitory interferences or interruptions of duration of up to 0.5 – 1 min occur in the transmission. This means that deciphering is not put out of order by the poorest transmission conditions.

VIII. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE VOICE-SCRAMBLING METHOD

Choice of a voice-scrambling method is subordinated to the condition of each particular case. The substitution method, known and used since some years, has been considerably improved by our synchronization device, which has permitted a reduction of the element duration. It is suitable for cases in which attempts at unauthorized deciphering, which as a matter of fact require great routine and complicated apparatus, are not to be feared. With the transposition method secrecy can be increased at the expense of longer transmission time. Conversation is however rendered more difficult in this way and this prevents the generalization of this method for commercial use. The apparatus size and weight are however less than those of the substitution apparatus because of the suppression of filters. The transposition method is thus particularly suitable for portable apparatus, when certain concessions can be made as regards duration of transmission and degree of secrecy. In the cases where maximum secrecy is essential, the combined method is preferred because attempts at unauthorized deciphering, which had given successful results when tried with the substitution and transposition methods failed to do so here. As it is possible to work with very small delays, combined keying is especially convenient for commercial use.

Message transmission by the channel splitting system has the advantage of a utilization of the transmission channel to a degree of secrecy. The time of voice transmission in this case, however,



Fig. 11
Portable scrambling and coding apparatus
The spheres are set in motion by a small electric motor. The assembly and apparatus weighs about 20 kg.

In many cases, the scrambling apparatus will also code non vocal signals, for example, by means of transposition or combined coding can be used for this purpose. The substitution method requires some auxiliary apparatus. Using a keying device which enables the simultaneous coding of several messages through different telegraphic transmission channels.

Fig. 11 shows a portable keying apparatus with supply equipment. This apparatus is suitable for coding or decoding speech or telegraphic messages. The communication between the two stations is by a simple actuating of a push-button switch on the micro-telephone device. The keying apparatus is composed of several figures. For telegraphic transmission a morse key can be connected.

The transposition method, which has been tried out in severe tests, has proved satisfactory. The speech intelligibility is particularly good.

The secrecy ensured by this compact piece of apparatus meets nearly fewer requirements and is superior to that of most of the well known scrambling devices which are on the market. It is also suitable for the construction of larger apparatus of even more effective secrecy.

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Communications 10,025
x Chart
x Radio
Telegraph,
International

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 18, 1943

FROM: Alvah W. Sulloway

File

SUBJECT:

I am sending you herewith a chart dated January 2, 1943, which Major Lowman has furnished us, showing the present normal routing of international radio-telegraph, cable, and radio-telephone traffic. You will note that this chart is in two sections, one covering Europe, Africa, and the Near East; and the other, South America and the Far East.

I am also sending you a communications chart of the world in three sections. You may find that this chart is too bulky for convenient use, in which case I suggest that it be returned to Major Lowman.

For your information, Corporal Jennings, a former RCA communications man has been transferred from the Army to OSS and is now working in the Message Center. He is familiar with the problems arising in connection with communications traffic throughout the world, and will be regularly available to answer any questions.

AWS.

Enc.

A.W.S.

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Common Carrier Division
Engineering Department

PRESENT NORMAL ROUTING OF INTERNATIONAL
RADIOTELEGRAPH, CABLE, AND RADIOTELEPHONE
TRAFFIC 1/

Confidential

WU - Western Union Telegraph Co. 2/ 3/ 4/
Postal - Postal Telegraph - Cable Co.
RCAC - R. C. A. Communications, Inc. 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/
Press - Press Wireless, Inc. 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/

CC - Commercial Cable Co. 2/
AAC - All America Cables and Radio, Inc. 3/ 4/

TRT - Tropical Radio Telegraph Co. 3/
MRT - Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.
CPC - Commercial Pacific Cable Co. 3/
AT&T - American Telephone and Telegraph

Country	RCAC	MRT	TRT	Press 10/	WU	CC
Europe, Africa and the Near East						
1. Albania	No	No	No	No	No	No
2. Austria (Germany)	No	No	No	No	No	No
3. Azores	Portugal	CC-New York	No	No	Direct	Direct
4. Belgium	No	No	No	No	No	No
5. Bulgaria	No	No	No	No	No	No
6. Czechoslovakia	No	No	No	No	No	No
7. Denmark	No	No	No	No	No	No
8. Estonia	No	No	No	No	No	No
9. Finland	Direct	CC-New York	No	No	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain
10. France	No	No	No	No	No	No
11. Germany	No	No	No	No	No	No
12. Greece	No	No	No	No	No	No
13. Greenland	Direct	Postal-New York	No	No	CMC-Nova Scotia	RCAC-New York
14. Hungary	No	No	No	No	No	No
15. Iceland	Direct	CC-New York	No	No	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain
16. Irish Free State (Eire)	Gt. Britain	Direct 12/	No	No	Direct	Direct
17. Italy	No	No	No	No	No	No
18. Latvia	No	No	No	No	No	No
19. Lithuania	No	No	No	No	No	No
20. Netherlands	No	No	No	No	No	No
21. Norway	No	No	No	No	No	No
22. Poland	No	No	No	No	No	No
23. Portugal	Direct	Argentina-Madrid	No	No	Direct	Gt. Britain
24. Rumania	No	No	No	No	No	No
25. Spain	Direct & Gt. Britain 19/	Argentina-Madrid	No	No	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain
26. Sweden	Direct	CC-New York	No	No	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain
27. Switzerland	Direct	CC-New York	"	Direct	" "	" "
28. U.S.S.R. (Unoccupied)	a	Direct	"	"	" "	" "
29. United Kingdom (Great Britain)	a	CC-New York	"	"	Direct	Direct
30. Yugoslavia	No	No	No	No	No	No
31. Vatican City		Direct				
32. Brit[illegible] East Africa	Gt. Britain	[illegible]				

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	Direct	CC-New York	No	No	Gt. Britain		Gt. Britain
	Direct	CC-New York	"	Direct	" "		" "
	"	Direct	"	"	" "		" "
	"	CC-New York	"	"	Direct		Direct
	No	No	No	No	No		
		Direct					
British East Africa	Gt. Britain 15/	CC-New York	No	No	Gt. Britain		Gt. Britain
British West Africa	Gt. Britain	" " "	"	No	" "		" "
British South Africa	" "	" " "	"	No	" "		" "
Belgian Congo	"	" " "	"	No	" "		" "
		Direct					
		Direct	"	No	" "		" "
	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	"	No	Gt. Britain 26/		" "
French Africa	Gt. Britain 18/	" " "	"	No	Gt. Britain 37/		" "
Italian Africa	Gt. Britain 20/	CC-New York 33/	"	No	Gt. Britain 20/		Gt. Britain 20/
	Direct	CC-New York	"	No	U.S.-Liberia-Akron		Gt. Britain CC-
	Portugal	Argentina-Madrid	"	No	Gt. Britain		" "
Spanish Africa	Spain	" "	"	No	Gt. Britain 38/		" "
Arabia	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	"	No	Gt. Britain		Gt. Britain CC-
Iraq	Direct	CC-New York	"	No	Gt. Britain		" "
Iran	Gt. Britain	" " "	"	No	" "		" "
Palestine	" "	Egypt	"	No	" "		" "
Syria	Direct	CC-New York	"	No	" "		" "
Turkey	Direct	" " "	"	No	" "		" "
St. Pierre et Miquelon	Direct	" " "	"	No	Direct	St. Johns, Newfoundland	

Routing Notes

1/ This chart contains the normal routing for international traffic originating in, destined to, or transiting the Continental United States. Routings for traffic originating in and destined to Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, Hawaii and Philippine Islands, which does not transit the United States, where American carriers maintain offices may be obtained upon request. Where a carrier does not maintain a direct circuit and the traffic is diverted to another carrier in North or Central America, the name of the carrier and the point of diversion has been given.

2/ Operates direct circuits to European Area.

3/ Operates direct circuits to Central American Area.

4/ Operates direct circuits to South American Area.

5/ Operates direct circuits to Pacific and Far East Area.

14/ Fire Government traffic only; all other traffic transferred to CC - New York.

15/ Traffic to Tunis suspended; French equatorial Africa Direct; French Somaliland, via Beyrouth, Syria; other countries via Gt. Britain.

19/ All traffic t... Lerica, and

20/ Italian East ...

25/ Service to all ...

26/ Service resto...

33/ International ...

37/ French Morocco ... Algeria; Tun...

38/ Spanish Moroc...

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[illegible]

[illegible] OF INTERNATIONAL
[illegible], CABLE, AND RADIOTELEPHONE
TRAFFIC 1/

Serial No. _____

January 2, 1943

[illegible] - Tropical Radio Telegraph Co. 3/
[illegible] - Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/
CPC - Commercial Pacific Cable Co. 5/
AT&T - American Telephone and Telegraph Co. 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/

CPR - Canadian Pacific Railroad
PCB - Pacific Cable Board
C & W - Cables and Wireless, Ltd.
CMC - Canadian Marconi Co.
French - French Cable Co.

[illegible] 10/	WU	CO	AAC	CPC	AT&T	Postal	
	No	No	No	No	No	No	1
	No	No	No	No	No	No	2
	Direct	Direct	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CC-New York	3
	No	No	No	No	No	No	4
	No	No	No	No	No	No	5
	No	No	No	No	No	No	6
	No	No	No	No	No	No	7
	No	No	No	No	No	No	8
	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CC-New York	9
	No	No	No	No	No	No	10
	No	No	No	No	No	No	11
	No	No	No	No	No	No	12
	CMC-Nova Scotia	RCAC-New York	RCAC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CPR-Montreal	13
	No	No	No	No	No	No	14
	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CC - New York	15
	Direct	Direct	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	Gt. Britain	CC - New York	16
	No	No	No	No	No	No	17
	No	No	No	No	No	No	18
	No	No	No	No	No	No	19
	No	No	No	No	No	No	20
	No	No	No	No	No	No	21
	No	No	No	No	No	No	22
	Direct	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	Direct	CC-New York	23
	No	No	No	No	No	No	24
	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	Direct	CC-New York	25
	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CC-New York	26
[illegible]rect	" "	" "	" " "	" " "	Direct	CC-New York	27
	" "	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "	28
	Direct	Direct	" " "	" " "	Direct	" " "	29
	No	No	No	No	No	No	30
						MRT-New York	31
	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CC-New York	32

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[illegible]	St. Britain	CO-New York	Postal-San Francisco	Direct	CO-New York
St. Britain	St. Britain	CO-New York	Postal-San Francisco	Direct	CO-New York
St. Britain	St. Britain	CO-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CO-New York
" "	" "	" " "	" " "	Direct	CO-New York
[illegible]	[illegible]	" " "	" " "	Direct	" " "
St. Britain	St. Britain	CO-New York	Postal-San Francisco	No	CO-New York
" "	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
" "	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
[illegible]	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
St. Britain 20/	St. Britain 20/	" " " 20/	" " " 20/	No	" " "
[illegible]	St. Britain	CO-New York	" " "	No	U. S. - Liberia[illegible]
St. Britain	" "	" " "	" " "	No	CO-New York
St. Britain 23/	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
St. Britain	St. Britain	CO-New York	" " "	No	CO-New York
St. Britain	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
" "	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
" "	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
" "	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
Direct	St. Johns, Newfoundland	" " "	" " "	No	" " "
				No	" " "

[illegible] transmitting [illegible], Canal Zone, [illegible] maintain [illegible] the traffic is [illegible] of diversion

Routing Notes

19/ All traffic for Madrid sent direct. Traffic for provinces of Balearic Islands, Barcelona, Gere[illegible] Lerida, and Tarragona via Barcelona.

20/ Italian East Africa only; no service to Italian North Africa.

15/ Service to all parts uncertain.

23/ Service restored June 10, 1942 to Addis Ababa, Harrar, Diredawa, Dessiejimma and Debramarcos, [illegible]

33/ International radiotelephone communications are subject to Board of War Communications Order No[illegible]

37/ French Morocco - Direct New York to Gibraltar via Azores, Carcavellos thence to Tangier, Algeria, Tunisia.

38/ Spanish Morocco - Direct New York to Gibraltar via Azores, Carcavellos - thence to Tangier.

[illegible]

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	Country	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Press 30/	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] Indies, Central & South America							
[illegible]	British West Indies							
[illegible]	[illegible]	WS-Origin	No	Direct	No	TRT - Miami	Postal - New York	Postal - [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Direct	Direct	No	"	C & W - Cuba	Nova Scotia	No
[illegible]	[illegible]	Puerto Rico	AAC - New York	Puerto Rico	"	Direct	" "	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	Puerto Rico	" " "	" "	"	"	" "	" "
[illegible]	[illegible]	" "	" " "	" "	"	C & W - Barbados	" "	" "
[illegible]	Cuba	Direct	" " " 16/	Direct	Direct	Direct	AAC-New York	Direct
[illegible]	Dominican Republic	"	" " "	No	No	RCAC - New York	" " "	"
[illegible]	French West Indies							
[illegible]	Guadeloupe	Puerto Rico	" " "	Puerto Rico	"	C & W - Cuba 29/	Nova Scotia	French - [illegible]
[illegible]	Martinique	" "	" " "	" "	"	" " 30/	" "	" "
[illegible]	Haiti	Direct	Direct	No	"	AAC - New York	AAC - New York	Direct
[illegible]	Netherlands West Indies							
[illegible]	Aruba	Curacao	AAC - New York	"	"	C & W - Barbados	Nova Scotia	"
[illegible]	Curacao	Direct	" " "	"	"	" "	" "	"
[illegible]	Puerto Rico	"	" " " 34/	Direct	"	Direct	" "	Direct
[illegible]	Virgin Islands	Puerto Rico	" " "	Puerto Rico	"	C & W - Puerto Rico	" "	"
[illegible]	British Honduras	Guatemala	No	Direct	"	TRT - New Orleans	Postal - New York	No
[illegible]	Costa Rica	"	AAC - New York	"	"	TRT - Miami	AAC - New York	Direct
20.	Guatemala	Direct	" " "	"	"	AAC - New York	" " "	"
21.	Honduras	Guatemala	San Salvador 7/	"	"	TRT - New Orleans	" " "	San Salvador
22.	Nicaragua	"	AAC - New York	"	"	" " "	" " "	Direct
23.	Panama	Direct	" " "	"	"	AAC - New York	" " "	"
24.	Panama Canal Zone	Panama City	" " "	Panama	"	" " "	" " "	"
25.	Salvador	Guatemala	Direct	Guatemala	"	" " "	" " "	"
26.	Argentina	Direct	Direct	No	Uruguay	Direct - Barbados	AAC - New York	Direct
27.	Bolivia	Argentina	Direct	"	No	Barbados - Argentina	" " "	"
28.	Brazil	Direct	Direct	"	"	Direct Barbados	" " "	"
29.	Chile	"	Direct	"	Uruguay	Barbados - Argentina	" " "	"
30.	Colombia	"	"	Direct	No	TRT - Miami 31/	" " "	"
31.	Ecuador	AAC - New York	AAC - New York	No	"	AAC - New York	" " "	"
32.	Guiana							
33.	British	Puerto Rico	" " "	"	"	C & W - Barbados	Nova Scotia	C & W - Cuba
34.	French	Surinam	" " "	"	"	Puerto Rico	" "	French - Pue[illegible]
35.	Dutch	Direct	" " "	"	"	Barbados	" "	C & W - Puer[illegible]
36.	Paraguay	Argentina	Direct	"	"	Barbados - Argentina	AAC - New York	Argentina
37.	Peru	Argentina and Chile	Direct	"	"	" "	" " "	Direct
38.	Uruguay	Argentina	AAC - New York	"	Direct	" "	" " "	"
39.	Venezuela	Direct	" " "	"	No	AAC - New York 32/	Nova Scotia	"
	Asia and Oceania							
40.	British India	Gt. Britain	CC - New York	No	No	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC - New Yo[illegible]
41.	British Malaya	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
42.	Ceylon	Gt. Britain	CC - New York	No	"	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CC - New Yo[illegible]

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	Direct	No			TRT - Miami 31/		
	CG - New York	No			AAC - New York		
	Puerto Rico				C & W - Barbados	Nova Scotia	
	Direct				Puerto Rico		
	Direct				Barbados		
	Direct				Barbados - Argentina	AAC - New York	
	Direct						Direct
	AAC - New York		Direct				
	Direct		No		AAC - New York 32/	Nova Scotia	
	Gt. Britain	CG - New York	No	No	Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CG - New York
	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	Gt. Britain	CG - New York	No		Gt. Britain	Gt. Britain	CG - New York
(Occupied Area)	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
(Unoccupied Area)	Direct 27/	Direct 27/	No	Direct	RCAC - San Francisco	Gt. Britain	
	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	Paraguay	No	No	No	No	No	
	No	No	No	No	No	Gt. Britain	CG - New York
	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	Direct	Direct	No	No	RCAC - San Francisco	Postal - New York	
	Australia 21/	Postal-New York 35/			PCB - Montreal 24/	Postal - New York	Postal - New York
	Direct 28/	No			RCAC - San Francisco		
	No	No	No	No	No	No	
	Direct	Direct	No		RCAC - San Francisco	Postal - New York	MRT - New York
	CPC - San Fran.	CPC-San Francisco			CPC - San Francisco		Postal - New York
	Direct	Direct			RCAC - San Francisco		
	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
	Navy-Honolulu	Navy - Honolulu	No	No	RCAC - San Francisco	Postal - New York	Postal - New York
	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
	Direct	No	No	No	RCAC - San Francisco	Postal - New York	Postal - New York

Routing Notes

1/ Includes New Hebrides, Solomon, and Santa Cruz Islands.
2/ ~~Includes~~ Society Islands and Tahiti.
3/ No Northward traffic.
4/ Point to point only. Does not include multiple addressed press transmissions on pre-arranged schedules for such receiving stations as newspapers, broadcast stations, etc.
5/ Traffic to Camaguey only handled by direct radio circuit.
6/ Includes New Guinea, Papua, Willis Islets, Cook or Hervey Islands, Fiji Islands, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Solomon Islands, British Samoa, Tonga Island and Union Island via Australia. All other places - WU at origin.
7/ Society Islands and Tahiti via Navy Honolulu.
8/ Service to Solomon Islands temporarily suspended April 30, 1942. Traffic to Loyalty Island, New Hebrides, and Wallis Island - via RCAC San Francisco.
9/ Via Chengtu, Chungking or Kunming

28/ Tahiti and Society I...
29/ Via Havana to C & W...
30/ Via Havana to C & W...
31/ Via TRT except Barra...
32/ Except Maracaibo-Whi...
34/ Direct to San Juan...
35/ Transferred to Post... via San Francisco -

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	GS	AAC	GPO	AAC 33/	Postal	
[illegible]	Postal - New York	Postal - New York	Postal - San Francisco	Direct	TRT - Miami	1
- Cuba	Nova Scotia	No	" " "	"	CPR - Montreal	2
	" "	C & W - Cuba	" " "	No	" "	3
	" "	" "	" " "	Direct	" "	4
- Barbados	" "	" "	" " "	No	" "	5
	AAC - New York	Direct	" " "	Direct	AAC - New York	6
New York	" " "	"	" " "	"	" " "	7
						8
- Cuba 29/	Nova Scotia	French - Puerto Rico	" " "	No	" " "	9
" 30/	" "	" " "	" " "	No	" " "	10
ew York	AAC - New York	Direct	" " "	Direct	" " "	11
						12
- Barbados	Nova Scotia	"	" " "	No	" " "	13
"	" "	"	" " "	"	" " "	14
	" "	Direct	" " "	Direct	" " "	15
- Puerto Rico	" "	"	" " "	No	" " "	16
ew Orleans	Postal - New York	No	" " "	"	TRT - New Orleans	17
iami	AAC - New York	Direct	" " "	Direct	AAC - New York	18
ew York	" " "	"	" " "	"	" " "	19
ew Orleans	" " "	San Salvador	" " "	"	" " "	20
" "	" " "	Direct	" " "	"	" " "	21
ew York	" " "	"	" " "	"	" " "	22
" "	" " "	"	" " "	Panama	" " "	23
" "	" " "	"	" " "	Direct	" " "	24
- Barbados	AAC - New York	Direct	Postal - San Francisco	Direct	AAC - New York	25
- Argentina	" " "	"	" " "	Argentina	" " "	26
Barbados	" " "	"	" " "	Direct	" " "	27
- Argentina	" " "	"	" " "	Direct	" " "	28
Miami 31/	" " "	"	" " "	Direct	AAC - New York	29
ew York	" " "	"	" " "	No	" " "	30
						31
- Barbados	Nova Scotia	C & W - Cuba	" " "	"	CPR - Montreal	32
Rico	" "	French - Puerto Rico	" " "	"	AAC - New York	33
	" "	C & W - Puerto Rico	" " "	Direct	" " "	34
- Argentina	AAC - New York	Argentina	" " "	Argentina	" " "	35
"	" " "	Direct	" " "	Direct	" " "	36
						37
"	" " "	"	" " "	Argentina	" " "	38
New York 32/	Nova Scotia	"	" " "	Direct	" " "	39
itain	Gt. Britain	CC - New York	No	No	CC - New York	40
	No	No	No	No	No	41
itain	Gt. Britain	CC - New York	No	"	CC - New York	42
						43

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[illegible]	" " "	"	" " "	Direct	" " "	[illegible]
[illegible]	" " "	"	" " "	Direct	AAC - New York	30
[illegible]	[illegible]	"	" " "	No	" " "	31
[illegible]	Nova Scotia	C & W - Cuba	" " "	"	CPC - Montreal	32
[illegible]	" "	French - Puerto Rico	" " "	"	AAC - New York	33
[illegible]	" "	C & W - Puerto Rico	" " "	Direct	" " "	34
[illegible] - Argentina	AAC - New York	Argentina	" " "	Argentina	" " "	35
"	" " "	Direct	" " "	Direct	" " "	36
"	" " "	"	" " "	Argentina	" " "	37
[illegible]	Nova Scotia	"	" " "	Direct	" " "	38
[illegible]	St. Britain	CC - New York	No	No	CC - New York	40
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	41
[illegible]	St. Britain	CC - New York	No	"	CC - New York	42
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	43
San Francisco	St. Britain	MRT - New York	MRT - San Francisco	No	MRT - San Francisco	44
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	45
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	46
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	47
[illegible]	St. Britain	CC - New York	No	No	No	48
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	49
[illegible]	No	No	No	No	No	50
San Francisco	No	No	No	No	No	51
Montreal 24/	Postal - New York	Postal - New York	Postal - San Francisco	Direct	PCB - Montreal	52
San Francisco	Postal - New York	Postal - New York	" " "	No	PCB - Montreal	53
	" " "	" " "	RCAC - Honolulu 23/	"	" "	54
San Francisco	No	No	No	No	No	55
San Francisco	Postal - New York	MRT - New York	Direct	Direct	CPC - San Francisco	56
San Francisco	" " "	Postal - New York	"	No	" " "	57
San Francisco	" " "	" " "	Postal - San Francisco	No	PCB - Montreal	58
San Francisco	No	No	No	No	No	59
San Francisco	Postal - New York	Postal - New York	Navy - Honolulu	No	CPC - San Francisco	60
San Francisco	No	No	No	No	No	61
	Postal - New York	Postal - New York	Postal - San Francisco	No	PCB - Montreal	62
						63

Routing Notes

28/ Tahiti and Society Islands - Direct. Loyalty Island, New Hebrides and Wallis Island - via New Caledonia.
29/ Via Havana to C & W Ltd., thence Kingston, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe wireless.
30/ Via Havana to C & W Ltd., thence Kingston, St. Lucia, Martinique wireless.
31/ Via TRT except Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cali, and Cartagena which circulate via AACR from New York.
32/ Except Maracaiba which circulates RCAC New York.
34/ Direct to San Juan, only at times of interruption of cable of AAC.
35/ Transferred to Postal at N. Y., thence Bamfield. Includes Solomon and Santa Cruz Islands but New Hebrides via San Francisco - Sydney, Australia.

dules for such

Islands, Solomon

brides, and Wallis

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FE-4

January 16, 1943

Memorandum

To: Colonel Donovan

From: R. Davis Halliwell

Subject: W/T Station

All Naval ships and stations are being advised that W/T station N K N will be activated on a restricted basis January 17th, 1943.

This station will be located at Kochwan, near Chungking, China. Its preliminary communications will be arranged with naval station on the American Pacific Coast.

R. Davis Halliwell

CC: Major Bruce and
Mr. Shepardson
Major Lowman
Captain Devlin

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J.S.O. 9905
Intercepts
Strong, Gen
Processing

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: February 3, 1943

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson

SECRET

SUBJECT:

Spencer Phenix is with me and tells me about your decision respecting Spanish material. For the sake of exact understanding let me explain two problems separately and get your ruling:

1. General Strong. You remember the episode in which General Strong handed me a package which had been supplied him by the FBI with the understanding that we were to do the work and that a copy of any proceeds thereof were to be delivered to G-2. We have been acting on this arrangement. Practically speaking the package handed me is no longer of service and, therefore, if you so desire I can inform General Strong that its usefulness is exhausted and that therefore he need expect no further distribution.

Yes

2. Under an arrangement with Secretary Hull a copy of processed material has been handed to Atherton with the understanding that he reads, takes notes, and then burns the original. It has always seemed to me that occasionally some of this stuff was of considerable value to State.

Do you feel that in view of the fact that the material is to be stopped to Strong we should also stop it to State?

An alternative to stopping all this communication to State is offered by a suggestion of Spencer's; that he should select those items of genuine interest to State, so prepare them that the source could not be identified, and that we could hand these only to State. Personally I prefer this suggestion to complete stoppage.

Yes

Hugh R. Wilson

c/c Mr. Wilson is handling this
Ed. Roy
E.J.

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COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 13, 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE V. STRONG
(THROUGH: SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

This is in reply to your memorandums of January 5, 1943.

Careful inquiry into the subject matter has disclosed the following:

1. In regard to Paragraph 1 of your memorandum: The messages referred to in your paper were sent by us to your G-2 office as the product of our decoding certain Spanish telegrams. This decoding was accomplished, not by cryptanalysis as suggested in your memorandum, but through use of a code delivered to our Mr. Hugh Wilson by General Kroner at your direction and in your presence on or about August 15, 1942. Specifically, on that occasion you asked that OSS do the decoding on all such material and give to your Colonel Clarke a deciphered copy.

In accordance with that arrangement this material has been regularly supplied to your office through Colonel Clarke in the following manner: It is placed in two envelopes, the inner envelope marked "Secret, to be opened only by Colonel Clarke", the outer envelope being addressed to Colonel Carter Clarke and marked "By Messenger". Colonel Clarke's office is telephoned whenever such matter is available and he sends an Army courier to pick up the envelope. The envelope is delivered to this courier whose identity is checked before delivery is made. Since the form of security of these messages and the extent of their circulation from the time of their delivery to Colonel

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COPY

SECRET

Clarke is a matter for your staff to determine, no attempt here has been made to ascertain whether they are properly safeguarded after they leave our possession.

II. With reference to your paragraph 2 concerning the three messages:

(a) I can find nothing in the Executive instructions of July 8, 1942, to which you refer, which designates the War Department to handle diplomatic traffic.

(b) There is an indication that an arrangement has been entered into among the three parties concerned, but what that arrangement is does not appear. Therefore, knowing neither the code nor the message content nor the decoding agency, Mr. Roseborough very properly in the interest of security sought the assistance of Lieutenant Commander Jones, who had originally set up and operated our Message Center and who, by authorization of the Coast Guard, has continued with us on parttime duty as adviser and consultant in communication matters.

(c) But even if we had knowledge of the rule to which you refer, there has in fact been delivery of the text to the War Department through Lieutenant Commander Jones, who must be regarded in his relationship to us and not as an outside agent.

III. As to paragraph 3: We are obliged, as is every other agency, to provide for the security of classified matter. As a means of fulfilling that obligation we have set up security regulations. As an added precaution, whenever we handle classified matter which may be the primary responsibility of a particular department, it is our practice to conform as far as possible to the procedure laid down by that department, whether Army, Navy or State.

William J. Donovan
Director

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COPY

JCS
JCH

July 6, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in the interests of maximum security and efficiency, cryptanalytical activities should be limited to the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At present, small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Director of Strategic Services. It is also possible that other offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units.

In the interests of secrecy, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and most efficient use of the limited number of talented personnel skilled in cryptanalysis, it is believed that this work should be controlled and undertaken by a minimum number of agencies. As the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation now have large organizations well equipped and capable of handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these activities be limited to the three agencies mentioned. An agreement has been reached with regard to the allocation of this work between the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Presidential approval of the foregoing is respectfully requested.

E. J. KING
Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

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January 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE V. STRONG
(THROUGH: SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

This is in reply to your memorandum of January 5, 1943.

Careful inquiry into the subject matter has disclosed the following:

I. In regard to paragraph 1 of your memorandum: The messages referred to in your paper were sent by us to your G-2 office as the product of our decoding certain Spanish telegrams. This decoding was accomplished, not by cryptanalysis as suggested in your memorandum, but through use of a code delivered to our Mr. Hugh Wilson by General Kroner at your direction and in your presence on or about August 15, 1942. Specifically, on that occasion you asked that OSS do the decoding on all such material and give to your Colonel Clarke a deciphered copy.

In accordance with that arrangement this material has been regularly supplied to your office through Colonel Clarke in the following manner: It is placed in two envelopes, the inner envelope marked "Secret, to be opened only by Colonel Clarke", the outer envelope being addressed to Colonel Carter Clarke and marked "By Messenger". Colonel Clarke's office is telephoned whenever such matter is available and he sends an Army courier to pick up the envelope. The envelope is delivered to this courier whose identity is checked before delivery is made. Since the form of security of these messages and the extent of their circulation from the time of their delivery to Colonel

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Clarke is a matter for your staff to determine, no attempt here has been made to ascertain whether they are properly safeguarded after they leave our possession.

II. With reference to your paragraph 2 concerning the three messages:

(a) I can find nothing in the Executive instructions of July 8, 1942, to which you refer, which designates the War Department to handle diplomatic traffic.

(b) There is an indication that an arrangement has been entered into among the three parties concerned, but what that arrangement is does not appear. Therefore, knowing neither the code nor the message content nor the decoding agency, Mr. Roseborough very properly in the interest of security sought the assistance of Lieutenant Commander Jones, who had originally set up and operated our Message Center and who, by authorization of the Coast Guard, has continued with us on part-time duty as adviser and consultant in communication matters.

(c) But even if we had knowledge of the rule to which you refer, there has in fact been delivery of the text to the War Department through Lieutenant Commander Jones, who must be regarded in his relationship to us and not as an outside agent.

III. As to paragraph 3: We are obliged, as is every other agency, to provide for the security of classified matter. As a means of fulfilling that obligation we have set up security regulations. As an added precaution, whenever we handle classified matter which may be the primary responsibility of a particular department, it is our practice to conform as far as possible to the procedure laid down by that department, whether Army, Navy or State.

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William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN CONCERNING SPANISH MATERIAL

An exhaustive search reveals that no archives exist in respect of this matter. Hence, I must rely upon my memory and am unable to even give dates other than that the final visit to General Strong took place on the day after his return from London.

Donald Downes had prepared a most secret memorandum explaining that all advance preparations in respect of the Spanish Embassy had been made by the OSS, that attempts to enter had been frustrated, apparently deliberately, by the FBI, that eventually it had been agreed between Donald and the local FBI that the undertaking was to be a mutual one, that the FBI would do the actual entering and furnish us with copies of material. Donald continued that the FBI entered, took copies of the material, whereupon Mr. Hoover appeared at the JIC, handed copies to Admiral Train and General Kroner, and said that in his opinion OSS, not being in the cryptographic business, had no right to a copy. The others acquiesced. All of the foregoing appeared in the memorandum.

It is pertinent to the foregoing to add that in the

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course of the casing of the Embassy, Dulles and I had kept General Strong apprised of steps taken and of our collaboration with FBI.

Under Colonel Donovan's instruction George Bowden and I presented the memorandum mentioned above to General Kroner. Kroner showed deep distress, said that Strong had never told him of our interest in the case, otherwise he would have acted differently at the JIC. He urged that we do nothing about the matter because Strong would be back in two or three days.

On Strong's return Bowden and I again called on G-2, told the story to Strong and presented the memorandum. He expressed blasphemous indignation at the way OSS had been treated, summoned Kroner from the next room and said to him in approximately the following language: "Kroner, get that Spanish material. Hand it to Hugh Wilson. OSS will do the deciphering for G-2 of this material. OSS will assume the responsibility to give to Colonel Clark copies of all matter deciphered."

I acquiesced in this procedure, General Kroner gave me the material, I returned to my office and made arrangements whereby the condition laid down by Strong has been carried out. The material has been regularly supplied in accordance with the undertaking since that time.

HRW

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H.R.W.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 8, 1943.

File

TO: Major Bruce

FROM: Arthur J. Goldberg

RE: Handling of Spanish Material.

This material is received in duplicate from Mr. Phenix. The original is sent to Colonel Carter Clarke and the copy is placed in our unaccessioned files. Mr. Phenix's covering letter is destroyed.

The original is sent to Colonel Clarke in the following manner: The material is placed in two envelopes, the inner envelope marked "Secret - To be opened only by Colonel Clarke", the outer envelope is addressed to Colonel Carter Clarke and marked "By Messenger". Colonel Clarke's office is telephoned (his telephone being War Dept., ext. 72662) and he sends an Army messenger to pick up the envelope. The envelope is delivered to this messenger. The messenger has been one of two Army officers and his identity checked.

Arthur J. Goldberg

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By authority Joint Security Control
JOINT SECURITY CONTROL
WASHINGTON, D. C. Date 1/6/43

January 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES: (THROUGH: SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

1. There have been called to my attention some 11 photostatic sheets containing approximately 20 messages on either the Madrid-Washington circuit, the Caracas-Madrid circuit, the Bogota-Caracas circuit, or the Caracas-Rio de Janeiro circuit, which apparently are intercepts of coded messages which had been processed in your office. As far as can be determined, no adequate steps had been taken to provide for the security of these messages either in marking or in restricting circulation. It was my understanding that work of this character was not to be performed in the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Information is requested, in view of the provisions of the Executive Instructions of July 3, 1942, delimiting cryptanalytic activities, as to the authority by which this activity is carried on in the Office of Strategic Services. Second, information is desired as to why the text of the three messages referred to in the letter from the Office of Strategic Services dated December 29, 1942, addressed to Lieutenant Commander L. F. Jones, Coast Guard Headquarters, 13[illegible] and E Streets, [illegible], Washington, D. C., and signed by W. A. Bosborough, was not forwarded to the War Department in view of the fact that they fall within the designation of diplomatic traffic referred to in the Executive Instructions cited above.

3. Finally, information is desired as to whether or not you consider the provisions of AR 380-5 binding upon the Office of Strategic Services in so far as the security of classified matter is concerned.

Geo. V. Strong

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control.

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SECRET

By authority Joint Security Control
Date .....
Initials

January 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES: (THROUGH: SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

1. There have been called to my attention three intercepted photostatic sheets containing approximately 20 messages on either the Madrid-Washington circuit, the Caracas-Madrid circuit, the Bogota-Caracas circuit, or the Caracas-Rio de Janeiro circuit, which apparently are intercepts of coded messages which had been processed in your office. As far as can be determined, no adequate steps had been taken to provide for the security of these messages either in marking or in restricting circulation. It was my understanding that work of this character was not to be performed in the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Information is requested, in view of the provisions of the Executive instructions of July 6, 1942, delimiting cryptanalytic activities, as to the authority by which this activity is carried on in the Office of Strategic Services. Second, information is desired as to why the text of the three messages referred to in the letter from the Office of Strategic Services dated December 29, 1942, addressed to Lieutenant Commander L. F. Jones, Court Guard Headquarters, 13th and E Streets, N.W., Washington, D. C., and signed by W. A. Roseborough, was not forwarded to the War Department in view of the fact that they fall within the designation of diplomatic traffic referred to in the Executive instructions cited above.

3. Finally, information is desired as to whether or not you consider the provisions of AR 380-5 binding upon the Office of Strategic Services in so far as the security of classified matter is concerned.

CLIO. V. STROH,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control.

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FROM:

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. [illegible]

Date Rec'd [illegible]

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Roseborough	1242	1/2		[illegible]	
2. Dwins					
3. Hyde					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments [illegible]
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

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A 1143

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMANDANT U.S. COAST GUARD AND REFER TO CH-500

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SECRET

WASHINGTON 31 December, 1942

Mr. W. A. Roseborough,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Roseborough:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 29 December, 1942, forwarding texts of cryptographic messages transmitted to Berlin by the German Minister in Lisbon, together with the tape used for their transmission.

I am forwarding the messages and the tape to the Army Signal Corps for examination. Possibly you will hear further from the Signal Corps on the question of the desirability of obtaining additional messages of this type.

In the examination of cryptographic messages the Coast Guard is primarily interested in messages dispatched by enemy "agents" (as distinguished from regular Naval, Military or Diplomatic dispatches), particularly when such messages are transmitted from clandestine radio stations located in neutral or United States and Allied territory. I would be most grateful for any messages you may be able to furnish in this category.

Very truly yours,

L. T. JONES,
Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Coast Guard.

FOR DEFENSE
BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

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FROM:

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA DEC 29 1947

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. [illegible]				[illegible]	
2. Mrs. Guggo					[illegible]
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
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DEC 29 1943

Can you decipher there? If you find that you can get some of your experts there to break this code, I will be able to furnish you with every message the Germans send home

Joe

[illegible]

Germany [illegible]

Codes in [illegible]

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This ribbon is telegraphic record of German encoded messages enclosed herein.

Joe

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December 29, 1942

Lieut. Commander L. F. Jones
Coast Guard Headquarters
13th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Commander Jones:

Enclosed are the enciphered or encoded texts of three messages sent by the German Minister in Lisbon to Berlin. Also enclosed is the tape which was used in sending these messages.

These are the only examples of these types of cipher or code which we have at the present time, but if desired, arrangements could, we believe, be made whereby all the messages sent by the German Minister in Lisbon to Berlin could be obtained in their enciphered or encoded texts.

We shall be interested in learning what, if any, success you have in breaking these ciphers or codes.

Yours very truly,

W. A. Roseborough.

sures

42

by Courier - 12/29/42)

C.J.C.

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

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Communications
X Secretary [illegible]
X Pen-Tag [illegible]

INTEROFFICE MEMO

November 16, 1942

To: Major David Bruce
Lt. Col. E.C. Huntington

From: H.M. Brooker
Kenneth H. Baker
L.W. Lowman

Subject: Proposed Change for Communications School

After examining the situation from the standpoint both of the Training Program and the accomodations offered to the students, we strongly recommend that we be authorized to move the present Communications School (Area C) to a new location. We suggest that this location be made to resemble in its physical aspects our other schools which have thus far been operating very successfully; that is, [illegible] conducted in the future in a country house [illegible] and equipment for such an operation.

For this purpose we will need two houses, one which [illegible] about twenty men with outside accomodations for the station complement, and another which will accomodate from ten to fifteen men with additional complement accomodations. The former will rent for approximately $6,000 per year, and the latter for from $4,000 to $5,000 per year.

We have no specific houses in mind, although it would seem convenient from several standpoints to locate the Communications School roughly in the general vicinity of Area E. We understand that such houses would be available.

Will you kindly give us permission to proceed with plans for the activation of this change?

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1 st Ind.

Headquarters, S.I. and S.O., Que Building, Washington, D.C. November 19, 1942. TO: Director of Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

1. Recommendations set forth above are hereby forwarded with approval.

2. It is requested that authority be granted by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to the Training Directorate to proceed.

David K.E. Bruce.
Chief - S.I.

E.C. Huntington, jr.
Chief - S.O.

2 nd Ind.

Headquarters, O.S.S., Washington, D.C. November 20, 1942. TO: Training Directorate, Que Building, Attention Dr. Baker.

1. Requested authority hereby granted.

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Goodfellow DATE: Sept. 15, 1945

FROM: Major Lowman

SUBJECT: ENGLISH FACILITIES - COMMUNICATIONS

The English station would now be well under way if the Cairo-Beyrouth Expedition had not been given first preference.

As you know, we have been carrying forward an exchange of telegrams between Col. Gunther and the Communications Section with the aid of the British here (Mr. Souverie and Col. Sweet-Escott), endeavoring to obtain information and certain permissions by cable. These are now pretty well clarified.

In the meantime, Captain Huot has been working closely with us here and has become fully acquainted with our objective and our operations. He is already well acquainted with the London office and his contacts with the British are excellent. He plans to leave Saturday of this week, to be followed shortly by Mr. van Dissel, who will act as engineering adviser. Mr. van Dissel is chief engineer for the Dutch and, after some negotiation, they have agreed to lend him to us in order to get under way. He has only to be cleared by the State Department. We plan to use him in a temporary capacity until the allotment comes through and we are able to replace him with a permanent commissioned officer-engineer.

As soon as Captain Huot has worked out plans abroad, we are ready to ship the necessary equipment which has already been ordered. And again, if the allotment plan is approved, we will soon have the personnel to man it.

Incidentally, as to the Cairo-Beyrouth Expedition, despite our lack of allotment, we have already a chief engineer, an assistant engineer and station operators ready to go. They are now being trained and are only awaiting

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the official go-ahead. In the meantime, equipment is already tested, packed and ready for shipment by both plane and by boat.

I am attaching to this memorandum a suggested cable to be sent to Mr. Gunther and have prepared a similar cable to send to Mr. Shepardson, along with suggested letters to them for Captain Knot to take with him.

There are also two copies of the memorandum attached in case you want to send one to Colonel Donovan; the other I thought might go to Mr. Braswell for Major Bruce's information.

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(SUGGESTED LETTER TO COL. GUENTHER & MR. SHEPARDSON)

Dear Colonel Guenther:

You, of course, know Captain Louis Huot who will present this letter. He is in London as liason for the O.S.S. Communications Section, and is presenting a similar letter to Whitney Shepardson.

We have asked him to get things under way with you, with the objective of setting up O.S.S. communications in London, and is responsibility while abroad is directly to you and to Mr. Shepardson.

Following him shortly will be Mr. van Dissel, who has been loaned to us by the Dutch Government to act as consulting engineer. Immediately, on recommendations from Captain Huot and Mr. van Dissel, we will send equipment and organize the man-power for the station to operate for both SC and SI. As soon as possible after Mr. van Dissel has laid the engineering groundwork, a permanent engineer will be assigned in charge of the operation.

Captain Huot will acquaint you with the organization set-up at this end, and we will try to tie both ends together as quickly as possible so that operation can go forward smoothly and quickly.

Sincerely,

Lawrence W. Lowman,
Major, AUS

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COMMUNICATIONS --
OSS - London

GENERAL ORGANIZATION


Administration and Liason
Capt. Huot, Assistants
British Liason
Engineering staff
Procedure Check
Final preparation of agents going to radio assignments in Continental Europe -- special security instruction, "refresher" on field problems and general proceedure
Receiving Station -- Operating Rooms
Transmitting Station

PHYSICAL LAYOUT


Grosvenor Street Offices
SO
SI
40 or 50 miles
1.
2.
Operating Rooms (at Rec. Sta.)
3.
Transmitting Station
4.
5.
two or three miles
1. and 2. - Printer circuits to Operating Rooms. (Note: one printer installation would suffice if both SI and SO used same code room).
3. Underground cable for remote control of transmitters.
4. Receiving antennae array and feeders.
5. Transmitting antennae array and feeders.

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Colonel Goodfellow

Sept. 16, 1943

Major Lowman

ENGLISH FACILITIES - COMMUNICATIONS

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As you know, we have been carrying forward an exchange of telegrams between Mr. Gunther and the Communications Section with the aid of the British here (Mr. Bouverie and Col. Sweet-Escott), endeavoring to obtain information and certain permissions by cable. These are now pretty well clarified.

In the meantime, Captain Buot has been working closely with us here and has become fully acquainted with our objective and our operations. He is already well acquainted with the London office and his contacts with the British are excellent. He plans to leave Saturday of this week, to be followed shortly by Mr. van Diesel, who will act as engineering adviser. Mr. van Diesel is chief engineer for the Dutch and, after some negotiation, they have agreed to lend him to us in order to get under way. He has only to be cleared by the State Department. We plan to use him in a temporary capacity until the allotment comes through and we are able to replace him with a permanent commissioned officer-engineer.

As soon as Captain Buot has worked out plans abroad, we are ready to ship the necessary equipment which has already been ordered. And again, if the allotment plan is approved, we will soon have the personnel to man it.

Incidentally, as to the Cairo-Beyrouth Expedition, despite our lack of allotment, we have already a chief engineer, an assistant engineer and station operators ready to go. They are now being trained and are only awaiting

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FUNCTIONAL CHART SHOWING LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR O.S.S.
OF EXISTING FACILITIES





OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
TRAFFIC HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON D. C.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

OF COMMUNICATION FOR O.S.S. ONLY WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
FACILITIES



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COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

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

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EXHIBIT "A"

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH



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and Development Division, which would design and maintain a continuous study of the efficiency of equipment supplied to operators and agents; and a Field Operations Division, which would maintain constant supervision over all phases of field communications.

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II. Organization and Functions of Proposed Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services

In order to meet the requirements outlined above, it is proposed to establish a Communications Branch of the O.S.S. The proposed organization chart of the Communications Branch is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

Its functions will be:

1. To devise appropriate channels of communications for every project in the field and to set up satisfactory communications between the O.S.S. in Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

2. To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communications where necessary.

3. To devise and procure materiel and recruit and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and its field agents.

Under the Director of Communications would be a Training Division to instruct and prepare agents for work in the field; a Traffic Division, under the direction of an experienced traffic manager, which would route communications and develop and service codes and ciphers; and Engineering Division in charge of construction work; a small Research

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of a device known as the "varioplex." This will result, at no extra cost, in greatly increased speed and secrecy of operation. Each office will be able to immediately contact its corresponding office across the Atlantic, and signals going eastward will be divided over three existing cables in such a manner that the enemy cannot obtain the messages unless he taps three cables simultaneously, has an exact copy of the machinery required, and operates in synchronism with such machinery.

Two radio stations, one located at Belmore, Long Island, the other in Hollywood, California, were acquired by the O.S.S. many months ago as an essential part of its operations. These two stations represent the minimum requirements of O.S.S. for its secret operations, i.e., to ensure the flow of communications from O.S.S. agents in fields where there are no existing facilities, or where facilities are inadequate. However, arrangements have been made with the office of the Director of Naval Communications, and similar arrangements have been offered to the U.S. Army Signal Corps, to enable us to make available to those services certain facilities at these two stations for monitoring and other purposes.

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Chungking, and Kweilin. These sites will of course be changed and others added as the necessity arises. If Egypt were occupied by the enemy, for example, it might be necessary to have a base station in Karachi. If Gibraltar were taken, it might require the location of a base station in Brazzaville. The type of equipment utilized at a base station will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the radius of operations in the territory in question, the range of agents' equipment, atmospheric conditions, and location of the nearest available established facilities for relaying communications.

3. Existing communication facilities between base stations and O.S.S. operational and Washington headquarters should be improved, and adequate facilities established. Existing facilities will be used wherever possible. A message center of O.S.S. in Washington will be connected with message centers in the Army, Navy, State Department, and with the commercial telegraph companies, as well as a direct circuit into the New York terminals of commercial radio and cable companies.

A method for substantially improving the communications across the Atlantic, known to O.S.S., was brought by it to the attention of representatives of the Army Signal Corps, the Director of Naval Communications, and the State Department. These departments have agreed with us to permit the installation

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types of equipment used in certain territories will be different from that used in others. Operators will be specially instructed in regard to the use of equipment in certain localities. New devices must be developed and adapted to particular needs, and in some cases agents must be instructed in the use of various types of equipment utilized by the British S.O.E. The security of the agents and the system itself obviously requires the utmost secrecy in connection with the recruitment, training, and concealment of the identity of all field personnel.

2. Base stations must be erected in United Nations or friendly territory, at points where atmospheric conditions make it possible to establish receiving stations sufficiently sensitive to maintain contact with agents in the field and at the furthest limit of the effective range of the agents' own equipment. Such base stations must also have transmitting apparatus sufficiently powerful to relay messages either directly or to points where there are established communications facilities capable of relaying messages to O.S.S. operational headquarters and to O.S.S. headquarters in Washington. Established facilities will of course be used wherever possible, but in some localities there are no facilities, and in others they are inadequate. Base stations will be erected in such sites as the vicinity of London, Gibraltar, Lagos, Cairo, Beirut, Basra, Calcutta,

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I. Communications Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services

The basic requirement is a system which will achieve rapid and secret communications with O.S.S. agents in the field. To accomplish this, it is necessary

(1) That field agents with special training be equipped with portable sending and receiving sets and devices;

(2) That base stations, in some cases fixed and in other cases mobile, be established in "safe" areas within range of the equipment of the field agents operating in the particular territory, for the purpose of maintaining constant contact with the agents, transmitting instructions and receiving information; and

(3) That lines of communication, by wireless and cable, be maintained between such base stations and O.S.S. operational headquarters attached to the Theater Commander, and O.S.S. headquarters in Washington.

1. The training and equipping of field agents calls not only for highly specialized personnel, but also for close coordination with the over-all planning of operations. Since a great variety of conditions are encountered in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, the system must be highly flexible. The

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PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

I. Communications Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

II. Organization and Functions of Proposed Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

JCS-

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PLAN FOR THE [illegible]
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OFFICE OF [illegible]

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

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hope that we can get prompt action. The very fact that communications is not even mentioned in the directive, and yet is an absolute must as far as GI or GO operations is concerned, adds to this conclusion.

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and, in addition to these, a clear understanding for the use of the Bellmore and Hollywood plants.

In this connection, for example, the Navy have moved in to share both plants, and the impression now is that they are making most satisfactory use of them, and that they will require some additional facilities within the plants if they can possibly obtain them.

On the West Coast, the suggestion has been made that the Navy would like approval for erection of directional antenna to better cover the Solomon Islands. The question as to whether we make the expenditure for installation or ask them to do it will soon be an immediate problem.

The Signal Corps have held off moving in pending the final outcome of the Joint Chiefs' directive both for OSS and on the communications plan for OSS. At Dr. Rogers suggestion, I held off further discussions with General Stoner on this matter and on other questions as to our own participation pending the signing of the directive. I have already spoken of the almost complete demoralization of our own personnel and the loss of manpower since we have more or less ceased "general monitoring." General monitoring was, as you may recall, considered a duplication of effort on our part and was to be limited specifically to the monitoring of our facilities where Army and Navy facilities were not available. On the other hand, the October 23 report by the United States Joint Communications Board has in "E" of their suggested action for the Joint Chiefs that these stations be placed under military control and provide such services as may be necessary to OSS.

This statement is open to various interpretations and should be clarified by further study here and further negotiations with General Stoner of the Signal Corps if that is the approach decided upon.

In view of the conversation with Colonel Woolnough, and in view of the situation in general, I

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Commander Vanderbilt DATE: Dec. 29, 1942

FROM: Major Lowman

SUBJECT:

At your suggestion I talked with Colonel Woolnough. I gathered from him that the plan for communications was presently before the Joint Planners. I gathered further that tomorrow it would come up for consideration. I presume he meant the report dated October 23rd by the Joint United States Communications Board, with enclosure A signed by Brigadier General Wedemeyer, and enclosure B signed by Admiral E. J. King.

I followed your suggestion that further consideration of the communications for OSS by the Joint Planners might better be held up until we had a chance to discuss it with Colonel Donovan in the light of the new directive for OSS recently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Colonel Woolnough is fully in accord with your idea and said that he would suggest that as coming from us at the meeting of the Joint Planners tomorrow. He thought that as a result the matter would immediately be referred back to us for consideration in light of new developments. I asked him if I might call him again to discuss it after we talked about it with Colonel Donovan and after the Planning Board had considered any new suggestions. He said this would be satisfactory and further implied that if we wanted quick action it should be resubmitted to the Board, I gather through him, as soon as we are ready.

I am sure that the sooner we can obtain an approval for communications in connection with OSS operations the better our position will be from many angles. I have in mind such things as impending equipment, closer cooperation with the Signal Corps and Navy Communications, additional personnel,

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Mr. Murphy:

Commander Vanderbilt suggests that we should act quickly on this and further that you may wish to arrange for Major Lowman to discuss it with Colonel Donovan.

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

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INDEX COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH... PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION.

J I C J C S J S P

File #	Date	Title & subject matter.
Tab A		Early Drafts.
7873	8/11/42	OSS: Memo fm. Mason with proposed draft.
8019	3/13	COMMUNICATION SERVICE: Ltr. to JIC, JCS to withdraw paper submitted.
	10/16	Memo fm. Lowman re paper being in Communications Board.
8138	8/15	COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. Memo fm. Loering with summary of Communications plan.
	8/30	Comments on Loering plan by W.J.L.
8229	9/3	COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH "Plan for the Establishment of a Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services." As submitted to J.I.C. 1/3/43. J.C.S. 118.
9794	12/29	COMMUNICATIONS PLAN: Memo fm. Lowman re necessity of approval.
	3/25	Memo fm. Joint Staff Planners referring to: JCS 118, 118/1 JPS 35/1o & 52nd Meeting, Item 3.

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It is my belief that General Handy intended that we discontinue use of the Hagelin machine only in so far as it might be used for secret messages and not for London traffic entirely. This is indicated by the fact that our Message Center in London was ordered by the Army to discontinue the use of the Hagelin machine only for transmission of "high grade traffic" and was permitted to continue its use for other traffic.

In view of the above I recommend that the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee issue a directive providing that:

(1) The Hagelin machine be discontinued for all traffic classified by O.S.S. as secret but that its use be permitted for material classified other than secret.

(2) Temporarily and until installation of the new Army equipment in O.S.S. offices in Washington and London, O.S.S. use for such secret traffic either the machines in the Army Message Center in Washington and the Military Attache's Office in London, or a system of codes and ciphers prepared in cooperation with the Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army. Upon installation of the new Army Equipment O.S.S. will use such equipment for the handling of London traffic classified as secret.

(3) For all such secret traffic to and from points other than London O.S.S. shall confer with the Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army and arrive at code and cipher systems suitable to the operations of O.S.S. which shall be substituted as soon as reasonably possible for the code and cipher systems now being used by O.S.S., the actual code and cipher used in such systems to be known only to O.S.S.

(4) For all material classified other than secret O.S.S. shall be permitted to use such code and cipher systems as it deems appropriate, safe and suitable.

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Prior to receipt of your Memorandum, discussions had been held with the Signal Security Officer, Army Signal Corps (with whom O.S.S. works in most friendly cooperation) for the purpose of checking the safety of the above cipher systems. On October 3rd and October 4th military officers from the Communications Division of O.S.S. had conferences with General Stoner, Major Cook and Captain Holger of the Signal Corps, which were attended by Commander Jones of the Coast Guard, an authority on cipher systems who established the systems now used by O.S.S. and has been its adviser on such matters. At these conferences O.S.S. representatives reiterated a request made by letter last January from the Director of Strategic Services to the Secretary of War for two new Army cipher machines to be used in place of the Hagelin machine in the handling of London traffic, and were advised that O.S.S. could expect to have the new machines by October 15th.

After thorough explanation of our cipher systems at these conferences it was concluded by all concerned that the "A" system as used by O.S.S. was entirely safe; that the "B" system, while safe, might be improved by making certain changes which had recently been made in similar systems used by other Governmental departments; and that no change need be made in the "C" system. In line with these suggestions of the Signal Corps, O.S.S. then submitted to Major Cook the alphabets to be processed for use in the Improved "B" system. When the details of the revised system are shortly made available to O.S.S. by the Signal Corps we intend to put it into effect among O.S.S. representatives throughout the world as quickly as it is possible to do so consistently with safety. It will take time to do this in all O.S.S. field offices since the revised instructions and materials must be sent out by pouch or otherwise to field representatives. In some instances this may take well over a month.

General Handy's recommendation that the Hagelin machine be discontinued would, if taken literally, mean that it cannot be used for any London traffic, even though much traffic is not classified as secret. Such a course would completely disrupt this traffic, which at present constitutes approximately three-quarters of O.S.S.'s total volume of communications. Relegation of O.S.S. to the use of machines in the Military Attache's office in London and the Army Message Center here, would only result in inconvenience and delay for both the Army and ourselves, especially if the Army Message Center here is shortly moved to Arlington. Furthermore, it now appears that the new Army cipher machines will not be available to us until some time in November.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 31, 1942

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

TO: Joint Psychological Warfare Committee

SUBJECT: Reply to JPWC 0025, October 22, 1942

This has reference to your Memorandum of October 22, 1942 requesting my comments and recommendations with respect to proposed changes in the cipher systems used by the Office of Strategic Services.

In reply I first wish to call your attention to certain facts bearing on the security of our cipher systems which were probably not known by the Commanding General of the European Theatre of Operations when he recently conducted an investigation into the security of our code systems in London, or by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and General Handy when your Memorandum was prepared.

The Office of Strategic Services has used three cipher systems (described for convenience as "A", "B", and "C"):

(1) System "A"

The Hagelin machine used exclusively for traffic between here and London until receipt of your memorandum.

(2) System "B"

A system of codes and ciphers for field representatives possessing safe storage space.

(3) System "C"

A paper and pencil system for field agents.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Secret Code for Use of Office of Strategic Services.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of October 21, 1942, on the above subject. A copy of a reply from the Director of Strategic Services, dated November 1, 1942, is attached for your consideration.

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

IN

J. H. [illegible]
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

OPD WDGS

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2. It is further recommended that the Chief Signal Officer be instructed to have his Signal Security Service make a periodic check of message handling procedure as well as context and classification of messages originating in the Office of Strategic Services. Such studies would assure the continued security of the cipher systems thus approved for that service.

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

C. E. GRIFFIN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive, OPD

Incl - Memo fr Sec. JCS
to CPD, WDSC, 11-6-42
w/cy of memo attached.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 311.5 C&C (11-6-42)

November 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT, JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Secret Code for Use of Office of Strategic Services.

I. Discussion.

1. In a memorandum dated October 21, 1942, certain recommendations were made relative to changing the cipher systems used by the Office of Strategic Services. That Service replied under date of October 31, 1942, and a copy of the memorandum was forwarded to the Operations Division for consideration under date of November 6, 1942.

2. The question of security of the cipher systems used by the Office of Strategic Services has been carefully analyzed and the following recommendations, suggested by the Chief Signal Officer to which Operations Division concurs, are submitted.

II. Recommendations.

1. That the Director, Office of Strategic Services be instructed as follows:

a. That paragraphs 1 and 2, of the recommendations made by the Director, Office of Strategic Services in his memorandum of October 31, 1942, are approved.

b. That his third recommendation is approved with the following reservation:

"The cryptographic systems for use by the OSS will be produced under the supervision of the Chief Signal Officer with the incorporation from time to time of such changes as are necessary to insure the security of the cryptographic system concerned."

c. That his fourth recommendation is not approved:

"It is believed that the Chief Signal Officer should supervise the production of all cryptographic systems used. Only by doing this can reasonable security be obtained."

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
November 19, 1942

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Secret Code for Use of Office of Strategic Services

Enclosures: 2 copies Gen. Handy's memo., signed by Col. Bailey, Nov. 17th; Gen. Deane's memo. Nov. 6th; and copy of Col. Donovan's memo. to J.P.W.C. Oct. 31st.

The above enclosures are forwarded to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for the necessary action.

T. D. Hammond

T. D. HAMMOND, JR.
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.
The Asst. Secretary (Executive)

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date Nov. 20, 1942

From: Lt. Col. A.H. Onthank

To: Col. W.J. Donovan

1. You will notice that Gen. Deane has referred this to the J.P.W.C.

2. It occurs to me that your position and that of Gen. Handy may not now be far apart, and that the matter might be settled informally, without going thru committee procedure. Will you let me know if OSS can agree?

3. Please return all papers

AHO.

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ENCLOSURE

October 23, 1942.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Previous references: (a) J.C.S. 118.
(b) J.C.S. 118/1.
(c) J.P.S. 35/13/D.
(d) J.P.S. 39th Mtg., Item 2.

Report by the Joint U.S. Communications Board

1. The Joint U.S. Communications Board recommends that the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff take the following action with respect to references (a) and (b):

(a) Due to the shortages of critical materials, equipment and personnel in the communication field, definitely prohibit the establishment by O.S.S. of a world-wide communication system.

(b) Approve the establishment of a communication branch of O.S.S. as requested by reference (a) but specifically limit its cognizance to communications between their intermediate base stations and field agents. All external and over-seas communications for this service to be handled through normal channels available to the Theater Commanders; namely, Army, Navy and commercial facilities.

(c) Place all O.S.S. communications definitely under the Theater Commander.

(d) Direct that all codes and ciphers used by O.S.S. be prepared by the Army or Navy, those services to supervise the use of such cryptographic aids for the purposes of security.

(e) Place the operation of the monitoring stations at Bellmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, under military control and provide such service as may be necessary to the O.S.S. at these two stations.

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ENCLOSURE

October 23, 1942.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Previous references: (a) J.C.S. 118.
(b) J.C.S. 118/1.
(c) J.P.S. 33/13/D.
(d) J.P.S. 34th Mtg., Item 8.

Report by the Joint U.S. Communications Board

1. The Joint U.S. Communications Board recommends that the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff take the following action with respect to references (a) and (b):

(a) Due to the shortages of critical materials, equipment and personnel in the communication field, definitely prohibit the establishment by O.S.S. of a world-wide communication system.

(b) Approve the establishment of a communication branch of O.S.S. as requested by reference (a) but specifically limit its cognizance to communications between their intermediate base stations and field agents. All external and over-seas communications for this service to be handled through normal channels available to the Theater Commander; namely, Army, Navy and commercial facilities.

(c) Place all O.S.S. communications definitely under the Theater Commander.

(d) Direct that all codes and ciphers used by O.S.S. be prepared by the Army or Navy, those services to supervise the use of such cryptographic aids for the purposes of security.

(e) Place the operation of the monitoring stations at Bellmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, under military control and provide such service as may be necessary to the O.S.S. at these two stations.

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J.P.S. 35/16

OCTOBER 23, 1942

COPY NO. 24

JOINT U.S. STAFF PLANNERS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATION SERVICES

Previous references: (a) J.P.S. 35/13/D.
(b) J.P.S. 38th Mtg., Item 3.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, report and recommendations submitted by the Joint U.S. Communications Board in response to reference (b), is circulated for consideration by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners in connection with reference (a).

A.J. McFARLAND,

J.E. REID,

Joint Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE B

1. I do not approve the proposals made in J.C.S. 110. I consider that the communications services of the U.S.S., should be dealt with as an adjunct of, and under the jurisdiction of, the Joint Communication Board.

2. My objections are based on the following considerations:

(a) There is danger that the proposed "communication branch" will grow into a communication service;

(b) the lack of strategic material for the manufacture of radio equipment, and the lack of trained radio personnel - both operating and material - are so acute that under no circumstances should any government agency be permitted to establish a new communication service of its own. In order to meet existing defense needs in personnel and material, it may even be necessary to curtail some existing government department communication service;

(c) the basic paper contains no information as to the size of the proposed organization, the number of communication installations proposed, or the number of personnel expected to be required;

(d) approval of this paper by the J.C.S. might be construed as a direct or implied commitment in regard to the amount of material to be allocated or the number of personnel to be recruited.

/s/ E. J. KING

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2. Where is the personnel coming from and how much is desired?

Will this result in another "emergency request" for allotment of officers and enlisted men to the OSS? Two such requests are already pending in lower committees.

3. Will duplication of effort result from approval of this request?

Establishment of an OSS signal school would duplicate the work of the Signal Corps. It is not believed that special equipment of the British SOE should be utilized, for the same reasons that we do not desire to use the Sten gun, therefor special training is not necessary.

B. Technical objections of the Chief Signal Officer (General Stoner) to the proposed plan are:

1. The OSS request for specialized equipment to meet various conditions has not been found necessary by the Army, which is operating with a few standardized models under all conditions. Special equipment would introduce production problems.

2. Base stations must be operated as well as installed under control of Theater Commanders in order to avoid undue interference and insure signal security.

3. Monitoring stations at Bellmore and North Hollywood should be controlled by Army. The Navy concurs in this view.

4. Cryptographic material must be furnished to the OSS by the Chief Signal Officer and be operated according to his instructions in order to insure proper security.

III. Action recommended.

That the paper be referred to the Joint U. S. Staff Planners for revision prior to consideration by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

/s/ A. C. WEDEMEYER,
Brigadier General,
Chief, S & P Group.

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ENCLOSURE A

I. Background.

Originally an OSS plan, this paper has been revised by special committee and is presented for consideration of the JCS (after approval by JIC). This paper states:

A. To accomplish rapid communications with OSS field agents it is necessary:

(1) To give field agents special training with special devices.

(2) To establish base stations to contact field agents.

(3) To utilize existing facilities.

B. To meet above requirements it is recommended that a Communications Branch of OSS (Organization chart attached)* be established. Its functions will be to:

(1) Devise channels of communication.

(2) Arrange for supplementary channels where necessary.

(3) Devise and procure material and recruit and train personnel.

II. Discussion.

A. Following unanswered questions come up in a study of this paper:

1. Where is the necessary equipment coming from, and how much is desired?

At present a critical shortage exists in radio equipment. If plan is approved, priorities must be assigned and competition between the OSS and the armed services for radio equipment is inevitable.

* attached to J.C.S. 118.

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J.C.S. 118/1

October 4, 1942

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JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Memorandum by the Secretaries

J.C.S. 118, together with comments thereon expressed in

Enclosure A, memorandum from Operations Division, War Department General Staff and

Enclosure B, memorandum from Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

have been referred to the Joint U. S. Staff Planners for review and submission of recommendations to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

L. R. McDOWELL,

Joint Secretariat.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

FUNCTIONAL CHART SHOWING LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR O.S.S. ONLY WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH



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Under the Director of C.I.S. Communications would be a Training Division to instruct and prepare agents for work in the field; a Traffic Division, under the direction of an experienced traffic manager, which would route communications; an Engineering Division in charge of construction work; a small Research and Development Division, which would design and maintain a continuous study of the efficiency of equipment supplied to operators and agents; and a Field Operations Division, which would maintain constant supervision over all phases of field communications.

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The Office of Strategic Services will set up its radio stations at Bolimore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, for general intercept or monitoring purposes. These stations will be used by O.S.S. for monitoring its own radio stations only and for establishing emergency contact with its base stations when Army and Navy communications are not available for this purpose. The O.S.S. will retain the use of one-third of the monitoring positions at each station and will make the remainder available to the Army and Navy. After a trial period of three months, the question of control of the stations may be raised and determined. If, during the trial period, an emergency arises on either seaboard making imperative the exclusive use of all the facilities of either station by either the Army or the Navy, no objection thereto will be offered.

II. Organization and Functions of Proposed Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

In order to meet the requirements outlined above, it is proposed to establish a Communications Branch of the O.S.S. The proposed organization chart of the Communications Branch is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

Its functions will be:

(1) To devise appropriate channels of communication for every project in the field and to provide for satisfactory communications between the O.S.S. in Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

(2) To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communication where necessary.

(3) To devise and procure materiel and recruit and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and its field agents.

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the identity of all field personnel. Army and Navy radio laboratories will be used to the fullest extent possible in the research and development of new items of O.S.S. equipment.

2. Base stations must be erected in United Nations or friendly territory, at points where atmospheric conditions make it possible to establish receiving stations sufficiently sensitive to maintain contact with agents in the field and at the furthest limit of the effective range of the agents' own equipment. Where Army and Navy communications facilities are not available, base stations of O.S.S. must have transmitting equipment of sufficient power to relay messages either directly or to points where there are established military communications capable of relaying traffic to O.S.S. operational headquarters or to O.S.S. headquarters in Washington. Established facilities will of course be used wherever possible, but in some localities there are no facilities, and in others they are inadequate. Base stations will not be installed in any theater without the specific approval of the theater commander in each case. The type of equipment utilized at a base station will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the radius of operations in the territory in question, the range of agents' equipment, atmospheric conditions, and location of the nearest available established facilities for relaying communications.

3. Existing communication facilities between base stations and O.S.S. operational and Washington headquarters should be improved, and adequate facilities established. Existing facilities will be used wherever possible. A message center of O.S.S. in Washington will be connected with message centers of such other agencies as can be agreed upon between the departments concerned, and with the commercial telegraph companies, as well as a direct circuit into the New York terminals of commercial radio and cable companies.

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I. Communications Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

The basic requirement is a system which will achieve rapid and secret communications with O.S.S. agents in the field. To accomplish this, it is necessary

(1) That field agents with special training be equipped with portable sending and receiving sets and devices;

(2) That base stations, in some cases fixed and in other cases mobile, be established in "safe" areas within range of the equipment of the field agents operating in the particular territory, for the purpose of maintaining constant contact with the agents, transmitting instructions and receiving information; operations of all base stations to be under the control of Theater Commanders;

(3) Existing Army and Navy Communications facilities will be used for handling O.S.S. traffic between Base Stations and O.S.S. headquarters in Washington, D. C. Commercial facilities will be used when Army and Navy facilities are not available.

1. The training and equipping of field agents calls not only for highly specialized personnel, but also for close coordination with the over-all planning of operations. Since a great variety of conditions are encountered in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, the system must be highly flexible. The types of equipment used in certain territories will be different from that used in others. Operators will be specially instructed in regard to the use of equipment in certain localities. New devices must be developed and adapted to particular needs, and in some cases agents must be instructed in the use of various types of equipment utilized by the British S.O.E. The security of the agents and the system itself obviously requires the utmost secrecy in connection with the recruitment, training, and concealment of

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J. C. S. 118

SEPTEMBER 30, 1942

COPY NO. [illegible]

JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed plan, originally submitted by the Office of Strategic Services, was referred to a special committee composed of the Directors of the Army and Navy Communications Services, the Office of Strategic Services Technical Adviser on Communications, and a representative of the Special Services Branch, M.I.S. It has now been approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee which presents it for consideration of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,
L. R. McDOWELL,
Joint Secretariat.

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DRAFT

J.C.S. 118 - OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

The Joint Intelligence Committee recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the establishment of a Communications Branch in the Office of Strategic Services, its functions to be as follows:

(1) To devise appropriate channels of communication for every project in the field and to provide for satisfactory communications between the O.S.S. in Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

(2) To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communications, where necessary.

(3) To devise and procure material and recruit and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and its field agents.

The basic requirement is a system of rapid and secret communication with O.S.S. agents in the field. Specially trained agents will communicate by portable devices with base stations operating under the control of the Theater Commander. Existing Army and Navy communications will be used to handle traffic between base stations and the O.S.S. in Washington, supplemented by commercial facilities when Army and Navy facilities are not available. Army and Navy laboratories will be used to the fullest extent possible in research and development of new items of equipment. The O.S.S. radio stations at Bellmore and North Hollywood will be used by the O.S.S. to monitor its own communications only, and will be shared with the Army and Navy, subject to future agreement as to control.

10-1-42
TWH:hjf

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2. Copies of the following papers are attached hereto for your information:

J.C.S. 118.

J.C.S. 118/1.

J.P.S. 35/16.

A.J. McFARLAND,
Secretary,
Joint Staff Planners.

Copy to:
General Deane, USA.
Captain Royal, USN.
Sec., J.I.C.
Sec., J.C.S.

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December 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR - Office of Strategic Services.

Subject: Office of Strategic Services Communications Services.

References: (a) J.C.S. 118.
(b) J.C.S. 118/1.
(c) J.P.S. 35/16.
(d) J.C.S. 155/4/D.
(e) J.P.S. 52nd Meeting, Item 3.

1. Your attention is invited to the following extract of Item 3, Minutes of the Joint Staff Planners, 52nd Meeting, held on December 30, 1942:

* * * * * *

"3. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES. (J.P.S. 35/13/D; J.P.S. 35/16; and J.P.S. 35/19)

"COLONEL HADDOCKS pointed out that in J.C.S. 118, the Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee recommended approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a plan for the establishment of a communications branch in the O.S.S.; that J.C.S. 118/1 listed certain comments on the plan made by the Operations Division of the War Department and by the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet; that both papers were referred to the Joint Staff Planners for review and by them referred to the Joint Communications Board for report and recommendation, and that J.P.S. 35/16 and J.P.S. 35/19 contained respectively the report of the Joint Communications Board and its approval by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee. He thought, in view of the revised functions of the O.S.S. recently published in J.C.S. 155/4/D, that the plan should be revised to bring it into line with the provisions of that directive.

"After discussion,

"THE COMMITTEE:-

"(a) Agreed to refer J.C.S. 118, J.C.S. 118/1 and J.P.S. 35/16 to the Office of Strategic Services and request them:

"(1) To make such corrections and revisions in the plan for a communications branch as may be necessary in view of the recommendations of the Joint Communications Board contained in J.P.S. 35/16 and the provisions of J.C.S. 155/4/D.

"(2) To include in the basic paper information as to the size of the proposed communications organization, both as to number and type of communications installations proposed and as to the personnel estimated to be required.

"(b) To return the revised plan to the Joint Staff Planners for consideration."

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D. To devise and procure material and materials and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and the field agents.

2. Communications between base stations and agents in the field will be under the control of the Theater Commander.

3. Existing Army and Navy communications will be used to handle traffic between base stations and OSS, Washington, supplemented by commercial facilities when Army and Navy facilities are not available.

4. The Army and Navy are directed, and the State Department, the Federal Communications Commission and other Government agencies concerned, are requested:

A. To afford OSS the fullest cooperation, including the use of their facilities for communications between base stations and OSS, Washington.

B. To afford OSS such information as to their current monitoring activities, and such reports of monitored transmissions, as OSS may reasonably request, in order to avoid duplicated effort and to enable OSS to reduce to a minimum the scope of its own monitoring activities.

C. To undertake for OSS such cryptanalytical service as OSS may reasonably require.

5. OSS will share its monitoring stations at Bellmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, with the Army and Navy, subject to future agreement as to [illegible]

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DRAFT

March 11, 1945

ANNEX "A"

JCS DIRECTIVE ON COMMUNICATIONS

1. The following functions of the Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services are hereby authorized:

A. Subject to Paragraph 2 below, to devise appropriate channels of communication for every project in the field and to provide for satisfactory communications between OSS, Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

B. To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communications where necessary.

C. To conduct the following monitoring activities:

(1) The monitoring of its own communications;

(2) Specialized monitoring of all types of communications, including voice transmissions, wherever originating, which affect the authorized functions of OSS, or knowledge of which is useful or necessary to OSS in the performance thereof, and which are not available to OSS from other monitoring services.

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quantities of the equipment needed for base station and field work, it is anticipated that OSS can procure this without interfering with any procurement plans of either the Army or the Navy. Agent sets being of a highly specialized type are not suitable for ordinary use by either the Army or the Navy and can be made up by small suppliers who are not set up to manufacture equipment on the scale required by the other services.

No equipment is necessary for communications from base stations to Washington since Army, Navy, or commercial facilities will be used.

E. Personnel.

The present overall allotment for the Communications Branch contemplates a total personnel of 294 men. This figure includes a small administrative staff in Washington, administrative staffs at the base stations, and a limited number of agent operators in the field.

This figure will not be adequate to service ...rations on any substantial scale. It does not ..., for example, the 16 officers and 90 men ... by the Theater Commander for the OSS ...ions operation in North Africa. Further ...ll have to be made for comparable ...n other theaters.

...ted that the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff ...roposed directive, Annex "A".

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6 - Director
Office of Strategic Services

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control can, it is believed, be left to agreements between these agencies, and paragraph 6 of the proposed directive, Annex "A", so provides.

5. With reference to Item 5 (a) (2) of JPS 82nd Meeting, the following information is submitted:

A. Equipment.

At present, base stations are contemplated for England, Algiers, and Cairo, and possibly North Australia, Ceylon, India, and China. A base station will require transmitters with output of 1/2 kilowatts (500 watts) or less. These transmitters vary in size and are semi-portable. A proportionate number of standard portable receivers (presently estimated at 5 receivers for 1 transmitter) will also be needed.

Sub-base stations, such as are presently contemplated in North Africa at Oran, Casablanca, and Constantine, will be equipped with portable transmitters and receivers.

The agent in the field will be equipped with a light portable 7 to 50 watt transmitter and receiver (similar to the British suitcase agent set) which will operate from either battery or power line.

The amount of equipment will, of course, depend upon the number of base and sub-base stations to be maintained, the latter in turn depending upon the number of agents to be placed in the field. Due to the small

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between base stations and agents in the field with supplementary channels of communication when necessary, and the limited equipment needed for this purpose would not, therefore, be an undue drain on critical materials. In paragraph 3, A of this memorandum, additional information is submitted in support of this conclusion.

(2) As recommended in subparagraph 1 (c) of JPS 35/16, the provisions of paragraph 7 (d) of JCS 155/4/D necessarily require that OSS communications in any theater of command be placed under the theater commander. This is specifically provided in paragraph 2 of the proposed directive, Annex "A".

(3) With reference to subparagraph 1 (d) of JPS 35/16, the Army Signal Corps at present maintains supervision of the use by OSS of its codes, ciphers, and cryptographic aids and has rendered OSS invaluable aid in this connection. It is believed highly desirable that this relationship should continue.

(4) With reference to subparagraph 1 (e) of JPS 35/16, the monitoring stations at Belmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California are now shared by OSS with the Navy. This arrangement has worked out successfully. Future questions of

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monitoring purposes".

(2) In light of JCS 155/4/D, approved December 23, 1942, and OSS General Order No. 9, approved by the Joint Deputy U. S. Chiefs of Staff, January 15, 1943, the organizational charts attached to JCS 118 are now, of course, inaccurate in a number of respects. It is believed that the position of the Communications Branch is sufficiently described in OSS General Order No. 9 and indicated in the organizational chart attached thereto. Accordingly, no revised chart and description are presented at this time.

B. The following comments are made with respect to the recommendations of the Joint U. S. Communications Board made in JPS 35/16:

(1) With reference to subparagraph 1 (a) and (b) of JPS 35/16, it is not believed that the proposed directive, Annex "A", would in any way authorize the establishment by OSS of a "world-wide communications system", nor is such a system sought by OSS. As recommended in subparagraph 1 (b) of the reference, external and overseas communications are to be handled through normal channels available to the theater commander; namely, Army, Navy, and commercial facilities. OSS proposes to provide direct communications only

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The annexed proposed directive provides in paragraph 1, C that in addition to monitoring its own communications, OSS may also conduct

> "specialized monitoring of all types of communications, including voice transmissions, wherever originating, which affect the authorized functions of O.S.S., or knowledge of which is useful or necessary to O.S.S. in the performance thereof, and which are not available to O.S.S. from other monitoring services."

It is essential to the operations of this Office that it should be able to monitor certain types of code and voice transmissions which are not covered by other monitoring services.

It is believed that such specialized monitoring is a necessary part of the duty with which OSS is charged in paragraph 3 (c) of JCS 155/4/D, i.e., to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information required for the execution of psychological warfare. OSS does not seek to duplicate the monitoring conducted by any other service of the Government whose reports are available to OSS, but its experience has indicated that certain types of transmissions of importance to the proper conduct of psychological warfare, are not monitored by other services. It does not appear that authority to conduct such monitoring within the limitations stated would be contrary to the recommendation of the Joint Intelligence Committee that OSS should not use its stations for "general intercept or

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MEMORANDUM FOR -- Joint Staff Planners

SUBJECT: OSS Communications Services

REFERENCES: (a) JCS 118
(b) JCS 118/1
(c) JPS 35/16
(d) JCS 155/4/D
(e) JPS 52nd Meeting, Item 3
(f) Memorandum from Secretary, JSF to OSS, Dated December 31, 1942

1. There is attached, as Annex "A", for the approval of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff a proposed directive to the Office of Strategic Services with reference to its communications services.

2. In response to the request of the Joint Staff Planners (JPS 52nd Meeting, Item 3), the following information is submitted:

A. With the exceptions hereinafter noted, it is believed that the attached proposed directive, Annex "A", is in accordance with the recommendations made by the Joint Intelligence Committee in JCS 118.

(1) Paragraph I, 3 of JCS 118 provides in part as follows:

> "The Office of Strategic Services will not use its radio stations at Bellmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, for general intercept or monitoring purposes. These stations will be used by O.S.S. for monitoring its own radio stations only and for establishing emergency contact with its base stations when Army and Navy communications are not available for this purpose."

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Date March 16, 1944

To: Colonel Donovan

Subject: Communications Branch - Proposed JCS Directive and Supporting Memorandum

Attached is the proposed directive from JCS to [illegible] on the functions of the Communications Branch, together with a supporting memorandum. These were approved by Commander Vandervoort and Colonel Lowman.

Colonel Lowman feels strongly that there should if possible be an opportunity for us to make oral explanations of various points raised in these papers before the Joint Staff Planners or other body which considers them.

W C L

W. C. L.

Attachments - 2

Office of the Secretariat

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT U. S. STAFF PLANNERS
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR - Director of Strategic Services.

Subject: Office of Strategic Services Communications Services.

References: (a) J.C.S. 118.
(b) J.C.S. 118/1.
(c) J.P.S. 36/16.
(d) J.P.S. 82nd Meeting, Item 3.

1. In their 82nd meeting held December 30, 1942 the Joint Staff Planners agreed to refer references (a), (b) and (c) to the Office of Strategic Services with a request for such corrections and revisions in the plan for an O.S.S. communications branch as might be necessary in view of the recommendations of the Joint Communications Board contained in reference (c) and the provisions of J.C.S. 155/4/D.

2. Pursuant to this decision copies of the references referred to, together with a memorandum from the Secretary, were forwarded to the Office of Strategic Services on December 31, 1942. Since then the subject has been retained on the agenda of the Joint Staff Planners and also the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Joint Staff Planners have directed me to request information as to whether the Office of Strategic Services expect to be able to return the subject papers for the consideration of the Planners at any time within the near future.

A.J. McFARLAND,
Secretary,
Joint Staff Planners.

Copy to:
Rear Admiral C.M. Cooke, Jr., USN.
Brig. Gen. A.C. Wedemeyer, USA.

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April 12, 1943

Colonel A.J. McFarland,
Secretary, Joint Staff Planners,
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

My dear Colonel McFarland:

I must apologize for my delay in replying to your memorandum of March 25th.

We have been giving careful consideration to this whole problem and I must ask your indulgence a little longer because of circumstances beyond our control.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

FUNCTIONAL CHART SHOWING LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR O.S.S. ONLY WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH



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(1) To devise appropriate channels of communication for every project in the field and to set up satisfactory communications between the O.S.S. in Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

(2) To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communication where necessary.

(3) To devise and procure material and recruit and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and its field agents.

Under the Director of Communications would be a Training Division to instruct and prepare agents for work in the field; a Traffic Division, under the direction of an experienced traffic manager, which would route communications and develop and service codes and ciphers; an Engineering Division in charge of construction work; a small Research and Development Division, which would design and maintain a continuous study of the efficiency of equipment supplied to operators and agents; and a Field Operations Division, which would maintain constant supervision over all phases of field communications.

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A method for substantially improving the communications across the Atlantic, known to O.S.S., was brought to the attention of representatives of the Army Signal Corps, the Director of Naval Communications, and the State Department. These departments have agreed with us to permit the installation of a device known as the "varioplex." This will result, at no extra cost, in greatly increased speed and secrecy of operation. Each office will be able to immediately contact its corresponding office across the Atlantic, and signals going eastward will be divided over three existing cables in such a manner that the enemy cannot obtain the messages unless he taps three cables simultaneously, has an exact copy of the machinery required, and operates in synchronism with such machinery.

Two radio stations, one located at Bellmore, Long Island, the other in Hollywood, California, were acquired by the O.S.S. many months ago as an essential part of its operations. These two stations represent the minimum requirements of O.S.S. for its secret operations; i.e., to ensure the flow of communications from O.S.S. agents in fields where there are no existing facilities, or where facilities are inadequate. However, arrangements have been made with the office of the Director of Naval Communications, and similar arrangements have been offered to the U. S. Army Signal Corps, to enable us to make available to those services certain facilities at these two stations for monitoring and other purposes.

II. Organization and Functions of Proposed Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

In order to meet the requirements outlined above, it is proposed to establish a Communications Branch of the O.S.S. The proposed organization chart of the Communications Branch is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."

Its functions will be:

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friendly territory, at points where atmospheric factors make it possible to establish radiating stations sufficiently effective to maintain contact with agents in the field and at the furthest limit of the effective range of the agents' equipment. Such base stations must also have transmitting apparatus sufficiently powerful to relay messages either directly or to points where there are established communications facilities capable of relaying messages to O.S.S. operational headquarters and to O.S.S. headquarters in Washington. Established facilities will of course be used wherever possible, but in some localities there are no facilities, and in others they are inadequate. Base stations will be erected in such sites as the vicinity of London, Gibraltar, Lagos, Cairo, Beirut, Basra, Calcutta, Chungking, and Kweilin. These sites will of course be changed and others added as the necessity arises. If Egypt were occupied by the enemy, for example, it might be necessary to have a base station in Karachi. If Gibraltar were taken, it might require the location of a base station in Brazzaville. The type of equipment utilized at a base station will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the radius of operations in the territory in question, the range of agents' equipment, atmospheric conditions, and location of the nearest available established facilities for relaying communications.

3. Existing communication facilities between base stations and O.S.S. operational and Washington headquarters should be improved, and adequate facilities established. Existing facilities will be used wherever possible. A message center of O.S.S. in Washington will be connected with message centers in the Army, Navy, State Department, and with the commercial telegraph companies, as well as a direct circuit into the New York terminals of commercial radio and cable companies.

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The basic requirement is a system which will assure rapid and secret communication with O.S.S. agents in the field. To accomplish this, it is necessary

(1) That field agents with special training be equipped with portable sending and receiving sets and devices;

(2) That base stations, in some cases fixed and in other cases mobile, be established in "safe" areas within range of the equipment of the field agents operating in the particular territory, for the purpose of maintaining constant contact with the agents, transmitting instructions and receiving information; and

(3) That lines of communication, by wireless and cable, be maintained between such base stations and O.S.S. operational headquarters attached to the Theater Commander, and O.S.S. headquarters in Washington.

1. The training and equipping of field agents calls not only for highly specialized personnel, but also for close coordination with the over-all planning of operations. Since a great variety of conditions are encountered in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, the system must be highly flexible. The types of equipment used in certain territories will be different from that used in others. Operators will be specially instructed in regard to the use of equipment in certain localities. New devices must be developed and adapted to particular needs, and in some cases agents must be instructed in the use of various types of equipment utilized by the British S.O.E. The security of the agents and the system itself obviously requires the utmost secrecy in connection with the recruitment, training, and concealment of the identity of all field personnel.

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J.I.C. 37/2

September 4, 1942

COPY NO. 4

JOINT U. S. INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

Note by the Secretary

The attached paper presents a plan submitted by the Office of Strategic Services in substitution for that referred to in J.I.C. 37/1/D.

L. L. MONTAGUE,

Secretary.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

PROPOSED CABLE SHOWING LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR O.S.S. ONLY WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES



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for every project in the field and [illegible] communications between the O.S.S. in Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

(2) To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communications where necessary.

(3) To devise and procure materiel and recruit and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and its field agents.

Under the Director of O.S.S. Communications would be a Training Division to instruct and prepare agents for work in the field; a Traffic Division, under the direction of an experienced traffic manager, which would route communications and ~~develop and service codes and ciphers~~; an Engineering Division in charge of construction work; a small Research and Development Division, which would design and maintain a continuous study of the efficiency of equipment supplied to operators and agents; and a Field Operations Division, which would maintain constant supervision over all phases of field communications.

24 & 21 of August. Security of OSS Code. Ordered that [illegible] Code discontinued & new one provided. Army Signal Corp to draft a new code - A Reserve Code will a 3d Code in further reserve.

Have OSS defined upon Army & Navy.

Does not prevent codes for use of [illegible] own agents

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commercial radio and cable companies.

A method for substantially improving the communications across the Atlantic, known to O.S.S., was brought by us to the attention of representatives of the Army Signal Corps, the Director of Naval Communications, and the State Department. These departments have agreed with us to permit the installation of a device known as the "varioplex." This will result, at no extra cost, in greatly increased speed and secrecy of operation. Each office will be able to immediately contact its corresponding office across the Atlantic, and signals going eastward will be divided over three existing cables in such a manner that the enemy cannot obtain the messages unless he taps three cables simultaneously, has an exact copy of the machinery required, and operates in synchronism with such machinery.

Thiet

The Office of Strategic Services will not use its radio stations at Bellmore, Long Island and North Hollywood, California, for general intercept or monitoring purposes. These stations will be used by O.S.S. for monitoring its own radio stations only and for establishing emergency contact with its base stations when Army and Navy Communications are not available for this purpose. The O.S.S. will make available five monitoring positions at each of these radio stations for use by the Navy and five monitoring positions at each of these radio stations for use by the Army.

Go over to next week. All else report approved.

II. Organization and Functions of Proposed Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

In order to meet the requirements outlined above, it is proposed to establish a Communications Branch of the O.S.S. The proposed organization chart of the Communications Branch is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

Its functions will be:

3 months - trial - review at the end.
If in mentions a real emergency [illegible] - such as [illegible] the Army or Navy can take over for the period of [illegible]

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tories will be used to the fullest extent possible in the research and development of new items of O.S.S. equipment.

2. Base stations must be erected in United Nations or friendly territory, at points where atmospheric conditions make it possible to establish receiving stations sufficiently sensitive to maintain contact with agents in the field and at the furthest limit of the effective range of the agents' own equipment. Where Army and Navy communications facilities are not available, base stations of O.S.S. must have transmitting equipment of sufficient power to relay messages either directly or to points where there are established military communications capable of relaying traffic to O.S.S. operational headquarters or to O.S.S. headquarters in Washington. Established facilities will of course be used wherever possible, but in some localities there are no facilities, and in others they are inadequate. ~~Base stations will be erected in such sites as the vicinity of London, Gibraltar, Lagos, Cairo, Beirut, Basra, Calcutta, Chungking, and Kweilin. These sites will of course be changed and others added as the necessity arises. If Egypt were occupied by the enemy, for example, it might be necessary to have a base station in Karachi. If Gibraltar were taken, it might require the location of a base station in Brazzaville.~~ The type of equipment utilized at a base station will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the radius of operations in the territory in question, the range of agents' equipment, atmospheric conditions, and location of the nearest available established facilities for relaying communications.

Base stations will not be installed in any theatre without the specific approval of Theatre Commander in each instance.

other installations now being put in.

3. Existing communication facilities between base stations and O.S.S. operational and Washington headquarters should be improved, and adequate facilities established. Existing facilities will be used wherever possible. A message center of O.S.S. in Washington will be connected with message centers of other departments & agencies as may be agreed upon in the Army, General Message Center and the Changed

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I. Communications Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

The basic requirement is a system which will achieve rapid and secret communications with O.S.S. agents in the field. To accomplish this, it is necessary

(1) That field agents with special training be equipped with portable sending and receiving sets and devices;

(2) That base stations, in some cases fixed and in other cases mobile, be established in "safe" areas within range of the equipment of the field agents operating in the particular territory, for the purpose of maintaining constant contact with the agents, transmitting instructions and receiving information; operations of all base stations to be under the control of Theater Commanders;

(3) Existing Army and Navy Communications facilities will be used for handling O.S.S. traffic between Base Stations and O.S.S. headquarters in Washington, D. C. Commercial facilities will be used when Army and Navy facilities are not available.

1. The training and equipping of field agents calls not only for highly specialized personnel, but also for close coordination with the over-all planning of operations. Since a great variety of conditions are encountered in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, the system must be highly flexible. The types of equipment used in certain territories will be different from that used in others. Operators will be specially instructed in regard to the use of equipment in certain localities. New devices must be developed and adapted to particular needs, and in some cases agents must be instructed in the use of various types of equipment utilized by the British S.O.E. The security of the agents and the system itself obviously requires the utmost secrecy in connection with the recruitment, training, and concealment of

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J.I.C. 37/2

COPY NO. 4

September 10, 1942

JOINT U. S. INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

Note by the Secretary

At the request of the Committee, a special committee composed of

Brigadier General F. E. Stoner, Director, Army Communications
Captain J. R. Redman, Director, Naval Communications
Colonel C. W. Clarke, Special Services Branch, M.I.D.
Mr. Charles W. Horne, Technical Adviser, O.S.S.

studied the plan presented in J.I.C. 37/2 and recommended certain amendments.

The attached paper is a revision of the text of J.I.C. 37/2 incorporating the amendments recommended by the special committee.

L. L. MONTAGUE.
Secretary.

See JIC Folder
for new draft.

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ENCLOSURE

October 23, 1942.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Previous references: (a) J.C.S. 118.
(b) J.C.S. 118/1.
(c) J.P.S. 35/13/D.
(d) J.P.S. 39th Mtg., Item 2.

Report by the Joint U.S. Communications Board

1. The Joint U.S. Communications Board recommends that the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff take the following action with respect to references (a) and (b):

(a) Due to the shortages of critical materials, equipment and personnel in the communication field, definitely prohibit the establishment by O.S.S. of a world-wide communication system.

(b) Approve the establishment of a communication branch of O.S.S. as requested by reference (a) but specifically limit its cognizance to communications between their intermediate base stations and field agents. All external and over-seas communications for this service to be handled through normal channels available to the Theater Commander; namely, Army, Navy and commercial facilities.

(c) Place all O.S.S. communications definitely under the Theater Commander.

(d) Direct that all codes and ciphers used by O.S.S. be prepared by the Army or Navy, those services to supervise the use of such cryptographic aids for the purposes of security.

(e) Place the operation of the monitoring stations at Bellmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, under military control and provide such service as may be necessary to the O.S.S. at those two stations.

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J.P.S. 35/16

COPY NO. _____

OCTOBER 23, 1942

JOINT U.S. STAFF PLANNERS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATION SERVICES

Previous references: (a) J.P.S. 35/13/D.
(b) J.P.S. 38th Mtg., Item 2.

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, report and recommendations submitted by the Joint U.S. Communications Board in response to reference (b), is circulated for consideration by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners in connection with reference (a).

A.J. McFARLAND,
J.E. REID,
Joint Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE B

1. I do not approve the proposals made in J.C.S. 1169. I consider that the communications services of the U.S.S. should be dealt with as an adjunct of, and under the jurisdiction of, the Joint Communication Board.

2. My objections are based on the following considerations:

(a) There is danger that the proposed "communication branch" will grow into a communication service;

(b) the lack of strategic material for the manufacture of radio equipment, and the lack of trained radio personnel - both operating and material - are so acute that under no circumstances should any government agency be permitted to establish a new communication service of its own. In order to meet existing defence needs in personnel and material, it may even be necessary to curtail some existing government department communication service;

(c) the basic paper contains no information as to the size of the proposed organization, the number of communication installations proposed, or the number of personnel expected to be required;

(d) approval of this paper by the J.C.S. might be construed as a direct or implied commitment in regard to the amount of material to be allocated or the number of personnel to be recruited.

/s/ E. J. KING

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much is desired?

Will this result in another "emergency request" for allotment of officers and enlisted men to the OSS? Two such requests are already pending in lower committees.

3. Will duplication of effort result from approval of this request?

Establishment of an OSS signal school would duplicate the work of the Signal Corps. It is not believed that special equipment of the British SOE should be utilized, for the same reasons that we do not desire to use the Sten gun: therefore, special training is not necessary.

B. Technical objections of the Chief Signal Officer (General Stoner) to the proposed plan are:

1. The OSS request for specialized equipment to meet various conditions has not been found necessary by the Army, which is operating with a few standardized models under all conditions. Special equipment would introduce production problems.

2. Base stations must be operated as well as installed under control of Theater Commanders in order to avoid undue interference and insure signal security.

3. Monitoring stations at Bellmore and North Hollywood should be controlled by Army. The Navy concurs in this view.

4. Cryptographic material must be furnished to the OSS by the Chief Signal Officer and be operated according to his instructions in order to insure proper security.

III. Action recommended.

That the paper be referred to the Joint U. S. Staff Planners for revision prior to consideration by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

/s/ A. C. WEDEMEYER,
Brigadier General,
Chief, S & P Group.

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ENCLOSURE A

I. Background.

Originally an OSS plan, this paper has been revised by special committee and is presented for consideration of the JCS (after approval by JIC). This paper states:

A. To accomplish rapid communications with OSS field agents it is necessary:

(1) To give field agents special training with special devices.

(2) To establish base stations to contact field agents.

(3) To utilize existing facilities.

B. To meet above requirements it is recommended that a Communications Branch of OSS (organization chart attached)* be established. Its functions will be to:

(1) Devise channels of communication.

(2) Arrange for supplementary channels where necessary.

(3) Devise and procure material and recruit and train personnel.

II. Discussion.

A. Following unanswered questions come up in a study of this paper:

1. Where is the necessary equipment coming from, and how much is desired?

At present a critical shortage exists in radio equipment. If plan is approved, priorities must be assigned and competition between the OSS and the armed services for radio equipment is inevitable.

* attached to J.C.S. 118.

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J.C.S. 118/1

October 4, 1942

COPY NO. _____

JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Memorandum by the Secretaries

J.C.S. 118, together with comments thereon expressed in

Enclosure A, memorandum from Operations Division, War Department General Staff and

Enclosure B, memorandum from Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

have been referred to the Joint U. S. Staff Planners for review and submission of recommendations to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

J. F. DEANE,
L. F. McCOWELL,
Joint Secretariat.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

FUNCTIONAL CHART SHOWING LINES OF COMMUNICATION FOR O.S.S. ONLY WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF EXISTING FACILITIES



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH



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Under the Director of O.S.S. Communications would be a Training Division to instruct and prepare agents for work in the field; a Traffic Division, under the direction of an experienced traffic manager, which would route communications; an Engineering Division in charge of construction work; a small Research and Development Division, which would design and maintain a continuous study of the efficiency of equipment supplied to operators and agents; and a Field Operations Division, which would maintain constant supervision over all phases of field communications.

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The Office of Strategic Services will not use its radio stations at Bellmore, Long Island, and North Hollywood, California, for general intercept or monitoring purposes. These stations will be used by O.S.S. for monitoring its own radio stations only and for establishing emergency contact with its base stations when Army and Navy communications are not available for this purpose. The O.S.S. will retain the use of one-third of the monitoring positions at each station and will make the remainder available to the Army and Navy. After a trial period of three months, the question of control of the stations may be raised and determined. If, during the trial period, an emergency arises on either seaboard making imperative the exclusive use of all the facilities of either station by either the Army or the Navy, no objection thereto will be offered.

II. Organization and Functions of Proposed Communications Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

In order to meet the requirements outlined above, it is proposed to establish a Communications Branch of the O.S.S. The proposed organization chart of the Communications Branch is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

Its functions will be:

(1) To devise appropriate channels of communication for every project in the field and to provide for satisfactory communications between the O.S.S. in Washington, each of its intermediate bases, and its agents in the field.

(2) To arrange for the establishment by an engineering staff of supplementary channels of communications where necessary.

(3) To devise and procure materiel and recruit and train personnel as may be necessary for the equipment of the Communications Branch and its field agents.

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the identity of all field personnel. Army and Navy radio laboratories will be used to the fullest extent possible in the research and development of new items of O.S.S. equipment.

2. Base stations must be erected in United Nations or friendly territory, at points where atmospheric conditions make it possible to establish receiving stations sufficiently sensitive to maintain contact with agents in the field and at the furthest limit of the effective range of the agents' own equipment. Where Army and Navy communications facilities are not available, base stations of O.S.S. must have transmitting equipment of sufficient power to relay messages either directly or to points where there are established military communications capable of relaying traffic to O.S.S. operational headquarters or to O.S.S. headquarters in Washington. Established facilities will of course be used wherever possible, but in some localities there are no facilities, and in others they are inadequate. Base stations will not be installed in any theater without the specific approval of the theater commander in such case. The type of equipment utilized at a base station will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the radius of operations in the territory in question, the range of agents' equipment, atmospheric conditions, and location of the nearest available established facilities for relaying communications.

3. Existing communication facilities between base stations and O.S.S. operational and Washington headquarters should be improved, and adequate facilities established. Existing facilities will be used wherever possible. A message center of O.S.S. in Washington will be connected with message centers of such other agencies as can be agreed upon between the departments concerned, and with the commercial telegraph companies, as well as a direct circuit into the New York terminals of commercial radio and cable companies.

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I. Communications Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

The basic requirement is a system which will achieve rapid and secret communications with O.S.S. agents in the field. To accomplish this, it is necessary

(1) That field agents with special training be equipped with portable sending and receiving sets and devices;

(2) That base stations, in some cases fixed and in other cases mobile, be established in "safe" areas within range of the equipment of the field agents operating in the particular territory, for the purpose of maintaining constant contact with the agents, transmitting instructions and receiving information; operations of all base stations to be under the control of Theater Commanders;

(3) Existing Army and Navy Communications facilities will be used for handling O.S.S. traffic between base stations and O.S.S. headquarters in Washington, D. C. Commercial facilities will be used when Army and Navy facilities are not available.

1. The training and equipping of field agents calls not only for highly specialized personnel, but also for close coordination with the over-all planning of operations. Since a great variety of conditions are encountered in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, the system must be highly flexible. The types of equipment used in certain territories will be different from that used in others. Operators will be specially instructed in regard to the use of equipment in certain localities. New devices must be developed and adapted to particular needs, and in some cases agents must be instructed in the use of various types of equipment utilized by the British S.O.E. The security of the agents and the system itself obviously requires the utmost secrecy in connection with the recruitment, training, and concealment of

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J. C. S. 113

SEPTEMBER 30, 1942

COPY NO.

JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed plan, originally submitted by the Office of Strategic Services, was referred to a special committee composed of the Directors of the Army and Navy Communications Services, the Office of Strategic Services Technical Advisor on Communications, and a representative of the Special Services Branch, M.I.S. It has now been approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee which presents it for consideration of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

J. P. GRANT,

L. S. HOWELL,

Joint Secretaries.

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J.P.W.C. 48

COPY NO. 1

October 29, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COMMUNICATION SERVICES

Note by the Secretary

1. The Enclosures, J.C.S. 118, J.C.S. 118/1 and J.P.S. 35/16 were referred to this Committee by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners with request for study and recommendations.

A. U. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

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